Unmanned Systems Troops (Voysk Bespilotnykh Sistem VBS)
On November 12, 2025, Colonel Sergey Ishtuganov, deputy head of the Unmanned Systems Troops, announced that the VBS had been formally established with full organizational structure, appointed leadership, and military administration units created at all levels throughout Russia. Ishtuganov confirmed that regular regiments, battalions, and other units had been formed and were conducting combat operations according to a unified plan in coordination with other branches of the armed forces. The expansion of existing units and creation of new formations was continuing, with operators, engineers, technicians, and other support specialists being assigned to these units. The integration of the VBS into combined arms operations appeared designed to overcome what Russian military analysts had criticized as ad hoc implementation, transforming unmanned systems from improvised solutions into systematically planned components of military art.
The formation of the new branch of the armed forces was announced in December 2024, and the unmanned systems force was established within the Ukrainian Armed Forces in February 2024. In December 2024, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced that the new branch of the armed forces was being proposed "in accordance with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's instructions." He noted that the creation would be completed in the third quarter of 2025. In June 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for "ensuring the fastest and highest-quality deployment and development " of the unmanned systems being developed. "We know how the enemy operates. But overall, I don't think we're behind the curve in any way," Putin said.
According to Ishtuganov, military command and control bodies have been established throughout the country. The combat operations of unmanned systems units are conducted according to a unified plan and coordinated with other units of the troop groups. This allows for the effective integration of unmanned systems into the overall battlefield command and control system. In addition, a higher military educational institution for this branch of the armed forces will be established in Russia.
"Work continues to expand the combat strength of existing units and create new ones within the Unmanned Systems Troops. Regarding personnel selection, a rigorous selection process is underway for assignments to the Unmanned Systems Troops. The best service members, including those based on their combat achievements, are assigned to the Unmanned Systems Troops. Specialist training is conducted at the Ministry of Defense's universities, military training centers affiliated with civilian universities, public organizations, and enterprises that manufacture unmanned systems. Work is underway to establish a higher military educational institution for the Unmanned Systems Troops," Ishtuganov said.
The Russian Ministry of Defense's Advanced Unmanned Technologies Test Center systematically and irreversibly disrupted the logistics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Kursk contingent, laying the groundwork for its defeat. This contribution was no less significant than the infamous Operation Stream ( troops' passage to Sudzha via a gas pipeline). The center destroyed tens of thousands of targets, including weapons and equipment, pickup trucks and SUVs, communications equipment, electronic warfare systems, radar stations, and military infrastructure. Approximately 45,000 Ukrainian Armed Forces FPV drones were suppressed.
"We've already formed established regiments, battalions, and other units," Sergei Ishtuganov, deputy commander of the Unmanned Systems Troops (UST), told KP. "Their combat operations are conducted according to a unified plan and in coordination with other units of the troop groups. At the same time, the expansion of existing UTS units and the creation of new ones continues. We're assigning operators, engineers, technicians, and other support specialists to these units."
Regular units are conducting combat testing of both drones and electronic warfare systems, working closely with manufacturers. And, if necessary, we modify these or other products to take into account the rapidly changing situation. The enemy plays with frequencies; we reconfigure our electronic warfare systems. The enemy starts to suppress us with electronic warfare; we switch to other frequencies. And this is an ongoing process, requiring, among other things, technical expertise.
"Today, specialists are being trained at the Ministry of Defense's universities, at military training centers affiliated with civilian universities, at public organizations, and at manufacturers of unmanned systems," continues Sergei Ishtuganov. "But work is already underway to create a higher military educational institution for the Unmanned Systems Forces."
The effectiveness of this new branch of the armed forces, still in its infancy, is demonstrated by its personnel approach alone. It recruits the best service members, in part based on their combat achievements. According to the deputy commander of the BvS troops, they demonstrate their capabilities daily by using various types of drones both in border regions and in the SVO zone to carry out strikes against enemy military installations and equipment.
