Uganda - Election 1996
The one principle that has been energetically enforced throughout the interim period - and continuing under the 1995 Constitution - is the restriction on political party activity. Broad-based governance has declined in importance. The Ten Point Programme is no longer generally regarded as the central doctrine specifying the policies adopted by the government. Although the original plan for the local Resistance Council (RC) after the war was to make them the cornerstone of Ugandan democracy in a Movement system, President Museveni now publicly argues that only after Uganda industrializes will it have the class conflict that, he believes, is the necessary basis for multiparty democracy. Resistance Councils, now renamed Local Councils (LCs), are therefore no longer considered to be essential elements of Ugandan democracy. Furthermore, while Article 70 of the 1995 Constitution requires that the movement political system conform to the principle of "participatory democracy," no further definition or explanation is offered. Given the diminished role of the Local Councils within the Movement system, the degree to which the National Resistance Movement can employ them to conform to this principle is in question.
The essential connection between RCs and Parliament has been definitively cut now that all members of Parliament representing territorial constituencies are elected on a universal franchise, rather than through electoral colleges which are drawn from the RC system. The NRM secretariat now has a far lower profile than the government. It has been widely considered a dead-end since the early years of the interim period. This status did not change even when President Museveni's righthand man, then First Deputy Prime Minister Eriya Kategaya was made its director. Instead, high officials who lost their positions in the Cabinet are often given positions in the Secretariat. Finally, the NRA has been renamed the Uganda Peoples' Defense Force (UPDF), and some years ago dropped its commitment to equality adopted during its guerilla war phase in favor of a conventional hierarchy of ranks for officers.
In general, then, the leaders of the NRM have reduced their emphasis on Movement institutions and moved toward conventional state administrative structures. This shift resembles the immediate postindependence pattern adopted by nationalist movements almost everywhere in Africa in which top officials focused their energies on official administrative structures at the expense of formerly supreme party mobilizing organs. Nevertheless, in present day Uganda, all the mobilizing structures associated with the Movement still function, receive some financial support and probably could be revived, if the NRM leadership cared to do so.
In Article 69, the 1995 Constitution gave Ugandans the right to choose their political system through an election or a referendum. Article 74 adds that two-thirds of the members of Parliament, upon petition of two-thirds the membership of each of half the district councils can also change Uganda's political system. Nevertheless, for the first five year period under the new Constitution, the choice of political system was made by the Constituent Assembly. The issue of establishing a multiparty as opposed to a movement political system was intensely debated. Since the Movement had the -support of about two thirds of the delegates, the outcome was never in doubt, but there was sufficient support for an eventual multiparty system, even among some prominent "Historical" Movement members, that a compromise was adopted as Article 271. This article states that Uganda's first presidential, parliamentary and local government elections under the new constitution must be held under the Movement political system. However, in the last month of the fourth year of the Parliament's five year term (presumably in June 2000) there will be a referendum jn which Ugandans may choose to continue with the Movement system, adopt a multiparty system or adopt some third democratic representative political system. In preparation for this referendum, any "person" may campaign for one of these systems after Parliament has met for three years (presumably from July 1999). Thus, individuals have the right to campaign for a multiparty system, but they must do so under the Movement system, and thus without the assistance of political parties. The right to form political parties and other political organizations is guaranteed by Articles 29 and 72. However, Article 71 makes clear that parties are subject to a series of constitutional restrictions. A party must have a "national" character, and may not be based on sex, ethnicity, religion or region. It must be internally democratic, run by Ugandans, account for its sources and uses of its funds, and not compel membership of any individual. In addition, Article 73 gives Parliament the power to further restrict parties when a movement political system has been adopted.
