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Russian Army - Special Military Operation

After the Russian army failed to quickly capture Ukraine, passing through it in a victorious march of supposedly “liberators”, the main motivation for participation in the war for Russians remains coercion. Such an opinion was expressed by Mykola Malomuzh, General of the Army of Ukraine, Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (2005-2010), on the air of the FREEDOM TV channel 21 August 2023.

“They were walking with flags, preparing for the parade, meetings and the like. This motivation was swept aside, like a cold shower, by the resistance that Ukraine put up when all the people united. Therefore, this motivation no longer exists. Now it’s different: the Russian leadership is tough, but will definitely send them to war already under certain pressure. This is not only mobilization, it is preparation for aggressive actions on the battlefield, these are detachments directly on the line of war. And nowhere to go. There is no choice in this situation: either our guys will destroy them, or the rear detachments will destroy them. Therefore, motivation is lost, ”comments Malomuzh.

According to him, Russian propaganda is still trying to motivate its military with the theses that they are carrying out some “sacred mission of liberating Ukraine from nationalists and fascists,” but these theses do not work after the Russian military enters Ukraine.

“But there is no choice. They believe that since the state has already given them a clear direction, then they need to fight, even if it is an unjust war. This is now the motivation of the majority: there is no choice, we are mobilized, we were forced, and we will act accordingly. But I’ll tell you straight: when there is a real fight, all these motivations evaporate quickly. They understand that they have come to the territory where they will die, and there is no point in this,” Mykola Malomuzh summed up.

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) made a conclusion in January 2024 that Russian forces are able to perform planned rotations due to their number throughout Ukraine’s east. “Russian forces maintain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine, and the absence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations likely removes pressure on operational deployments that had previously partially restrained the Russians‘ ability to conduct rotations,” add the authors of the report.

According to Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence, Russian troops in Ukraine total 462,000 and that this is the entire ground component of Russia’s Armed Forces. And most Russian units in Ukraine are staffed at 92-95% of their estimated full strength, with the size of the Russian grouping in Ukraine allowing Russian troops to rotate throughout the entire war zone.

Russian troops withdraw units with 50% or less of the intended strength to the rear areas and send them back to the battlefield after they have been refreshed and replenished. Russian troops have carried out some regroupings since early October 2023 on the Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Lyman and Kupiansk fronts, which gave Russian forces time to perform the rotations described by Skibitskyi. However, analysts expect the overall combat capability of Russian troops in Ukraine to regress, so the Russian military will not be able to conduct several major offensive operations at the same time despite rotation.

The fighters of the Ukrainian 31st OMBr [Separate Mechanized Brigade] managed to break out of the Russian encirclement. Activity north of Progress was an extremely dynamic and intense day. Around 14:00, as predicted, a number of observation posts of the 1st and 3rd battalions were completely encircled. The brigade commander never gave the order to break through, so the personnel who were in that area confronted him with the fact that the boys would break through with a fight. With the help of coordinated actions of artillery, air reconnaissance and related forces, as well as under the control of officers on the ground, the guys from the 1st and 3rd battalions were able to break out of the encirclement in full force.

Artur Rehi noted by 27 July 2024 the most difficult situation continued to develop in the Avdiivka direction in the Ocheretyne and Toretsk area. Frontelligence writes that these advancements resulted from a lack of coordination and poor command decisions, similar to those made by the Ukrainian command during the rotation in Ocheretyne in the spring of 2024. Interestingly, the command of the Ukrainian 41st Mechanized Brigade, which was rotated to Chasiv Yar before moving to the Toretsk area, bears the lion's share of the blame for the loss of the canal district in Chasiv Yar and the Toretsk - Niu York area. In both cases, the Russians were able to advance within their areas of responsibility.

The defense of Ukrainian formations in Krasnohorivka continued to rapidly crumble under the onslaught of Russian troops. At the moment, most of the city is under the control of the Russian Armed Forces. The active battles that have been raging for the settlement since the beginning of January are, it seems, approaching their logical conclusion. With the capture of Krasnohorivka, the last line of defense of the AFU west of Donetsk, which has remained almost unchanged since 2014, will fall.

Russians are advancing in various directions around Vesele, which is flanked, towards the railway along the ridge, and towards the south in the Zheleanne area, with the aim to take from behind the fortifications behind Novoselivka Persha. The Russians will try to flank the entire line of basins from behind, thus bypassing the Ukrainian trenches and the line of lakes.

According to Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, the front line is currently 3,700 kilometers long. Active hostilities were conducted on 977 kilometers, that is, on territories that are twice the length of the border between Germany and France. Ukrainian troops are stretched out and the defense line is very thin, and if it crumbles, the Russians can go behind the positions and advance several kilometers at once. Syrsky acknowledged the significant advantage of the Russians in equipment and personnel.

By the end of 2024, the Kremlin plans to increase the army to 620 thousand. Now it numbers 520 thousand, which is 5 times more than at the beginning of the invasion. The number of the Armed Forces in 2024 is approximately 350,000.