"About 300 enemy targets—armored vehicles, fortifications—are engaged daily. Unmanned aerial vehicles are used to deliver food and ammunition to the front lines, as well as mine laying and evacuate the wounded from the battlefield," explains Sergei Ishtuganov. "The procedure for delivering and decommissioning unmanned aerial vehicles is optimized to the maximum extent possible so as not to distract specialists from combat operations. The Chief of the Unmanned Air Defense Forces and the entire command staff interact directly with the commanders of the Unmanned Air Defense Forces units and subunits daily to resolve all issues that arise."
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced the creation of Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (Voysk Bespilotnykh Sistem, or VBS) on December 16, 2024, during the Ministry of Defense's annual board meeting. The announcement came in response to a directive from President Vladimir Putin, who had ordered the formation of this new branch of the armed forces based on operational lessons from what Moscow terms the Special Military Operation in Ukraine. Belousov stated that the VBS would be fully operational by the third quarter of 2025, with completion of organizational structures expected during that timeframe. The decision reflected Russian recognition that traditional measures for developing and delivering unmanned systems to troops, operating on peacetime timelines stretched over years, could not address the battlefield realities where drones were being employed at unprecedented scale and with devastating effect.
The organizational development of the VBS had been accompanied by institutional infrastructure to support long-term capability development. In August 2024, well before the formal announcement of the VBS, Belousov had personally ordered the establishment of the Rubicon Center of Advanced Unmanned Technologies, formed on the basis of an existing drone unit operating in Ukraine. This center was positioned as a prototype for systematizing training, force structure, capability development, procurement, and provisioning related to unmanned systems. Ishtuganov confirmed in November 2025 that work was underway to establish a higher military educational institution dedicated specifically to the Unmanned Systems Forces, with specialists currently being trained at Ministry of Defense universities, military training centers affiliated with civilian universities, public organizations, and manufacturers of unmanned systems. The creation of a dedicated military academy reflects Russian commitment to professionalizing drone operations and developing specialized career paths for unmanned systems personnel.
Russian military theory regarding the VBS has been articulated in professional military literature, most notably in an article by Colonel (retired) Gregoriy Vokin published in the June 2025 issue of Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), the General Staff's professional journal. Vokin's analysis framed the VBS as both a reaction to immediate battlefield realities and a preemptive investment in the future character of warfare, describing "remote-cybernetic" weapons as both shield and sword for the newly established branch. Russian military specialists Sergei Makarenko and Konstantin Kozlov have argued that the formation of the VBS must be accompanied by systematic transition to automated command and control of unmanned aerial systems, critiquing Russia's current practice of "one operator-one UAV" as inefficient and operationally unsustainable given the rapid expansion and tactical diversity of drone employment in modern conflict. These theoretical discussions suggest Russian awareness that organizational changes alone are insufficient without corresponding doctrinal evolution and technological advancement.
The strategic rationale for the VBS reflects Russia's goal of achieving technological asymmetry to offset adversary advantages in manpower, alliances, and conventional hardware. The decision to elevate unmanned systems to the level of a dedicated service branch, comparable in status to the Airborne Forces or Strategic Rocket Forces, marks a transition from viewing drones as support assets to recognizing them as primary instruments of warfare capable of enabling high-precision, low-risk operations with significant operational autonomy. President Putin noted in June 2025 that Russian troops received over 1.5 million unmanned systems of various types in 2024, describing them as decisive elements in ensuring military prowess. This massive scale of deployment, combined with the institutionalization of drone warfare through the VBS, represents a fundamental shift in how Russia conceptualizes and structures military power for future conflict.
The VBS faces significant challenges in implementation, however, as Western analysts have noted. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has observed that questions remain about whom Moscow will tap to lead the branch, noting that Kyiv performed well in selecting a young, innovative commander with deep understanding of unmanned systems. There are concerns that heavy-handed bureaucratic approaches could stifle the bottom-up innovation that has characterized Russian drone development during the war, potentially disrupting volunteer units and startup manufacturers that have been working effectively. Additionally, there appear to be tensions between rapid battlefield adaptation and institutional systematization, as evidenced by scandals that forced the Ministry of Defense to investigate problems with drone unit integration into official force structures. The success of the VBS may ultimately depend on whether Russia can balance the need for standardization and central control with preservation of the innovative flexibility that has driven Russian drone development throughout the conflict.
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