Until Parliament acts, Article 269 carries forward the existing restrictions on parties. Parties may not open nor operate branch offices, hold delegates' conferences, hold public rallies, sponsor or campaign for or against candidates for public elections, or engage in activities that may interfere with the Movement political system. Finally, Article 75 deprives Parliament of any power to create a one-party state. These restrictions, particularly the catchall provision forbidding activities that may interfere with the Movement political system, make it virtually impossible for parties to influence the electorate during the campaign leading up to a referendum on the political system. Nevertheless, the NRM (since it is not a party) is not under a similar constitutional restriction in presenting its position on such a referendum.
Uganda is divided into 39 administrative districts, nineteen of which comprise the six largest ethnic groups. The districts are divided into 214 territorial constituencies, which themselves are composed of subcounties and parishes. Members of Parliament represent one of the territorial constituencies; one woman is elected per district; and special interest groups have a national constituency of which a smaller group elects representatives.
On 07 May 1996, President Museveni made a speech including remarks on the security situation in the country. During the speech, he indicated that the UPDF would be called out to protect citizens on election day. As Commander-in-Chief of the UPDF, the announcement might have been interpreted as a routine sharing of information. However, civic leaders expressed concerns about the announcement, as it undermined the authority of the IEC and could intimidate voters who had not made the distinction between Museveni the president, the candidate or the chief executive of the armed forces.
The voting procedure used in the 1996 elections was based on the system employed for the 1994 Constituent Assembly elections. Polling stations were outside, usually located near a school for a rapid relocation in case ofrain. To assure transparency of the process, the polling station tables were placed ten to fifteen meters away from each other. Individual polling stations were outlined with twine. After casting the ballot, the voter had his or her right thumb marked with ink.
The campaign for parliamentary seats, approximately 35 days for the constituency seats and 28 days for the women's seats, began officially on May 22. The bulk of the activities were conducted through candidates meetings, scheduled by consensus through the returning officer in each district. Each candidate was given time to make a presentation in a panel with other candidates, and a question-and-answer session followed the final presentation.
The voter turnout was lower for the parliamentary than for the presidential elections. Voters felt that having cast ballots for the president, their duty was done. In areas where the IPFC boycott was in force, voters stayed away rather than to cast a ballot.between NRM-supported candidates.
Given the existing political atmosphere of the general elections, with Yoweri Museveni in a clear position to win, his victory with 72% of the votes cast (the presidential election garnered a 73% voter turnout) represented a higher margin than expected by the observers, and was an accurate one in relation to the opinions expressed by voters to international observers. Mohammed Mayanja, the dark horse candidate, received 4.9% of the votes cast, a figure that reflected his limited resources, his new arrival to the political contest in Uganda, and therefore his ability to pose a viable challenge to either Museveni or Ssemogerere. Contrary to expectations, IPFC and current Democratic Party (DP) leader Paul Ssemogerere scored a very low percentage of around 20% and lost every single constituency in the kingdom of Buganda, including his own constituency of Busiro South, in Mpigi. Ssemogerere, himself a Muganda, was expected by most commentators to do quite well in Buganda, and to stand at least a slim chance of winning the region. In addition, Masaka District was widely perceived as a stronghold for Ssemogerere by virtue of its predominantly Catholic population, Ssemogerere's Democratic Party having traditionally been Catholic-based.
One of the central reasons offered for Ssemogerere's regionalc defeat was his alliance with UPC in forming the Inter-Political Forces Cooperation. This is hardly surprising, since it opened an easy line of attack for the Museveni side, which was able to raise the specter of UPC's and Milton Obote's eventual return to power. Ssemogerere seems to have hugely underestimated the depth of fear and hatred for Obote and his party among the majority of Baganda. Virtually everyone interviewed who had voted for Museveni emphasized that they had voted in part to avoid any chance of a return to the violence and anarchy of the early 1980s. The effect of Ssemogerere's alliance with UPC, however, does not seem to have been immediate. Most people felt that the shift in sentiment against Ssemogerere had taken place in the last two months or so prior to the election. The Museveni campaign strategy of increasingly emphasizing the UPC and Obote connection towards the end of the campaign period was felt to have been effective. In Masaka, the New Vision advertisement during the final week of the campaign, displaying a putative 'Ssemogerere cabinet' which included Obote, was spontaneously photocopied and disseminated in the rural areas. Equally important was Ssemogerere's perceived failure to explain or justifY his alliance with UPC to the Baganda electorate, and the general perception that his campaign was being managed by the UPC leadership, while DP members were being sidelined.
