Mobilization Deployment
Mobilization deployment is a set of measures carried out in order to systematically transfer the military organization of the state from peacetime to wartime; an integral part of mobilization in the Russian Federation. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation consists in a planned, pre-prepared transfer of troops (forces) to the organization and composition of wartime with their additional staffing in a timely manner, additional provision with weapons, military equipment and other materiel. The call-up of citizens who are in the reserve, and the supply of equipment from organizations and from citizens to the RF Armed Forces for mobilization are carried out by orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may be general or partial; the general one covers the entire armed organization of the state and is carried out throughout the country, while the partial one deploys part of the RF Armed Forces in certain strategic (operational) directions (areas).
The thinking behind the mobilization concept had always been that the Soviet military would only ever be engaged in full-blown superpower conflict, and never in any small-scale, low-intensity engagements. For the Soviet military, with its “big war” emphasis, the thinking was that any lead-up to such a war would involve a prior buildup of tension that would allow time for the mobilization of reservists.
Yeltsin inherited a military some four million strong; but by 1992 this figure had dropped to 2.8 million, and it continued to fall further throughout the later 1990s. This was not so much to do with any active attempts to reduce the size of the military, but rather came about both because of the increase in the number of post-Soviet deferments available to potential conscripts and because the pool of manpower that Russia now had access to was much smaller than that in the Soviet Union. What curiously did not change, though, and this was to the conservative generals’ advantage, was the number of actual formations within the army’s ground forces. This stayed the same — at 203 divisions.
In the later Soviet period, these 203 divisions were never all fully manned. Only 50 Category A divisions were described as being at “permanent readiness.” The rest, the B, C, and D category formations, were cadre units; understrength and waiting to be filled out only on mobilization. The division’s category depended on its manning strength and equipment schedules. A Category C division would, for instance, have a personnel strength of approximately 1,000 — mainly officers and warrant officers.
In the post-Cold War era, the situation in terms of these divisions’ manning levels became considerably “worse.” Only some 13 percent of the ground forces’ overall assets were now deemed ready to take part in immediate operations (i.e., without mobilization). But while all these divisions were lacking in conscripts, what they did not lack was officers. These were still there acting in their role as the divisions’ cadre strength. Thus there were divisions with only 1,000 or so personnel; half of whom would be officers or warrant officers. This was the obvious result of putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop.
The officers serving in this skeleton army were all the time losing their leadership and administrative capabilities because they had no actual soldiers to lead or to administer. By 2007, while the ground forces had its 203 divisions, it could only muster 90,000 combat-effective troops. At least this was better than the figure quoted earlier by Putin in 2006 of only 55,000 combat-effective troops.
The peacetime staff for a military formation means the part-time employment of all positions provided for by the staffing table and differs in the time required for full deployment (bringing to the wartime staff). A unit (combination) in which the peacetime staff of the formation is staffed by half or less of the wartime staff is called a cropped unit ( framed formation ) in Russian military terminology. For example, for motorized rifle divisions of the USSR Armed Forces, there were 4 main typical peacetime states:
- state "A" (division of constant readiness) - staffing of 90-100% and staffing of equipment and weapons 100%;
- staff "B" (division with a readiness period of 1 to 3 days) - 60-80% of personnel and 75-90% of equipment and weapons;
- staff "V" (division with a readiness period of 4 to 10 days) - 25-50% of personnel and 50-75% of equipment and weapons;
- staff "G" (division with a readiness period of 11 to 30 days) - 1-10% of personnel and 40-50% of equipment and weapons.
Officially, the divisions of state "V" and state "G" were called cadre divisions ( cadre divisions , framed divisions ). The total number of cadre divisions in the ground forces of the USSR reached 60% of the total number of divisions.
Because the new combat-ready units incorporated most of the available army personnel, military leaders again reconsidered the classification of army units, and a new version was approved in 1998:
- Constant Combat Readiness (95–100% of the wartime TOE);
- Reduced (up to 70% of the wartime TOE);
- Cadre (5–10% of the wartime TOE);
- Equipment Storage Bases (less than 5–10% of the wartime TOE).
As Russia’s military leaders tried to preserve combat power without reducing formations, it was felt that BKhVTs were a reasonable compromise. They were non-deployable and required little funding and, should a military situation deteriorate, there was an opportunity, albeit a limited one, to deploy them into fullyfledged military formations.
This concept also applied to military units in divisions and to separate brigades. For example, almost all separate special-purpose brigades of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces were cropped brigades, in which there were no more than 500 people in peacetime, and up to 1700 people in wartime.
Using the example of a motorized rifle regiment, the difference between the personnel in wartime and in peacetime is as follows:
- wartime staff - 2,400 military personnel;
- peacetime staff "A" - 2100-2400;
- peacetime staff "B" - 1300-1500;
- peacetime staff "V" - 200-300;
- peacetime staff "G" - 0-20.
For example, in the 191st motorized rifle regiment of the cropped 201st motorized rifle division at the beginning of December 1979, there were 12 (twelve) people ( regiment in the state "G" ). In connection with the introduction of the regiment to Afghanistan , in January 1980, the personnel of the regiment was brought up to 2,200 people as soon as possible.
The reason for the creation of framed units and formations in the USSR Armed Forces was the need to reduce the Armed Forces while maintaining officer personnel, stocks of military equipment, weapons and materiel. The main condition for the need to maintain framed units and formations is the proper level of maintaining the mobilization capabilities of the state , due to which the deployment of formations to the wartime staff is carried out.
