Russia-USA Relations - Late 19th Century
Great friendship existed between the United States and Imperial Russia during the nineteenth century. The Old World Russian autocracy supported the young New World democracy because of the emerging U.S. role as a bulwark against Great Britain’s ambitions, in Asia and in the North Pacific Ocean region especially. In fact, when the American Civil War threatened to divide the United States, Russia alone among the European great powers gave no aid or comfort to the seceding states.
The difficulty of the average American to understand the character of Russian life, may be attributed to a general idea that a country rubbing elbows as it were with Western civilization for several centuries must perforce itself possess the characteristics of modern civilization. A closer survey of the economic, social and political conditions prevailing in Russia to-day, however, reveals many points of difference from those of the countries of Western Europe, and presents a remarkable contrast with those prevailing in the United States. Russia and the United States, indeed, stand, in Leroy-Beaulieu's phrase, at the two poles of modern civilization. So far apart are they in the character of their economic, social and political structures, in the degree in which they utilize the forms and institutions of modern life, and, in the difference in the mental make-up of their peoples, that there exist few, if any, points of real contact.
A fitting climax to this strange paradoxical friendship appeared in the negotiations resulting in a treaty of 1867 for the transfer of Alaska which, although it had been suggested as early as 1845 and contemplated again in 1854 and in 1859, surprised the diplomats of the Old World.
Although the absence of conflicting interests after the transfer of Alaska seemed a guarantee against serious dispute new sources of controversy arose, first, in connection with AngloAmerican negotiations for adjustment of serious questions, and later, from reactionary Russian policy after the death of the liberal Emperor Alexander II in 1881.
Near the close of 1870 when a series of events contributed to hasten the American negotiations with Great Britain for the adjustment of the Alabama claims, Constantin Calacazy, the Russian Minister who since his arrival in 1869 had interfered in questions not appropriately connected with his legation, suggested to Fish that the condition of European affairs indicated that it was an opportune time to press for an immediate settlement which he expected to result in the American annexation of Canada, but Secretary Fish proposed to the British Minister Thornton a basis of settlement which omitted any mention of Canada and resulted in the famous Treaty of 1871 for the peaceful settlement of Anglo-American difficulties — doubtless much to the surprise of Russia. Catacazy continued to use methods at variance with diplomatic practice to defer or to prevent a peaceful adjustment with England. He did not hesitate to use the newspapers to influence the public on questions pending before the government. His continued methods of interference to prevent the successful execution of the provisions of the treaty whose negotiation he had unsuccessfully attempted to prejudice and defeat made him intolerable and finally induced the American government (in July 1871) to suggest his recall and later impatiently to urge it, notwithstanding the "intimate ties of amity" between the two governments. Secretary Fish acceded to a postponement of the recall only because Russia found his removal inconvenient and impracticable until after a prearranged visit of the Grand Duke Alexis.
Although after the close of the period of the "entente cordiale* there appeared evidence of continued friendship — such as resolutions unanimously adopted by the United States Senate in March 1881 denouncing the assassination of Emperor Alexander II and extending condolence, and the promotion of popular sympathy by American shipments of food to relieve the famine sufferers of Russia in 1892 — the chief subjects of correspondence in the last quarter of the 19th century were sources of friction and irritation. An extradition treaty signed on 28 March 1887 met strong opposition in the United States from those who urged various objections against treating Russia with the same consideration as countries such as Great Britain or Switzerland, but after six years of delay its ratification was advised by the Senate (Febn»ary 1893) and it was proclaimed by the President in June 1893. In 1894 an agreement for a modus Vivendi in relation to seal fisheries wasconcluded. In September 1900, by exchange of notts, a claims protocol submitted to arbitration certain differences relating to American claims.
After 1890 earlier friendly relations gradually changed and after 1898 became increasingly unsatisfactory by the aggressiveness of Russian diplomacy and by repressive measures of Russian internal administration. Americans condemned the harshness of the Siberian exile system, published to the world by articles of George Kennan in 1888-89, and the increasingly reactionary spirit of government authorities shown in severe treatment of Poles and Jews — many of whom emigrated to the United States in increasing numbers, destitute and with their tales of woe to spread a hatred of the land from which they had fled. In 1903, following the horrible massacre of Kishinev which was believed to have been instigated by government authoritity. The Washington government brought the subject into publicity by an unusual and unsuccessful inquiry whether the Russian government would receive a petition from American Jews. In 1904 President Roosevelt expressed the American nation's condemnation of the outrage at Kishinev.
