Barrage detachments of the Red Army
In the early days of the Great Patriotic War, the leaders of a number of party organizations, the commanders of fronts and armies took measures to restore order in the troops retreating under the onslaught of the enemy. Among them - the creation of special units that performed the functions of barrage detachments. So, on the North-Western Front, already on June 23, 1941, in the formations of the 8th Army, detachments were organized from the retreating units of the border detachment to detain those leaving the front without permission. In accordance with the resolution "On measures to combat enemy paratroopers and saboteurs in the front line", adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 24, by decision of the military councils of the fronts and armies, barrage detachments were created from the troops of the NKVD.
Such warriors were still in the days of the Greek historian Xenophon. In his work of the 4th century BC, Cyropaedia, the historian wrote about the back rank in the multinational army of the Persian king Cyrus the Great , whose function was: “ to encourage those who do their duty, to restrain the faint-hearted with threats and to punish with death all those who intend to turn into rear, instill more fear in cowards than enemies. In the same Xenophon, one can also find psychological sketches in which the attitude towards those who give in to panic during the battle is quite unambiguous: “The human mass, when it is full of confidence, evokes indomitable courage, but if people are cowardly, then the more of them, the more terrible and panicky fear they succumb to . Here Xenophon defines the primary function of the back rank - to stop desertion in the bud, when people have not yet succumbed to mass panic.
On June 27, the head of the Third Directorate (counterintelligence) of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, Major of State Security A.N. Mikheev signed Directive No. 35523 on the creation of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads and railway junctions in order to detain deserters and all suspicious elements who had penetrated the front line.
Commander of the 8th Army, Major General P.P. Sobennikov, who operated on the North-Western Front, in his order No. 04 of July 1, demanded that the commanders of the 10th, 11th rifle and 12th mechanized corps and divisions "immediately organize detachments of barriers to detain those who fled from the front."
Despite the measures taken, there were significant shortcomings in the organization of the barrage service at the fronts. In this regard, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, in his telegram No. 00533 dated July 26, on behalf of the Headquarters, demanded that the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions and the commanders of the troops of the fronts "immediately personally figure out how the frontier service is organized and give exhaustive instructions to the chiefs of the rear guard." On July 28, Directive No. 39212 was issued by the head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Commissar of State Security 3rd rank VS Abakumov on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line.
During the fighting, a gap formed between the Reserve and Central Fronts, to cover which on August 16, 1941, the Bryansk Front was created under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In early September, his troops, at the direction of the Headquarters, launched a flank attack in order to defeat the German 2nd Panzer Group, which was advancing to the south. However, having pinned down very insignificant enemy forces, the Bryansk Front was unable to prevent the enemy grouping from reaching the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko appealed to the Headquarters with a request to allow the creation of barrage detachments. Directive No. 001650 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 5 gave such permission.
This directive marked the beginning of a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. If before that they were formed by the bodies of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then by the Special Departments, now the decision of the Stavka legalized their creation directly by the command of the troops of the army, so far only on the scale of one front. Soon this practice was extended to the entire active army. September 12, 1941 Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov signed Directive No. 001919, which ordered each rifle division to have "a barrage detachment of reliable fighters no more than a battalion in size (calculated as one company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at his disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles. The tasks of the barrage detachment were to provide direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, in stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, in eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, etc.
On September 18, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front adopted Decree No. 00274 “On intensifying the fight against desertion and penetration of enemy elements into the territory of the city of Leningrad”, in accordance with which the head of the Front’s military rear defense guard was instructed to organize four barrage detachments “to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without papers."
October 12, 1941 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. A note to Stalin in which he proposed "to organize a group of command personnel along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow" to organize the repulsion of enemy tanks, which should be given a "barrage detachment to stop the fleeing." On the same day, the State Defense Committee adopted Decree No. 765ss on the creation of a headquarters for the protection of the Moscow zone under the NKVD of the USSR, to which the troops and regional organizations of the NKVD, militia, fighter battalions and barrage detachments located in the zone were operationally subordinate.
In May-June 1942, during the hostilities, the Volkhov Group of Forces of the Leningrad Front was surrounded and defeated. As part of the 2nd shock army, which was part of this group, detachments were used to prevent flight from the battlefield. The same detachments operated at that time on the Voronezh front.
On July 28, 1942, as already noted, order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, which became a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. On September 28, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar of the 1st rank E.A. Shchadenko signed order No. 298, in which the state No. 04/391 of a separate barrage detachment of the army was announced.
