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T-64 Tank - Limitations

The T-64 has some advantages, but a large number of shortcomings, some of which are very significant, do not allow speaking of its superiority. The T-72 is simpler, more reliable, cheaper, its latest modifications eliminate many shortcomings, and the tank itself is adapted to almost any conditions, be it frost, mountains or desert. The tank had a number of flaws. Many of them were successfully eliminated during mass production, which began before the official adoption of the product for service and lasted more than 20 years.

There were a number of objective reasons for the end of production of the T-64. One of the main ones is age. The T-64 began to become obsolete in the 80s. Not as fast as now, but still. The main "Achilles' heel" is the suspension. She was counted on a vehicle weighing no more than 40-45 tons, and the T-64A weighed about 40-42 tons. During development, they tried to reduce the mass of the tank as much as possible, which led to negative consequences after 15 years. "Sixty-fourth" was initially deprived of the lion's share of the modernization potential.

• The use of an automatic loader allowed the Soviets to reduce not only the number of crewmen, but also the size of the turret. Therefore, the space available in the turret is not significantly increased. The ability to depress the main gun (-5°) is still limited. When using the mast antenna, the command variant is immobile, since the mast must be anchored in the ground.
• Reports appeared about problems with the ground-breaking and innovative automatic loading system. According to some of these reports, the tank's automatic loader occasionally "ate Soviet tankers" and that "few gunners are excited by the prospect of having their arm fed into the breach of the cannon." More recent information indicates that these early reports were exaggerated and that the majority of these problems had been solved with the appearance of later variants.
• The design of the loading mechanism of the T-64 has only one plus in the form of a larger number of initially ready shells for firing. Everything else is a disadvantage, because it is much more complicated and unreliable compared to the T-72 automatic loader, requires periodic adjustments, in addition, causes a gas contamination of the fighting compartment, requires unnecessary actions from the crew when firing, twice as much time to load and can deprive the life of a driver.
• The loading mechanism of the T-64, or rather, its cassettes in the turret, that makes it impossible to escape with a blocked hatch on the hull. This is not uncommon in combat, moreover, there is a case of tank flooding during exercises, when there was a lot of time left, but the driver simply drowned, unable to get out through the turret.
• The missile-firing T-64B has been criticized for employing a sophisticated weapon system whose HEAT warhead is too small to successfully penetrate the advanced frontal armor of modern NATO MBTs. What these critics failed to see is the primary mission of the missile-armed tank. Using its very powerful conventional kinetic energy armor piercing ammunition against those same NATO MBTs, the crew of the Soviet missile-armed tank would reserve it's missiles to engage and destroy NATO ATGM delivery systems. While there is a secondary capability to engage tanks like the M1 Abrams and the Leopard 2 from the flank or rear, the missile's primary targets are the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), the M901 Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV), and the AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra Attack Helicopters. The elimination of these ATGM systems from a distance beyond the maximum effective range of deployed NATO MBTs, is a capability the Soviets have been searching for since the first development of the ATGM. With the exception of the missile capability, the T-64B is very similar to the M1981/1; and with both tanks fitted with reactive armor they are very hard to tell apart.
• One aspect of the suspension is top speed. The T-80 was developed on the basis of the T-64 and it was they who wanted to equip it with a gas turbine engine, but on rough terrain, at high speeds, small rollers were deformed and could not be restored, only replaced. The T-64B had problems with the rollers - they deformed and fell into disrepair faster than that of the more massive T-72 and the recently adopted T-80. As a result, the tank's suspension, turret and final drives were redesigned along with the tank's control system. Those who served and encountered the T-64 are aware of the main drawback of its running gear - when “dancing” on rough terrain, the caterpillars fly off very easily. If the caterpillar is slightly weakened, then it easily flies off even during normal turns at high speed. And towing a tank on the ground is very difficult due to the fact that its road wheels easily get stuck in it. It’s good when this happens during exercises, but in war this can cost the life of the entire crew. In addition, such a chassis design leads to additional noise and shaking with vibrations.
• And last but not least, no need for further production. The tank did not have a significant reserve for modernization due to the thrust-to-weight ratio, a powerful engine could be installed, but for this it was necessary to change the suspension. All this at a higher cost compared to the T-72, which was in no way inferior. Numerous changes did not make sense, since there was already a modified T-80 - the ideological successor of the T-64 and in many ways similar to it inside the fighting compartment. Between the T-80UD and T-64B, then the difference in them is not as big as with the T-80U.