2001 - The Bush Administration
In June 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin met in Slovenia for their first face-to-face talks. It was a get-acquainted session, and, at the end of the meeting, Mr. Bush said: "I looked the man in the eye. I found him straightforward and trustworthy. . . I was able to get a sense of his soul." For his part, the Russian leader said he viewed the United States as a partner. Western experts on Russia say the rapport between the two men established at that meeting has solidified over the years, and has been a key factor in Russian-American relations.
Terrorism is one issue that had drawn the United States and Russia closer together after September 11th. Russian President Vladimir Putin was one of the first world leaders to call President Bush and offer his deepest sympathies after the September 11 terrorist attacks. He pledged Russia's unparalleled support and cooperation. In that instant, Mr. Putin largely cast away the lingering post-Cold War distrust for a new focused mutual concern: the war on terror.
Many people in Russia said the high-profile relationship between Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin contributed to generally positive relations between the two former Cold War adversaries. Nonetheless, there were issues that strained relations. Russia strongly opposed the American-led war against Iraq and Moscow has looked on warily, as the North Atlantic military alliance expanded into Easter Europe. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov summarized relations between Russia and the United States as: 'not enemies, but not yet allies.' Many analysts agree, however, that ties between the former enemies have warmed considerably under the Bush administration.
By 2004 Bush was always on Russia's side. He is maybe the most pro-Russian American president in US history, at least in the 20th century. He liked Putin and supported him. But this was very much based on personal, subjective reasons or current needs of the US political establishment. Russian reaction to President Bush's re-election in 2004 was generally positive, partly because Russian President Vladimir Putin openly supported Mr. Bush during the election campaign. And, in general, Russians have tended to favor Republicans over Democrats. President Putin publicly praised President Bush, even before the final outcome of the U.S. election was known.
Russians across the political spectrum nurture a grievance over their perceived humiliation during Russia's period of acute weakness in the 1990's and argue that important gestures by Putin, including acceding to the U.S. abrogation of the ABM treaty and post-9/11 assistance in staging the war in Afghanistan, went unreciprocated. Many Russians insist that the U.S. is intent on weakening Russia, including by "encircling" Russia in waves of NATO enlargement and by establishing U.S. basing and missile defense sites that over time could erode Russia's national security.
In terms of stabilizing Afghanistan, Russia was a critical partner. Established in 2008, the Northern Distribution Network is a key strategic alternative to the congested Pakistan Ground Line of Communication. Thanks to Russia’s agreement to allow the transit of U.S. personnel and equipment across Russian territory in support of the ISAF mission, as of June 2012, more than 2,374 flights and over 404,000 military personnel had transited this corridor, while Russia’s ground transit arrangement with NATO resulted in the shipment of over 50,000 containers of supplies to Afghanistan.
Since the beginning of the War on Terrorism, Russia had been uncomfortable with the large NATO force deployed in its back yard. While Russia had extended measures of cooperation, such as the agreement for the distribution network to traverse its territory, relations cooled in light of other global events. Suspicions of geopolitical maneuvering increased in 2005 when the Uzbek government unexpectedly demanded that the U.S. Air Force abandon the Karshi-Khanabad air base (also known as K2). After the United States responded negatively to the government’s handling of a civilian uprising in the country, the Uzbek government rescinded its invitation to use the base. After the United States closed the base, Russia and Uzbekistan signed an alliance treaty and hailed the closure as a Russian diplomatic victory.
Russia rejected the physics driving the geographic selection of the two sites for missile defense in Europe, , and the U.S. decision to provide Poland with Patriot batteries was been pocketed as evidence of the "anti-Russian" nature of the program. Since October 2007, the US proposed a number of transparency and confidence-building measures to reassure Russia, providing extensive technical briefings on the threat from Iran as well as on the characteristics of the system, showing that it could not be effective against Russia's nuclear arsenal. Moscow continued to insist that their experts be permanently stationed at the sites; something the two host countries did not accept.
Russia's overwhelming response in Georgia and the breakaway enclave of South Ossetia was widely seen as symptomatic of Russian grievances over western actions. These include the expansion eastward of NATO and the European Union into what was once the Soviet sphere of influence, American plans for a missile defense system in eastern Europe and western support for the independence of Kosovo from Russian ally Serbia.
Russia welcomed NATO's decision to resume engagement in the NATO-Russia Council post-Georgia as a "return to realism," continuing its policy of demanding greater cooperation even as it decried the security organization as an existential threat to Russian security. While NATO reaffirmed the Bucharest Declaration's pledge that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members, Russian interlocutors argueed strongly that further enlargement risked direct military confrontation.
Russians pointed to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [CFE] as the archetypal outdated security structure, premised on the Cold War division of Russia versus the rest of Europe. Russia maintained its December 2007 suspension of its Treaty obligations and to press for ratification of the Adapted Treaty by the NATO signatories, while insisting on changes to the Adapted Treaty, such as elimination of the flank regime for Russia. The U.S. continued to pursue a "parallel actions plan" that would culminate in ratification of the Adapted Treaty; however, Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia repudiate the US operating premise that all Russian forces must leave all Georgian territory.
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