The Bolivarian Revolution
The diversity of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' "Bolivarian Revolution" often made it appear divided. For example, differences emerged between the movement's civilians and soldiers, its democrats and dictators, and its ideologues and crooks. Nonetheless, these disputes were isolated; they have not divided Chavez' movement. Because all Chavista officials ultimately depended on Chavez for influence, machinations among pro-Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela groups had little impact on the stability of the administration. Government officials even had an interest in "staging" differences within the ruling party to try to establish that the branches of government are independent.
The "Bolivarian Revolution" of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez suffered from divisions and dissent, yet remained firmly in control. In addition to the festering morale issues in the Venezuelan Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministr, splinters within the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have appeared throughout the country. Public disputes among pro-Chavez leaders and frequent Chavista-led protests against the government have led to speculation about the causes and extent of the divisions, in particular those between civilian and military officials.
The ruling Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR Fifth Republic Movement) party was not the source of Chavez' power. Rather, the party depended on the President for influence and resources. The MVR had no weight other than what Chavez lent it, and its leaders had no independent support. Some said that without Chavez, the MVR would disintegrate. Because party members lacked their own power bases, the importance of intra-MVR disputes could be overplayed. MVR differences were settled when Chavez intervened. Chavez wielded almost unquestioned authority over other pro-Chavez political parties, as well, despite their trying to maintain a separate identity from the MVR.
Battle lines did not extend across Chavismo on any particular issue. As such, issue-specific interpretations of disputes within the government tend to be oversimplifications. The MVR was a chaotic party organized around personalities, business deals, institutions, and old alliances. The MVR lacked solid organizational structures and was racked with personal divisions. Although these competing sources of authority and personality conflicts rarely come to light, they all contribute to intra-party friction. Internal clashes were naked disputes over power. Given the separate and diffuse power centers, individual disputes are not necessarily representative of broad trends. None of the differences permeate the movement.
CIVILIAN vs. MILITARY. Some observers made much of civilian-military tensions. One example was Carabobo Governor Luis Felipe Acosta Carles, who irritated the local MVR by packing his staff with soldiers and bringing in some competent opposition party officials to keep the state running. There was much speculation as well over the civil and military factions in the National Assembly, led by National Assembly president [and later Vice President and chosen successwor] Nicolas Maduro and former president Francisco Ameliach, respectively. Such strains exist; the pet holdovers and fellow coup-plotters from Chavez' military days probably did arouse some resentment. Nevertheless, Chavez opponents exaggerated the splits to try to condemn Chavez for the "militarization" of Venezuelan society. The civilian-military divide is not the defining axis of division.
IDEOLOGY vs. VENALITY. Reporters attempt to discern divisions by hyping differences in Chavista officials' character traits. Chavismo contains, for example, officials who appear extremely ideological, such as firebrand deputy Iris Varela, former human rights lawyer Governor Tarek William Saab, and mob leader "comandante" Lina Ron. It also includes less reactionary officials who appear to be devoting considerable energies into getting rich, such as Miranda Governor Diosdado Cabello and Interior Minister Jesse Chacon. All of these politicians have had public disputes with other pro-Chavez officials, but no evidence exists that corrupt officials are aligning against the "true believers" or vice versa. On the other hand, it appears that as Chavez prioritized the fight against corruption, Chavistas attempted to undermine their personal enemies in the revolution by accusing them of graft.
DEMOCRATS vs. "TALIBANES." Experiments with internal democracy have caused some disenchantment in the party. Media headlines have suggested a war between "democratic" Chavistas and hard-line "Talibanes" who impose electoral candidates from above. Yet, none of the splits exposed by elections have cut across the entire movement, either. For instance, MVR primaries held in April 2005 to determine candidates for the August parochial elections touched off disputes over candidacies, but all appeared to be isolated instances. In perhaps the most notorious example, Chavez silenced a public row between Caracas metropolitan mayor Juan Barreto and the city's Libertador municipality mayor Freddy Bernal over candidacies. The nature of the insults swapped suggested the two may have harbored personal grudges before the elections. In other isolated examples, the MVR expelled Trujillo State Governor Gilmer Viloria and two Portuguesa State mayors from the party for promoting unsanctioned candidates for the December 2005 National Assembly elections.
DIVISIONS AMONG CHAVISTA PARTIES. Divisions between the MVR and other pro-Chavez political parties were perhaps the only ones that Chavistas themselves had an interest in hyping. Following Chavez' sweep of the National Assembly elections in December 2005, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela representatives publicly rattled off a laundry list of pro-Chavez parties with seats to try to show that the legislature remained an independent branch of government. These parties' public and private statements, however, indicate their firm loyalty to Chavez. Pro-Chavez parties Podemos and Patria Para Todos (PPT) announced in early May 2006 that they backed Chavez' threat to hold a referendum asking voters to allow him to remain in office until 2031. Although Podemos and PPT announced they would form a legislative "opinion bloc," they assured reporters they did not seek to compete with the MVR.
The resolution of a few highly public rifts between Chavista parties displayed the cohesion of the Chavez movement. The PPT and Podemos parties' annoyance over the MVR's failure to consult with them over National Assembly leadership positions appeared to end quickly. A dispute between the PPT and the MVR over candidates for the Amazonas State gubernatorial elections in August 2005 appeared to fizzle once the parties conducted a poll and settled on the incumbent PPT candidate. Implicated in human rights abuses in his states, PPT Governor of Guarico State Eduardo Manuitt emerged from a National Assembly interior politics committee inquiry with no more punishment than a declaration of "political responsibility." Nicolas Maduro, then National Assembly president, effectively silenced MVR critics of Manuitt when he demanded an inquiry into whether their "political enmity" motivated the committee's report.
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