Barrage detachments were primarily created on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the end of July 1942 I.V. Stalin received a report that the 184th and 192nd rifle divisions of the 62nd army left the village of Mayorovsky, and the troops of the 21st army left Kletskaya. On July 31, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, V.N. Gordov was sent directive No. 170542 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, signed by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, who demanded: “Within two days, to form, due to the best composition of the Far Eastern divisions that arrived at the front, barrage detachments of up to 200 people each, which should be placed in the immediate rear and, above all, behind the divisions of the 62nd and 64th armies. The barrage detachments are to be subordinated to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments. The next day, General V.N. Gordov signed order No. 00162 / op on the creation within two days in the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies of five barrage detachments, and in the 1st and 4th th tank armies - three barrage. At the same time, it was ordered within two days to restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Supreme High Command No.
On October 1, 1942, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky sent directive No. 157338 to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, which spoke of the poor organization of the service of detachments and their use not for their intended purpose, but for combat operations.
During the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), barrage detachments and battalions on the Stalingrad, Don and South-Eastern fronts detained servicemen fleeing the battlefield. From August 1 to October 15, 140,755 people were detained, of which 3,980 were arrested, 1,189 were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies and 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points. Commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, according to the report of the special department of the front to the Office of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR of October 30, 1942, proposed using detachments to influence the infantry of the unsuccessfully advancing 66th Army. Rokossovsky believed that the barrage detachments were supposed to follow the infantry units and force the fighters to attack by force of arms.
Army detachments and detachments of divisions were also used during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In a number of cases, they not only stopped those fleeing the battlefield, but also shot some of them on the spot.
In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed mass heroism and self-sacrifice. This, however, does not mean that there were no cases of desertion, abandonment of the battlefield and alarmism. Barrage formations were widely used to combat these shameful phenomena. In the autumn of 1943, measures were taken to improve the structure of the barrage detachments. In Directive 1486/2/org of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, sent on September 18 by the commander of the troops of the fronts and the 7th separate army, it was said:
“1. In order to strengthen the strength of the rifle companies, the non-standard barrage detachments of the rifle divisions, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 of 1941, should be disbanded.
2. In each army, in accordance with the order of the NCO No. 227 of 28.7.1942, 3-5 full-time barrage detachments according to the state No. 04/391, each numbering 200 people, should be contained.
The upkeep of these detachments should not come at the expense of combat units. Detachments must be maintained as independent full-time military units. In the tank armies, there should not be barrage detachments."
In 1944, when the troops of the Red Army were successfully advancing in all directions, barrage detachments were used less and less. At the same time, they were used in full measure in the front line. This was due to the increase in the scale of atrocities, armed robberies, thefts and killings of the civilian population. Order No. 0150 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal A.M. was sent to combat these phenomena. Vasilevsky on May 30, 1944
Barrage detachments were often used to solve combat missions. The improper use of barrage detachments was mentioned in the order of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command G.K. Zhukov dated March 29, 1943, commander of the 66th and 21st armies. In a memorandum “On the shortcomings of the activities of the front troops’ detachments”, sent on August 25, 1944 by the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A.A. Lobachev to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel-General A.S. Shcherbakov, it was noted:
“1. The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the people's commissar of defense. Most of the personnel of the detachments are used to guard army headquarters, guard communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc.
2. In a number of detachments, the headquarters staffs have become extremely swollen ...
3. The army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies ...
4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters led to the fact that in most detachments, military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded ... Conclusion: The detachments for the most part do not fulfill the tasks specified by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. Guarding headquarters, roads, communication lines, performing various chores and assignments, serving commanders chiefs, supervision of the internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the functions of the detachments of the troops of the front.
I consider it necessary to raise the question before the People's Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation."
However, not only the use of barrage detachments to perform tasks unusual for them was the reason for their disbandment. By the autumn of 1944, the situation with military discipline in the active army had also changed. Therefore, on October 29, 1944, I.V.Stalin signed order No. 0349 with the following content:
“Due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.
I order:
1. To disband separate barrage detachments by November 15, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.
2. Report the disbandment of the barrage detachments by November 20, 1944.”
The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” notes: “Due to the change for the better for the Red Army after 1943, the general situation on the fronts also completely eliminated the need for the continued existence of barrage detachments. Therefore, all of them were disbanded by November 20, 1944 (in accordance with the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0349 of October 29, 1944).
The 2001 film Enemy at the Gates shows Soviet Red Army commissars and barrier troops using a PM M1910 alongside their own small arms to gun down the few retreating survivors of a failed charge on a German position during the Battle of Stalingrad. The 2011 South Korean film My Way also depicts Soviet blocking troops shooting retreating soldiers during a charge.
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