Uganda - Military Personnel
During the early 1990s, the strength of the national army began to be reduced from 90,000 to 50,000. In August 2001, the Uganda People's Defence Forces was estimated to number 50,000 to 60,000 men including paramilitary forces (a border defence unit of about 600 men, a police air wing of about 800 men, about 400 marines and local defence unit totalling about 15,000 men).
By 1990 Western reports of military strength estimated 70,000 men and women. Budgetary problems apparently had prevented Museveni from achieving his promise of increasing the NRA's size to 100,000. No information was available on military organization; Western sources cited only six brigades, several battalions, and a Police Air Wing.
By 2020, law, arts and science majors were among those wanting to enlist as Uganda's defense force undertakes its latest recruitment drive. Tough training aside, the army is seen as a reliable employer when jobs are scarce. In many cases, the candidates are too old, have the wrong training, the wrong expectations, or simply need to read up on the recruitment process. In Uganda, the young applicants need to at least be high school graduates and if they wish to advance quickly, they need a university degree. Nevertheless, the demand for a steady government job is high amongst Uganda's overwhelmingly young population. With the high demand for an army job, the requirements have also risen.
Before independence professional standards for military training were high. During World War I and World War II, the protectorate fielded an impressive force, and Ugandan soldiers earned international admiration. Then during the 1960s, training standards declined amid the nation's political and economic crises, and military service attracted fewer educated recruits.
There is no military conscription in Uganda. The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) is under full civilian control. The recruitment criteria is a minimum age of 18, recommended by the local council structure, medically fit and educationally literate. However, in practice some recruiters have allowed 17 year olds to enlist. LDUs may recruit children under the age of 18 with parental consent. There have been several reports from concerned parents of forced recruitment. This may be due to the massive levels of recruitment since the start of the conflict with the DRC and also high levels of unemployment making the army a relatively attractive option for out of work youngsters. 9 There is no provision for conscientious objection. In 1991, under the National Resistance Army (NRA) Code of Conduct, applications from professional serving soldiers for discharge were made under an individual basis. Apparently, leaving the armed forces for professional serving soldiers may prove difficult.
Both before and after independence, Uganda relied on voluntary recruitment to the military, although the government forced some people to enlist during the 1970s. Minimum age for recruits was seventeen, and the maximum age, twenty-five. Military service required the equivalent of a seventh-grade education, although this requirement, too, was suspended at times during the 1970s and 1980s.
The army changed composition under Amin's rule. By 1977 it had grown to 21,000 personnel, almost twice the 1971 level. Amin killed many of its more experienced officers and imprisoned others for plotting to weaken or overthrow his regime. A few fled the country rather than face the mounting danger. Amin also increased the number of military recruits from other countries, especially Sudan, Zaire, and Rwanda. By 1979 foreigners accounted for nearly 75 percent of the army, exacerbating problems of communication, training, and discipline. The government barely controlled some army units. A few became quasi-independent occupation garrisons, headed by violence-prone warlords who lived off the land by brutalizing the local population.
Scorched earth policies, and the wholesale killings of civilians, were consistent features of regular army activities in areas such as West Nile and Buganda, not noted for their support of the government. Morale was far from high. Obote, like Amin in 1979, did not command the sort of loyalty that encourages his troops to die for him - which perhaps explains the UNLA preference for attacking civilians rather than engaging the 'bandits ' as the government liked to term the guerrillas, (it is reported that some troops had to be driven into battle at gunpoint.)
At the beginning of the interim government after Amin in 1979, the military numbered fewer than 1,000 troops who had fought alongside the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) to expel Amin. The army was back to the size of the original King's African Rifles (KAR) at independence in 1962. But in 1979, in an attempt to consolidate support for the future, such leaders as Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and Major General (later Chief of Staff) David Oyite Ojok began to enroll thousands of recruits into what were rapidly becoming their private armies. Museveni's 80 original soldiers grew to 8,000; Ojok's original 600 became 24,000. In fact, the army was still very disorganized - there was no proper documentation of the strength and disposition of its units. In June 1983, there were believed to be 18 battalions - theoretically making a total of some 20,000 men - but such was the level of unofficial, independent recruitment by commanders and other otticers, that the national total could be nearer 40,000. (William Pike in August 1984, suggests 16,000 or more regulars, and 23,000 militia.)
Training and discipline were woefully inadequate, with officers disclaiming responsibility for the actions of their own men; neither had the efforts of instructors from Tanzania, North Korea, the Commonwealth, or Britain so far noticeably improved the situation. A British company, Falconstar, whose ex-SAS personnel were employed between 1982 and 1984 to train the paramilitary Special Force was no more successful.
After 4 years in power, the government still made no systematic provision for army food, pay, clothing or housing, or any real attempts to return troops to barracks, or bring commanders into line. Some observers were beginning to question the received wisdom that the army was beyond the government's control, and are asking whether it is not actually in the UPC leadership's interest to perpetuate this interpretation.
A December 1985 agreement signed by General Okello, NRA leader Museveni and President Moi [the "Nairobi agreement}, a 17-member military council would govern the country. It would be comprised of seven members of the UNLA, seven members of the NRA, and representatives of the other smaller factions which had joined Okello. Museveni would have served as Vice Chairman under General Okello. A reconstituted national army was to comprise:
from UNLA 3,700 soldiers (44%) from NRA 3,600 soldiers (42%) from other factions 1,200 soldiers (14%) TOTAL 8,500 soldiers (100%
Six months after General Okello’s coup, and just one month after the execution of the Nairobi power-sharing agreement, the NRA unilaterally abrogated the treaty and proceeded with the military capture of Kampala. Government forces were overrun and expelled from the capital.
Disruptive activity by rebel groups in northern and western Uganda, in conjunction with Uganda's military involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the middle of the 1998 resulted in higher levels of military expenditure during the 1990s. Military officials unofficially put the UPDF strength in 2013 at about 55,000 officers and men. It was not clear if that included the over 6,700 routinely moving in and out of Somalia and the estimated 2000 involved in CAR and the DRC. Usually, some of the men deployed on such mission are called up from the so-called Reserve Force. This force alone is said to comprise over 10,000 battle-hardened soldiers.
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