Casamance - 2000s - Greed
In the early 2000s, the government of Senegal worked to cut off both external and internal support to the MFDC, by improving its relations with the neighboring countries and practicing a politics of ‘charm’ vis à vis the local populations, while buying off MFDC leaders (i.e., paying them not to fight). The rebellion lost its remaining popular support and the support of external actors as a result of these government initiatives. Weakened, the leadership signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government in which the word “independence” was not mentioned. In exchange, the movement received financing for economic projects from the state and from some internationally-based Senegalese partners.
Unfortunately for the peace process, the MFDC subsequently moved beyond these initial legal initiatives to become increasingly engaged in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The movement has not disarmed or demobilized. Some minor skirmishes occur from time to time. In other words, a situation of “neither peace nor war” prevails in Casamance, as the MFDC has become increasingly driven by greed. The area of Senegal called the Casamance is located between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Agriculturally one of the potential richest regions in Senegal, the Casamance had suffered from the effects of an 18-year separatist movement. Approximately 60,000 civilians had been displaced, and many had lost their means of livelihood. Land mines had been laid in many formerly productive areas. Villages had been abandoned. Infrastructure had been neglected, and investment had come to a virtual standstill.
The intensity of the conflict had varied over the years. Occasionally there had been violent flare-ups. The areas in which armed robberies/attacks take place had also changed over the course of time. Up until 2000, for example, most of the Kolda region was not an area in which attacks took place. Increasing frequency of cattle rustling and banditry from bands of armed people who routinely fled into Guinea-Bissau resulted in closure of the border with Guinea-Bissau in September 2000.
Throughout the history of the insurgency, there had been few incidents of fighting within the city of Ziguinchor and the resort area of Cap Skirring. In recent years, however, rural areas had been the sites of sporadic violent attacks on Senegalese military and civilian personnel and, on rare occasions, tourists.
The conflict had taken a hard toll on the population living in the Casamance. Normal means of livelihood (rice farming, other agricultural activities, etc.) were no longer possible for a high percentage of the population who no longer had access to their land or who had lost materials due to theft. Normal markets had been disrupted, and many normal services (such as financial services, health posts, schools) had been suspended or ended.
In December 2000, the Government issued a general warning to the national press that the dissemination of communications from the MFDC would be considered attempts to derail the Casamance peace process and would be prosecuted under the Penal Code. On the same day, the publisher and managing editor of the newspaper Le Populaire were summoned and interrogated for 7 hours by the criminal investigation division after the newspaper published a review of the 19-year-old Casamance conflict; 3 days later, they were arrested and then released on the same day after being charged with "disseminating false news and undermining public security." In January 2001 the cases were dropped.
Sporadic fighting continued during 2001 in the Casamance area in the southern part of the country between the Government and the secessionist Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). The incidence of violence in the Casamance region increased during the year, particularly in June and July, and reportedly resulted in some deaths. The military zone commander for the Casamance region made an effort during the year to reduce the number of human rights abuses committed by security forces under his command. During 2001, the press continued to report on frequent small arms attacks, raids, ambushes, and clashes with military forces by suspected MFDC gunmen, with continuing military and civilian fatalities. In March 2001 the Government and the MFDC signed two peace agreements designed to end the 20-year insurgency; however, these agreements were ineffective and fighting continued in Casamance. Following a change in MFDC leadership in August 2001, new talks were proposed but had not taken place by year's end.
Duirng 2001 Human rights NGO's in Casamance reported a decrease in the number of detentions of suspected MFDC rebels reported by local families; however, in January Amnesty International reported that 30 MFDC sympathizers remained in detention in Dakar and Kolda without trial. According to Amnesty International, the sympathizers were arrested in 2000 because of their Diola ethnic origin; they were charged with compromising state security, but no evidence was provided of their involvement in any acts of violence. Following the signing of a peace accord with the MFDC on March 16, on March 19, the Government released 16 of these prisoners; the remaining 14 prisoners remained in detention at year's end.
Throughout 2002, MFDC gunmen or suspected MFDC gunmen committed numerous killings. For example, in March 2002 suspected MFDC insurgents attacked a group of civilian vehicles 4 kilometers from the town of Diouloulou, near the Gambian border in the Bignona region of the Casamance and killed seven civilians and wounded four. In a government military sweep following this attack, the military killed several suspected MFDC insurgents, although exact figures were not available. In October 2002 suspected MFDC gunmen opened fire on a taxi in Diabang killing three civilian passengers. Military authorities in the Casamance region made an effort during 2002 to reduce the number of human rights abuses committed by security forces under their command, and human rights NGOs confirmed that there were significantly fewer complaints of arbitrary arrests, lengthy detention, and abuse during detention; however, there were no statistics available at year's end. At times, usually during sweeps for MFDC rebels, the security forces temporarily restricted access to the Casamance region or areas within it. The security forces also regularly maintained checkpoints in the Ziguinchor region to screen for MFDC rebels and arms transports. Security forces generally allowed travelers to proceed after checking documents and searching vehicles.
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), during the first 2 weeks of May 2002, approximately 2,000 civilians fled the country to the Gambia following clashes between government security forces and MFDC rebels in the Bignona area of northwestern Casamance. The UNHCR reported that 70 percent of these refugees returned to their villages by early June 2002. The numbers of refugees outside the country fluctuated according to the level of violence in the Casamance region; at year's end, it was estimated that several thousand refugees remained outside the country, mostly in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. A UNHCR census in January 2002 counted 7,000 Senegalese refugees living in the north of Guinea-Bissau.
As of 2002 Secretary-general of the MFDC Augustin Diamacoune Senghor was estimated to had some 2,300 troops under his command.
On 26 May 2003 separatist rebels in Casamance announced the death of Sidi Badji, a hardline leader who had held out against any compromise with the government on Dakar. The Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) had confirmed the death of Badji at the age of about 83. Despite his advancing years, Badji had remained, at least nominally, the head of the MFDC's military wing and commander-in-chief of its guerrilla army. Badji and his supporters opposed the softer line taken by MFDC's veteran President, Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Roman Catholic priest who had shown a willingness to settle for a modest degree of autonomy for Casamance. Over the past two years there had been a concerted campaign by local non-governmental organisations and other would-be peacemakers to improve relations between Diamacoune and Badji and to send an unequivocal message of peace to MFDC combatants in the bush.
For the first time in a number of years, by January 2004 there were reasonable expectations for peace in the Casamance, as a result of calls for peace from MFDC members at their annual conference in October 2003. The Government of Senegal and one of the three armed groups agreed to a timeline for pacifying the northern part of the Casamance between Gambia and the city of Ziguinchor. The government is also accelerating efforts to re-establish "normal" economic and social life to provide an alternative to the rebellion. In addition to the prolonged insurgency, armed bandits and landmines present a threat in rural areas.
Up to 15,000 displaced people were expected to return to their home villages in Senegal's southern Casamance province during 2004 as a low-level insurgency that had gone on for two decades petered out, but little was being done by the international community to assist them. In January 2004 Refugees International said over 50,000 people had been displaced from their homes as a result of a rebellion by separatist guerillas in the narrrow strip of swampy forested land bounded to the north by Gambia and to the south by Guinea-Bissau. Refugees International said in a statement that the Association of Young Farmers in Casamance (AJAC APREN) expected 10,000 to 15,000 displaced people to return to their home villages in 2004.
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