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Su-57 Felon - Combat Operations in Ukraine

The Su-57's combat employment in Ukraine represented a cautious, evolving deployment strategy that balanced operational needs against the extreme strategic value of Russia's limited stealth fighter fleet. The Su-57 saw expanded but still limited operational use in Ukraine since the 2022 full-scale invasion began. Russian forces have increased Su-57 deployment throughout 2024 and into 2025, with reports indicating more frequent missions and broader tactical roles. According to Ukrainian and Western sources, Russia employeds Su-57s primarily in standoff roles, launching long-range missiles like the Kh-69 cruise missile and guided munitions from Russian airspace or occupied territories in Luhansk, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts, avoiding penetration into Ukrainian air defense coverage.

Ukrainian military monitoring groups revealed advanced tactics for the more aggressive use of their fifth-generation Su-57 fighters. According to the Ukrainians, "entire formations" of Su-57 aircraft carry out coordinated, precision missions throughout Ukraine, adapting to increasingly sophisticated Western air defense systems with new strategies and weapons systems.

During these operations, Su-57 stealth aircraft fly in tactical groups, where some aircraft provide air cover using long-range R-77M air-to-air missiles , while others deliver devastating strikes with Kh-69 cruise missiles (a stealthy version of the Kh-59 MK2 missile ) and precision-guided bombs against critical Ukrainian targets deep inside enemy territory.

The expanded deployment of Su-57 stealth fighters to Ukraine signaled Russia's clear intention to stress-test its latest stealth fighters in real combat conditions to validate their effectiveness and demonstrate their operational capabilities to potential foreign buyers, primarily India. Eyewitness accounts (both Ukrainian and Russian) and open-source data indicate that Russia is experimenting with new guided munitions alongside the Kh-69. One such innovation is a mysterious hybrid weapon, unofficially dubbed the Su-71K/M.

By August 2025, Ukrainian defense sources reported Russia was deploying Su-57s in multi-aircraft formations with whole formations of fifth-generation jets conducting coordinated strikes. Typical configurations involve Su-57s providing air cover with long-range R-77M air-to-air missiles while other aircraft conduct precision strikes. The aircraft's low observable characteristics have been demonstrated in combat according to Russian sources, allowing closer operations to the battlefront compared to fourth-generation fighters without detection by Ukrainian air defense radars.

However, the Su-57 remains vulnerable on the ground. In June 2024, Ukrainian forces reportedly damaged one or two Su-57 aircraft at Akhtubinsk airfield in southern Russia using long-range one-way attack drones, striking the test center approximately 370 miles from Ukrainian-held territory. This incident emphasized both Ukrainian strike capabilities and the vulnerability of Russian airbases despite being located well behind front lines.

The Su-57 reportedly entered combat operations approximately two to three weeks after Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022, according to Russian state media TASS claims from May 2022. However, these early claims lacked verification and the aircraft's actual combat role remained murky for months. By June 2022, Russian sources including RIA Novosti reported that four Su-57s working in a networked configuration were employed in SEAD operations over Ukraine to identify and destroy Ukrainian air defense systems, with sources emphasizing that the aircraft's low radar visibility was demonstrated in combat.

In October 2022, Russian Army General Sergey Surovikin, then commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, publicly claimed the Su-57 had been used in both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles and had scored kills in both categories. Subsequently, Russian sources alleged the Su-57 shot down a Ukrainian Su-27 fighter and a Su-24 strike fighter using long-range R-37M air-to-air missiles. These claims suggested the kills occurred at extreme range, with some reports indicating the Su-27 was shot down while barely above safe altitude attempting to intercept Geran-2 kamikaze drones. Russian media speculated that only the Su-57 could have fired these missiles without being detected by AWACS aircraft operating from Poland and Romania in 24/7 mode. However, no hard evidence has surfaced confirming these air-to-air kills, and Western analysts note that MiG-31 interceptors also employ R-37M missiles extensively and could account for these claimed shootdowns.

Throughout 2022-2023, the Su-57's operational employment remained extremely limited and cautious. UK Ministry of Defence intelligence assessments from January 2023 stated that Su-57s had "very likely" been employed in combat since at least June 2022, but emphasized these missions were limited to flying over Russian territory and launching long-range air-to-surface or air-to-air missiles into Ukraine. This standoff approach allowed the aircraft to avoid penetrating Ukrainian air defense coverage while still contributing to combat operations. Commercial satellite imagery from December 2022 showed five Su-57s deployed at Akhtubinsk air base, approximately 500 kilometers from Ukraine, supporting assessments that these aircraft were involved in operations against Ukraine while remaining in Russian airspace.

In February 2024, a confirmed Su-57 operation occurred when the aircraft, escorted by two Su-35 fighters, launched a missile strike against Ukrainian targets using the stealthy Kh-69 cruise missile. The aircraft operated above the Luhansk Oblast, in Russian-controlled territory. By May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported Russia had intensified Su-57 operations, with air strikes carried out from the airspace of Kursk, Bryansk, and occupied Luhansk oblasts utilizing Kh-69 cruise missiles.

In July 2024, Sergei Chemezov, General Director of Rostec, announced the integration of drones into the Su-57's weaponry to expand and enhance the aircraft's functionality for combat tasks in Ukraine, including targeting key infrastructure and logistic points. The United Aircraft Corporation emphasized improvements to boost the Su-57's performance in dense enemy air defense environments by leveraging its increased stealth and survivability features.