In Moscow, the one-time payment for signing a contract was raised to 2 million rubles and they began to use a new practice reminiscent of the multilevel marketing, only life is at stake. In general, in Russia they began to pay money if the signer of the contract can bring a friend into the army. All new contracts are indefinite. People sign them, thinking that the contract is for six months, but do not read the small print.

Tatarigami reported 29 July 2024 that "Feedback from officers and soldiers on the ground, the rapid progress of Russian forces, and the unacceptable attitude towards regular soldiers from higher command indicate that the situation is not "under control." It is not a total disaster only due to the actions of people on the ground who are trying their best to prevent advances and showing examples of individual heroism and leadership. Of course, deliveries of F-16s, permission to strike deeper into Russia, and supplements of vehicles would have helped the situation, but resources alone can't fix the problem of continuous command mistakes, including unrealistic tasks disproportionate to available human resources, combined with demands to retake lost positions....

"The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.... It is still possible to break the spine of the Russian army, which has severe logistical problems, dwindling availability of preserved vehicles, reliance on unarmored transportation, unmotivated personnel, and artillery barrel replacement bottlenecks. Additionally, many internal economic problems take time to manifest. However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation."

The Russian propagandist Voenkor Kotenok reported in July 2024 that "The pace of our progress has slowed down. Slowly we are crawling west from Donetsk. Toad jumps. It's clear why there's a slowdown. There are no people. The level of losses is high. For those who don't understand, there is NO ONE PHYSICALLY to advance. The living force has been depleted. All this taking into account the fact that some military leaders are trying to adjust the result to fit the required dates. Everyone understands that by the end of the year there is a possibility that an agreement will begin, they are trying to make it in time. In Kharkov we are fighting back with heavy losses - Liptsy, Volchansk. We are crawling along Svatovo-Kupyansky, the other day we took Peschanoye. Zaporozhye and Dnieper are standing.

"The level of a number of tactical commanders is extremely low. During an operation, these "father commanders" do not prepare an evacuation group. Company "Storm" Logic: "Why? The lightly wounded will come out on their own, but we don't pull out the heavy ones." The reality is that company commanders DO NOT KNOW their personnel, which is rapidly changing due to huge losses. "Evil tongues say that in one of the static areas the management made a "brilliant" decision....not to take away the "two hundredths" [dead], because this increases the loss statistics. In the meantime, they lie "ownerless", listed as alive or missing. They are allowed to pull the dead out in parts, in doses, so that the statistics do not increase. Unfortunately, not fiction, but reality."

Fighterbomber posted in July 2024 about the VKS motorized rifle regiment. "This is a tricky one. Under the slogan "As long as there is not a second wave of mobilization," various types of units are scooping up contract personnel for replenishment or the formation of new detachments and even units, as we see from the report. Before this video, I heard that the Navy, as soon as possible, transfers contract soldiers to Marine brigades. Including transforming of the commandant's platoon into an assault platoon. Now here is a motorized rifle regiment consisting of the VKS personnel.

"In addition, there are situational initiatives at the front. For example, taking at least a few "unnecessary" signalmen to replenish the assault company. Transfer RMO officers to the UAV platoon being formed, because contractors or specialists from mobilisation have not appeared. Form an evacuation group from a mortar battery after the loss of materiel. Disband the sniper platoon of the sniper company in order to transfer personnel to the assault platoon. This is all turnover, starting around December 2023 - the result of constant, without operational pauses for replenishment and preparation of a "positional offensive".

"Let's add to this the inflated requirements for traumatism after wounds/injuries as a basis for demobilization. Requiring to lose not just one finger, but two on one hand. And so on. As a result, there are crowds of cripples in the recruitment, from which individual commanders scoop up reinforcements for assaults - as stories from the internet show. And the fact that they tend to discharge the slightly wounded early is even more widely known.

"All this is the very reverse side of the adopted "grinding strategy" and constant, without proper pauses, pressure on all fronts. The grinding is mutual. And the hohols are striving to improve the personnel exchange rate for themselves to at least 1 to 1. Hence the bet on "a million drones," on the speed of artillery response, on the F-16 and existing aircraft as carriers of the KAB.

All these are bells (and the VKS motorized regiment generally rings the alarm bell) that either there will be a truce or a second wave of mobilization. The adopted strategy of relying on striking with poorly trained infantry instead of increasing firepower by adding its "million drones" to hundreds of artillery barrels makes a second wave almost inevitable....

"Motorized rifle regiment of the Aerospace Forces (VKS). People recruited from airfields. There are engineering and technical staff, flight crews, and flight crews present. Armed forces, radio operators, mechanics, engine and brake engineers. Sergeants, warrant officers and officers. It seems there is even one navigator. They fight normally. As everybody. Everything is provided. No complaints. Everything is fine. This is approximately the same as the motorized rifle regiment of the Alexandrov Choir. Well, or a CSKA [football team] assault brigdade. There must be some message or conclusion here. But it is not there. Today this is a given."