Ssemogerere reportedly confined his campaigning in these districts to historically Catholic and DP areas, where he thought he was assured of support, whereas Museveni took his campaign to precisely those areas where his prospects were poorest, in order to swing the opposition vote.
Politics in Buganda, as in much of the rest of Uganda, has historically been characterized by antagonisms based on ethnicity and religion. Museveni and the NRM have insistently proclaimed their comrnitmenHo eradicating this type of politics. Museveni' s victory here demonstrates that the political significance of ethnic and religious cleavages has in fact been diminished in Buganda to an extent not hitherto appreciated by most observers.
The most frequent charge by opposition IPFC campaigners, both at the district and local levels, is that there was a systematic inflation of voters registers by means of introducing fictional names and registering Museveni supporters several times under a number of similar names. The Masaka IPFC leadership cited the total of 8,492,154 registered voters, which is close to half the national population and therefore implausible, given that roughly half the population is below the age of 18 and therefore ineligible, and that a registration rate of nearly 100% of the adult population is unrealistic in a country like Uganda.
The general tone was one of satisfaction with the process and, even among Ssemogerere supporters, acceptance of the outcome. Probably the single most important cause of this was the generally transparent voting procedures. Although IPFC campaigners in both Masaka and Mpigi complained that they were harassed and that voters were intimidated by local LC officials and Museveni campaign agents, and a few government officials also claimed voter intimidation by Ssemogerere campaigners, it is worth emphasizing that not a single one ofthe (non-campaigning) voters reported having experienced any such intimidation or knowing of any.
While there were undoubtedly a few overly zealous campaigners on both sides who overstepped the boundaries of civil persuasion in their interactions with voters, there was no pervasive violence or intimidation reported in either of these districts. On the other hand, memories of the violence associated with earlier Ugandan national elections are still strong in many people's minds, and a fear of possible persecution does seem to have dissuaded several of the Ssemogerere-aligned voters from expressing their opinions publicly and from campaigning openly for their preferred candidate. A good deal ofthe unexpectedly low voter turnout should be attributed to fears oflater retribution, and a number of known Ssemogerere supporters in his area (Kyaddondo East, in Mpigi) appear to have stayed home rather than risk accusations of having "voted the wrong way."
The long-term shift away from the politics of religion and ethnicity is an important background determinant in the outcome of the presidential election. The poor campaign performance of Paul Ssemogerere, as contrasted with the much more skillful one of Yoweri Museveni, was certainly another central element. The high percentage of women who voted for Museveni, as a result of the encouragement that he has given to women's increased political and economic participation, probably played a significant role as well, although this is extremely hard to verilY or quantilY. Two other determinants are less palatable: the structural advantages conferred on the incumbent by the electoral laws and by an electoral machinery beholden to the incumbent government, and a certain level, probably quite variable, of illegal manipulation of the electoral process.
Inequalities and irregularities left the opposition extremely embittered and disillusioned with the current political system. This was not merely the position of a handful of IPFC leaders who may rightly be accused of having already decided to cry foul long before the election was over; it was also the deeply felt mood oflocal opposition leaders, down to the village level. It is a mood partially shared by ordinary voters who supported Ssemogerere, at least with regard to the structural factors. This local mood is probably a more important detenninant of the decision of most opposition politicians in Buganda not to stand for Parliament than the IPFC's vague boycott announcement. Despite the widespread perception that Museveni's victory was legitimate, such a mood did not bode well for the future of government / opposition relations in Uganda.
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