On October 5, 2024, a Su-57 employed an air-to-air missile to deliberately shoot down an out-of-control Russian Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B heavy strike drone over Ukraine, approximately 10 miles behind Ukrainian lines. The incident occurred following a technical failure during what was described as a test flight, with the Su-57 destroying the malfunctioning drone under a pre-planned protocol to prevent it from falling into Ukrainian hands. This incident demonstrated the aircraft's employment in overwatch roles during testing of advanced unmanned systems integration.

Despite its stealth characteristics, the Su-57 has proven vulnerable to Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities. On June 8-9, 2024, Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence claimed to have damaged or destroyed at least one, possibly two, Su-57 fighters using drones during a strike on the Akhtubinsk air base in Astrakhan Oblast, approximately 589 kilometers (365 miles) from the front lines.

GUR published before-and-after satellite imagery showing an Su-57 sitting under a framework for a shelter without protective covering on June 7, and then on June 8 showing blast ruptures and characteristic fire damage spots near the aircraft. The attack was reportedly carried out by three Ukrainian drones according to Russian sources. The pro-Russian Fighterbomber Telegram channel, which has deep connections to Russian Aerospace Forces, confirmed one Su-57 was damaged by shrapnel and stated authorities were determining whether it could be restored or would become the first combat loss of an Su-57 in history.

GUR Commander Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone that a second Su-57 may have been hit as well, though this remains unconfirmed. The Russian Fighterbomber channel bitterly complained about the lack of protective shelters, noting that for the price of a single Su-57, shelters from UAVs could be built for all test aircraft in the country. This strike emphasized both the vulnerability of Russian airbases despite their distance from front lines and the high-value nature of each Su-57 given the extremely limited fleet size.

A significant escalation in Su-57 combat employment occurred in August 2025. Ukrainian military observers, particularly the aviation-focused group "Sonyashnyk," reported on August 5 that Russia was now deploying "whole formations" of Su-57s in regular combat operations. This marked a substantial departure from previous cautious, limited employment. Russia began employing Su-57s in multi-aircraft formations integrated into strike missions deep into Ukrainian territory, with Russian forces refining weapons loadouts and testing coordinated air tactics under combat conditions.

The typical tactical configuration involves a Su-57 hanging back to provide cover with long-range R-77M air-to-air missiles while other aircraft, potentially including additional Su-57s or fourth-generation platforms, conduct precision strikes using Kh-69 cruise missiles or guided bombs. This coordinated strike package approach represents a more sophisticated employment of the platform beyond simple standoff missile launches. Ukrainian sources claim Russia is testing a new weapon system dubbed the Kh-71K or Su-71K, described as a hybrid drone-missile system with enhanced radar evasion features and high maneuverability, potentially deployed from Su-57 platforms.

Russia's increasing employment of Su-57s in Ukraine served multiple purposes beyond immediate tactical impact. The aircraft provides valuable combat testing and data collection under real wartime conditions, allowing Russian forces to refine tactics, evaluate weapons integration, and assess performance against actual air defense systems. The Su-57's advanced sensor suite and communications datalinks enable it to operate as an electronic intelligence and command-and-control asset, similar to how the F-35 and F-22 function, providing real-time intelligence and helping coordinate other aircraft operations.

Critically, expanded Su-57 operations serve as a high-stakes effort to showcase the aircraft's capabilities to potential export customers after the Algeria deal was announced. The Made-in-Russia arms export brand has suffered significantly since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, with many Russian and legacy Soviet weapon systems performing poorly in combat. Demonstrating the Su-57's effectiveness in contested environments helps validate the platform's export appeal and justify the Algeria purchase to international observers.

However, severe limitations constrain Su-57 employment. With only 16-20 operational aircraft and production rates of 4-8 per year, each Su-57 represents an extraordinarily valuable asset that Russia cannot afford to lose. The aircraft has consistently avoided penetrating deep into Ukrainian-controlled airspace where it would face dense integrated air defense networks including Patriot systems, NASAMS, and other Western-supplied capabilities. Instead, operations remain concentrated in Russian airspace or occupied territories, limiting the aircraft's tactical impact on frontline operations.

As noted by The National Interest in November 2024, Russia has been reluctant to send the Su-57 into genuine combat but may find increasing need to do so as Russian jet losses continue mounting faster than they can be replaced. The expansion of operations in mid-2025 suggests Russia is accepting greater risks with the platform as the war continues, though whether this translates to more aggressive employment penetrating contested airspace remains uncertain.

Assessing the Su-57's actual combat effectiveness in Ukraine remains challenging given limited verifiable information. Russian claims of air-to-air kills lack independent confirmation, and the aircraft's employment in standoff roles launching missiles from safe distances provides limited data on how it would perform in contested air-to-air engagements or while penetrating sophisticated integrated air defenses. The aircraft's good front-aspect stealth allows closer operations to battlefronts compared to fourth-generation fighters without radar detection, but its overall low observability remains inferior to F-22 and F-35 standards, particularly from rear aspects.

The Su-57's demonstrated ability to employ long-range cruise missiles like the Kh-69, coordinate with other aircraft in strike packages, and operate as a sensor and command node suggests it adds genuine capability to Russian air operations. However, the extreme caution with which Russia employs the aircraft, combined with its vulnerability to Ukrainian long-range strikes on airbases, indicates Moscow recognizes both the platform's strategic value and its irreplaceability given production constraints. Whether the Su-57 would prove effective against peer adversaries with robust air defenses and fifth-generation fighters remains an open question that the Ukraine conflict has not definitively answered.




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