Russian Policy - American Civil War
By 1860 the United States and Russia had similar problems and the same European enemies and that was reason enough why they should feel kindly towards each other. The United States had been invited by France to join the powers in dictating to Russia upon the Polish problem and had declined ; Russia had been asked by France to intervene in the Amrican Civil War and had refused. Russia was fighting against Polish insurrection; the United States to put down rebellion.
Just as the United States was about to fight a war motivated in part by the national conflict over American slavery, Alexander II issued a manifesto in February 1861 releasing Russian serfs from their servitude. American abolitionists celebrated this turn of events, while Russians watched from afar as the United States descended into armed conflict.
Those Americans who supported the Union cause during the Civil War were pleased that Emperor Alexander II had freed Russia’s serfs. He became known as the “Tsar Liberator”, while Americans referred to President Lincoln as “The Great Emancipator” for freeing the slaves in Confederate territories in January 1863.
Russian Minister Stoekel initially encouraged mediation between President Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of State, William H. Seward, and representatives of seceded Southern states; however, after Seward refused such negotiations, the Russians assumed an official position that supported the Union while urging reunification. The Russians also supported the suggestion made by Napoleon III of France that called for a peace mediated by the French, British, and Russians. However, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, that freed slaves in Union territory, raised the stakes and made real negotiation between the North and South, or outright British or French endorsement of the Confederacy, unlikely.
In 1863, when a revolt in Poland caused apprehension of an Anglo-French diplomatic intervention there as well as in America, Russia demonstrated her goodwill toward the American government by sending a fleet on a friendly visit to American waters causing various rumors and suggestions of a possible Russo-American alliance.
Russian naval ships sailed to New York in late 1863 to demonstrate Russia's naval capability and its growing support for the North. More importantly, this was a strategic move in anticipation of a possible war with the British following the recent Polish uprising against Russian rule. By staging visits to U.S. ports, the Russian Navy aimed to relocate a number of its ships so that they would not be trapped in the Baltic Sea in the event of war in Europe. New York celebrated the visitors in style, with lavish social events, parades, and military reviews. The ships eventually called on the ports of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and Annapolis, and traveled as far south as Alexandria. Russian officers entertained members of the U.S. Cabinet and Congress on board. A separate Pacific squadron visited California.
The welcome the Russians received in New York and San Francisco was overwhelming, and included elaborate balls. The New York squadron also visited Washington and Boston, and were feted with galas in those cities as well.
Sailing on the “Almaz” clipper was the composer Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov. Legend has it that he wrote “Flight of the Bumblebee” because of that trip. He wrote in a letter home: “I’m bored and hear buzzing wind all the time.” Some believe that buzzing became the sound of the bees in his famous composition.
In Russia the visits were regarded from the point of view of European politics, while in America many people associate it with the Civil War. The year 1863 an exceedingly critical one ; for a time it looked as if the Polish Question would lead to a general European war. By June 1863, war seemed inevitable, and Russia began to work on a plan of campaign. Russia's fleet was too weak to make an effective fight against the combined naval strength of England and France, but it was strong enough to prey upon their commerce. As soon as England realized what Russia had in mind her attitude on the Polish question would change. If the fleet remained at home it would probably be blocked in ; it was therefore necessary that it should be sent away to some place more conveniently situated for commerce raiding.
If anchored in one of the Atlantic ports of the United States, the Russian fleet would be able to dash out quickly and in a short time be on the trade routes. This condition held true in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic. The English and French, though numerous, were just then unpopular ; the American population felt kindly towards the Russians, and their cruisers would be permitted to go and come as they pleased.
The Russians toasted the President and dwelt, as they were requested to do, on the historic friendship which bound Russia and America. All references to the European situation were purposely avoided. This was good diplomacy, for on the one hand it concealed the real purpose of the visit and on the other it strengthened the Americans in their belief that the fleet came especially for their benefit. The fact that this idea has such a strong hold in the USA shows how skillfully the game was played. It is only fair to say that this idea was not brought over on the fleet but was born on American soil.
The Russian squadron anchored in San Francisco harbor on 12 October 1863. The Russians were willing to fight the battles of the nation, and if the proper opportunity had come they would have done so. During the winter of 1863-1864 San Francisco was without the protection of a man- of-war. It was reported that the Confederate cruisers Sumter and Alabama were planning to attack the city. In view of this possibility the Russians took measures to prevent it.
During the winter months of 1863-64 the European war clouds passed away. Russia held firm and won. England was willing to call names but not to fight, and France was helpless without England. Gradually the Polish insurrection was put down and the excitement subsided. Officers of the Russian navy assert that the coming of the fleet to America was, if not altogether, at least in a very great measure, responsible for England's change of front and consequently for the prevention of the war.
No one can question for a moment that this visit gave much moral support to the cause of the Union. At a time when European powers were plotting against Washington, when conditions at home were most discouraging, Yankees felt that they had a friend in Russia. It put life and strength into the people of the North. Every one took the visit as a special mark of friendship and it was highly appreciated.
On April 26, 1864, the Russian emperor said there was no longer any need for the fleet to remain in America. The Russian Squadron in New York was notified the next day to get ready to return home. Somewhat similar orders were despatched to San Francisco.
It was a most extraordinary situation: Russia had not in mind to help America but did render a distinct service; the United States was not conscious that it was contributing in any way to Russia’s welfare and yet seems to have saved her from humiliation and perhaps war. There is probably nothing to compare with it in diplomatic history.
David T. Gleeson and Simon Lewis wrote " Over the years, popular and scholarly understanding of the visit, which became a disputed topic within the complex history of the two countries’ diplomatic relations, has undergone a significant evolution. In the earliest American accounts, though the specific circumstances often differed, the prevailing sentiment was that when fears of foreign intervention in the Civil War were at their height, Tsar Alexander II dispatched the fleets as a gesture of friendship and that the action successfully restrained the British and the French."
A fitting climax to this strange paradoxical friendship appeared in the negotiations resulting in a treaty of 1867 for the transfer of Alaska which, although it had been suggested as early as 1845 and contemplated again in 1854 and in 1859, surprised the diplomats of the Old World.
Secretary of State Seward secured a deal to purchase Alaska from the Russian tsar for $7.2 million in March 1867. Although the U.S. Congress initially resisted the idea, citing the price as too high, legislators ultimately agreed to the deal because it blocked a large portion of Great Britain's Pacific access, made Alaska's rich mineral resources available to American entrepreneurs, and provided easier access to lucrative Asian trade. Russia had become increasingly frustrated with the expense and difficulty of supplying its businesses in the Pacific territory, and was thus also satisfied with the sale.
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