Russian Orthodox Church
The Moscow Patriarchate has at least 150 million followers worldwide, which – according to various estimates – could be more than half of all Orthodox Christians.
On 11 October 2018 a synod led by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople – the “first among equals” in Orthodox Christianity – said it would grant autocephaly, or independence, to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate in Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church announced on 15 October 2018 it was severing ties with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople over its decree on recognition of the autocephaly the Ukrainian church. Metropolitan Ilarion, the head of external relations for the Russian Orthodox Church, stated "A decision has been made to rupture full communion with the Constantinople Patriarchate," he said, meaning that priests from the two churches cannot serve together while worshippers of one cannot take communion in the other. Ilarion said that Constantinople's decision to back what the Russian Orthodox Church considers a schismatic church is "illegal and canonically worthless," and effectively drives it into a schism. "We cannot be in communication with this church, which is in a schism," he said, adding that the Russian Orthodox Church hopes that “common sense prevails and that the Constantinople Patriarchate changes its mind."
Orthodox patriarchates in the Balkans and around the world must now decide whether to continue honoring the leadership of the Constantinople Patriarchate or follow the Russian Church's lead and cut ties with the 1,600-year-old institution. The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople had honorary and historical supremacy over the world's other Orthodox patriarchs.
The Moscow Patriarchate weighed in on the issue at a 15 October 2018 synod in Minsk led by Patriarch Kirill of Russia, an ally of President Vladimir Putin. Having held jurisdiction over Ukraine since the late 1600s, the Russian Church announced that the Constantinople Patriarchate has "excluded itself from the canonical field of the Orthodoxy" with "lawless and canonically void moves" on Ukraine.
British historian Lionel Kochan recounted some of the rather complicated story of religion and the tsars: "The Church, because of its large landholdings, had played an active part in backing Muscovy's claim to Slav overlordship. From the fourteenth century onwards, the association of Church and State, which was much more intimate than anything comparable in Western Europe, had become closer, until by the early sixteenth century the Tsar had come to be considered a semi-sacrosanct personality with unlimited power, the earthly representative of God.
To quote Joseph of Volokolamsk, the influential early-sixteenth century Abbot: "The Tsar is in nature like to all men, but in authority he is like to the highest God." It was thus, taking all these factors together, that the autocracy became, in theory, the divinely ordained fountainhead of an undifferentiated concentration of authority - political, in that the Tsar was the only political authority; economic, in that he claimed ownership of the totality of the land; military, in that he led the country in war; religious, in that he ruled by divine right and was committed to maintain and defend the rights of Orthodoxy."
Russian Christianity reinforced its authoritarian claims by extolling the virtue of self-sacrifice in the populace. More appeal was made to emotion than to logic.
President Putin's and Patriarch Kirill's stances on issues of foreign policy, family values, and human rights all too often went hand in hand. The Russian Orthodox Church, which has around 165 million members worldwide, has a history of opposing homosexuality, which it considers a sin. In August 2013, its Patriarch Kirill declared same sex marriage to be a sign of the impending apocalypse and urged people to do more to combat the rise of gay rights.
Another group church and state failed to protect are women and children. In January 2017, the Orthodox Church and conservative members of parliament pushed though legislation that decriminalizes domestic violence. After the controversial amendment that Russian President Putin signed into law in February, only injuries like concussions or broken bones would lead to criminal charges. First-time offenders who do not cause serious medical damage will go without punishment.
The Church said in a statement July 6, 2016 that physical punishment was a Russian tradition and thus should be protected as "an essential right given to parents by God. ... there is no doubt that Holy Scripture (Proverbs 22:15, 23:13-14, 29:15, Hebrews 12:6-11, etc.) and the Holy Tradition of the Orthodox Church view the possibility of the reasonable and loving use of physical punishment as an integral part of parental rights laid down by God Himself. Thus, attempts at artificial legislative restriction against this parental right contradict the teachings of the Orthodox Church”. Many adults in Russia believe they have a right to spank their kids to teach a lesson, and this is exactly how they were raised. Belting is so deeply rooted in the culture that many Russians associate the clothing accessory with punishment. According to Russia's Interior Ministry, 40 percent of all grave violent crimes are committed in families. An estimated 12,000 women die annually from domestic violence, that is one woman in every 40 minutes.
One of Russia’s most outspoken critics of the Church, Alexander Nevzorov, a former member of the Russian parliament, journalist, author and filmmaker, was one of the few public figures who has actively criticized what he and others have called the “clericalization” of Russia. That term refers to the growing involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church in state affairs, despite Article 14 of Russia’s constitution, which explicitly declares the country “a secular state.” Nevzorov said in June 2016 “Everything we see the Russian authorities doing is only the continuation of standard, primitive, imperial policies which definitely include an Orthodox component”.
Russia first came into definite relations with Christianity on the visit of Princess Olga to Constantinople, where she was baptized about A. D. 957. Subsequently Vladimir the Great sent emissaries to the different churches, Eastern and Western, to learn of their doctrines and rituals, with a view to adopting those which they liked best. The emissaries returned and reported in favor of the Greek Church, whose ceremonial in the Cathedral of St. Sophia at Constantinople seemed to them to excel all others. Thereupon Vladimir was baptized, and the Greek Church became the church of the state.
While historic United States policy sees a clear and distinct line between church and state, other areas of the world often have no such clear demarcation. Orthodoxy fuses together the two. To be religious was to be politically involved. Citizenship and church identity go hand in hand. Even if a person seldom attends divine services, yet holds to the orthodox faith, he or she consider themselves devoted followers and good citizens. Over the centuries the church was governed, first, by metropolitans looking to the Patriarch of Constantinople as their titular head; since about 1589, by patriarchs; and since the time of Peter the Great, by the Holy Synod.
The Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox churches in Western Europe returned to the historic aegis of Moscow, ending several decades of schism and preventing new splits among parishes, Patriarch Kirill proclaimed 04 November 2019. “We are one church now, there are no reasons to be outside of the ecumenical and people-to-people ties,” Russia’s Patriarch Kirill said before a grand mass to celebrate both churches’ unification. “There are no grounds to lose this coveted and sacred unity that we strived for during decades,” he stated. Governed by Metropolitan John, the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox churches in Western Europe (AROCWE) historically belonged to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople until the late 20th century when it was granted broad autonomy. However, Constantinople changed its mind in late 2018, ordering AROCWE to dissolve. The Western European church defied the order and opted instead for joining the Moscow Patriarchate. The AROCWE was officially formed in the early 1930s by the priests and faithful who fled the Russian Revolution of 1917.
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