Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) - Special Military Operation
As of February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation concentrated about 700 combat aircraft and helicopters near the borders, most of which were soon successfully destroyed. Despite the large flight fleet, Russia inherited part of this equipment from the USSR, and the resources of Soviet aircraft are practically exhausted. The Russian Federation had abot 300 old Su-24 bombers manufactured in 1967–1993. For more than a decade, the Russian Federation had tried to replace them with modern Su-34s (the Russian version of the American F-15E Strike Eagle), but as of 2021, fewer than 130 such aircraft had entered service.
Ukrainians learned so quickly that the enemy did not fly into the territory controlled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine for more than two months. The Russian Federation also had 296 old Su-24 bombers manufactured in 1967–1993. For more than 10 years, the Russian Federation has tried to replace them with modern Su-34s (the Russian version of the American F-15E Strike Eagle), but as of 2021, only 127 such aircraft have entered service.
Military intelligence officers of the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain believe that the Russian Federation is highly unlikely to be able to achieve air superiority in a war with Ukraine. It is likely that for years the Russian Air Force has been working for show for higher officials without developing the skills and potential of pilots.
The UK Ministry of Defence reported 20 June 2022 that Russian ground and tactical air operations had remained focussed on the central Donbas sector.In the conflict to date, Russia’s air force nderperformed. Its failure to consistently deliver air power was likely one of the most important factors behind Russia’s very limited campaign success. It cannot gain full air superiority and has operated in a risk-averse style, rarely penetrating deep behind Ukrainian lines. Some of the underlying causes of its difficulties echo those of Russian Ground Forces.
For years, much of Russia’s air combat training had highly likely been heavily scripted and designed to impress senior officials, rather than to develop dynamic initiative among air crews. While Russia had an impressive roster of relatively modern and capable combat jets, the air force also almost certainly failed to develop the institutional culture and skill-sets required for its personnel to meet Russia’s aspiration of delivering a more Western-style modern air campaign. This led to a greater than planned weight of effort falling to ground troops, who were becoming exhausted; and on advanced cruise missiles, stocks of which were possibly running low.
According to Oryx, a total of at least 500 Russian aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) had been destroyed, damaged and captured as of 20 September 2023, of which over 300 were Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The actual total number of destroyed and damaged aircraft is likely significantly higher than recorded. The total does not include loitering munitions as drones used as unmanned bait.
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