Russian aggressiveness in diplomacy became a larger source of danger. Germany and Russia, who in 1895 were foremost in intervening to deny to Japan the legitimate fruits of her victory over China against the latter's exclusive policy, in 1897 seized strategic positions in China which, together with demands for vast concessions, threatened the complete exclusion of the United States. In the SpanishAmerican War, Russia favored Spain and participated in a movement to make a European question of Cuba. Thus in connection with the revolution in international relations after 1898 a wider divergence of Russo-American interests resulted from events in the Far East. The threatened disintegration of China induced the American government to propose (6 Sept. 1899) a policy of "open door," largely directed against the exclusive trade policies of Russia in Manchuria where the recently constructed trans-Siberian Railway gave her special advantages.
Later (1900) the American government presented a courteous reminder of Russia's promise to evacuate Manchuria whose occupation appeared to menace American trade and manufacturing interests. A continuation of the controversy was a sequel of the peace-making in China following the Boxer troubles.
In the Russo-Japanese War, American public opinion favored Japan to a high point of enthusiasm, causing considerable astonishment and anger to many conservative Russians, but at the close of the war bitter feelings were softened by President Roosevelt's successful initiation in facilitating peaceful negotiations resulting in the Treaty of Portsmouth and by later American sympathy for reforms in Russia.
Although Russia showed gratitude for the peace, her subsequent acts in violating the open door principle in Manchuria resulted in a divergence of policy in the Far East, again causing friction, chiefly illustrated in the American propositions to internationalize the railroad system of Manchuria under Chinese management and with foreign capital in order to eliminate the political purposes of Russia and Japan. It was further illustrated in the new facilities offered to Russian encroachment in Manchuria and Mongolia following the Chinese revolution of 1911 resulting in the American note of 3 Feb. 1912. In Persia also in 1911, the American government viewed with some concern the Russian action in forcing Commissioner Shuster to leave the country. In 1912 Secretary Knox secured the right of the United States to participate in a loan needed by the new Chinese government, resulting in an arrangement (of June 1912) for a loan shared by bankers of six powers. After the rise of new difficulties resulting from hesitation of China and the imposition of new conditions which China in her extremity was compelled to accept, President Wilson, 18 March 1913, reversed this policy in recognizing the new Chinese republic, and withdrew government support from the combination of the six-power loan.
Meantime, on 7 July 1911, the United States and Russia together with Great Britain and Japan concluded at Washington a treaty for joint protection of fur-seals and sea otters in the north Pacific above 30° latitude for a period of 18 years. The serious dispute in regard to non-admission (even for short visit) of American Jews into Russia, whose government had never officially abandoned the theory of perpetual allegiance, finally led to an American agitation for abrogation of the Russo-American commercial treaty of 1832.
As early as 1873 Secretary Fish protested against Russian treatment of American citizens of Jewish birth as a violation of the treaty of 1832, to which Russia replied that the treaty must be interpreted in accord with requirements of Russian domestic law. The importance of the subject increased by increase of intercourse and in 1880 Secretary Evarts and in 1881 Secretary Blaine vigorously protested to no avail — as did Frelinghuysen in 1884-85 and Bayard in 1886. The subject was investigated by Secretary Olney in 1895 and in 1902 Secretary Hay at the request of Congress made a detailed report showing that Russia was clearly violating provisions of the treaty of 1832.
The United States had been inactive from a desire not to offend Russia, but a large Jewish immigration, and consequent political and business influence, finally led to offensive action in the House of Representatives in 1911 through the passage of an intemperate resolution ordering the abrogation oi the treaty. The Senate proposed a more diplomatic substitute resolution which was unanimously adopted. Meanwhile President Taft properly informed Russia of the intention to abrogate by a year's notice as provided in the treaty.
Thus after seeking ineffectually for over 30 years by deliberate processes of diplomacy to persuade Russia to observe the treaty, the United States resorted to the remedy provided by the express words of the treaty, and on 1 Jan. 1913 the treaty was abrogated. The action met a strong protest from reactionary PanRussian leaders. Unsuccessful steps were at once taken to negotiate a new treaty on a basis satisfactory to the United States. The issue was not one easily settled by compromise or by arbitration. As each party showed no disposition to recede from its position no progress was made in negotiations.
After 1914, with the disappearance of many causes of alienation and with the probability of a satisfactory understanding in regard to China and Japan, American opinion was again disposed to be friendly to Russia — and especially to sympathize with the struggle for liberal reforms in government.
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