Casamance - 1990s - Growth
In the 1990s, the MFDC began to receive substantial support and benefits from neighboring countries and in response came to rely less upon the support of local constituents. With the change in the source of its support, the MFDC demonstrated an increased inclination to use violence not only against the state but also against local populations, which reinforced its growing dependence upon external patrons rather than popular support.
The conflict worsened in the late 1990s with the appearance of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. These landmines had adversely affected the population, agricultural activities and tourism, as well as hampering donor and NGO efforts in the region. No accurate information is available regarding the total quantity of landmines or the number of landmine casualties. Over the years, hundreds of villages had been abandoned and schools and health centres had closed. Hundreds of children and women had become victims of landmines and risk of exposure to sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV/AIDS had increased due to population displacement, the presence of combatants and increased poverty. The nutritional status of children had also deteriorated.
Fighting between the Government of Senegal soldiers and rebels for the Movement of Democratic Forces for the Casamance adversely affected the potential of the Casamance to contribute fully to the economy of Senegal. It is estimated that the conflict cut agricultural production by 50 percent. The tourism industry had been devastated by the conflict with many of its 16,000 employees being dismissed as a result of the continuing struggle. In addition, it is estimated that thousands of refugees had fled Casamance to neighboring countries such as Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia.
There were repeated violations of human rights in the southernmost region of Senegal, the Casamance region, mainly committed by the MFDC, but also by the army and the gendarmerie. Most of the recent violations took place prior to the cease-fire on 08 July 1993 between the Government and the MFDC. The MFDC, a predominantly Diola minority ethnic group, had been campaigning for the independence of the Casamance region for over 10 years. Until August 1992, the military and gendarmes had been restricted to their barracks as required by the May 1991 Agreement of Bissau between the Government and the MFDC. However, as rebel activity increased in the Casamance, government forces redeployed and engaged the MFDC units in several battles.
Several MFDC-initiated incidents heightened tensions, beginning with the death of seven Red Cross workers on 25 January 1993 by mine explosions. On the day of the presidential election, February 21, MFDC troops killed 24 persons, following MFDC threats to attack Casamance voters and politicians. The separatist movement had previously announced a ban on politics and voting in the Casamance. The MFDC was also held responsible for the deaths of 20 other persons that day when a mine blew up under a van rented by the Socialist Party to bring its members to the polls.
In larger engagements between the Senegalese army and MFDC rebels, the fighting in March 1993 at Badem, near Ziguinchor, left 80 dead, and a major battle in April near the town of Oussouye resulted in at least 100 rebels and 3 government soldiers dead. While estimates varied widely, the two battles resulted in the highest death tolls in the recent history of Casamance violence. As the military held few MFDC rebel prisoners following these significant engagements, the local press and local human rights associations charged that the army had engaged in extrajudicial killings. These charges could not be confirmed, and there had been no followup official investigation. As the MFDC normally does not leave their dead or wounded members behind in battle, this could also be a possible explanation.
The press and other observers not only questioned the military's action in these major battles but also criticized the army for periodic indiscriminate shelling of suspected rebel areas, which jeopardized the lives of innocent civilians. There were several incidents following the July 8 cease-fire, including in September the killing of a young MFDC member during a search at a police checkpoint.
The number of civilian deaths due to the fighting in the Casamance in 1993 could not be determined but was believed to be as high as 250. No one had been charged in any of the killings.
In 1997 a renewal of fighting in the Casamance area in the southern part of the country between the Government and the secessionist Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) caused many civilians to flee their villages. MFDC rebel forces reportedly were responsible for killings, disappearances, and torture. Guerrillas of the rebel MFDC were suspected of being responsible for killing many civilians during the fighting in the Casamance. A report by AI issued in September 1997 alleged "tens" of civilian deaths in the Casamance. A report by RADDHO released in the same month listed 16 individuals including Sarani Badiane, who had been killed in the conflict. Of the 16, RADDHO stated that 3 were killed by the army and 12 by the MFDC.
While there were no confirmed reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government officials during the 1997 resurgence of violence in the southern Casamance region, government forces were suspected of responsibility for many civilian deaths. In August 1997 a leader of the MFDC, Sarani Badiane, was found murdered near Ziguinchor. While no group claimed responsibility for the killing and no direct proof of guilt had emerged, the Senegalese human rights organization African Meeting for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO) and Amnesty International (AI) attributed responsibility for Badiane's death to the Government.
Although the leader of the MFDC, Abbe Augustine Diamacoune Senghor, remained free from house arrest in 1997, his movements were controlled by the Government. The Government reportedly blocked a trip by Diamacoune to France to meet with the leader of the MFDC's external wing to coordinate policy in peace talks with the Government. After the killing of Sarani Badiane in August 1997, two of Diamacoune's remaining lieutenants sought refuge with Diamacoune who remained in government custody at a church in Ziguinchor. The Government did not attempt to hinder their joining Diamacoune, but in October 1997 expelled them from Diamacoune's quarters.
In a February 1998 report, Amnesty International (AI) alleged that several mass graves for victims of extrajudicial killings exist in Niaguis and at Niamalang bridge. According to AI, an unknown number of civilians had been killed by civilian authorities or soldiers and had been buried secretly in these mass graves since the early 1990's. There had been no independent confirmation of these allegations.
Sporadic fighting continued through 1999 in the Casamance area in the southern part of the country between the Government and the secessionist Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). In January the Government and the leadership of the MFDC began a new peace initiative with a meeting between President Diouf and MFDC head Abbe Augustine Diamacoune Senghor. The MFDC leadership then held a conference--the "days of reflection"--in Banjul, the Gambia, in June 1999 to develop a unified position for advancing the peace process.
In its annual report published in July 1999, African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO - a local human rights organization) alleged that MFDC rebels were responsible for the widespread and indiscriminate use of land mines in the Casamance. According to RADDHO the rebels planted the mines in an effort to terrorize both the government security forces and the civilian population. Although it was difficult to determine the extent of their use in the Casamance, RADDHO claimed that up to 80 percent of the arable land in the areas of Ziguinchor, Sedhiou, Oussouy, and Bignona were unusable due to the land mines. RADDHO also estimated that between 1997 and 1998 land mines killed and injured some 500 civilians in the Casamance.
In a report on the Casamance published in June 1999, Amnesty International (AI) charged that the MFDC rebels committed killings and torture of dozens of civilians. According to AI, MFDC guerillas, who belong mainly to the Diola ethnic group, occasionally targeted members of other ethnic groups, such as the Mandingo, Balante, Manjak, and Mancagne, whom they viewed as unsympathetic to their cause. AI also charged that MFDC shelling killed civilians. According to AI, the MFDC also executed government security forces it had taken prisoner.
On 12 February 1999, the Government released 123 suspected MFDC members who had been detained in Dakar, Ziguinchor, and Kolda without trial, some for several years, on grounds of compromising or plotting against the security of the State. The courts ordered their release following the January 1999 meeting between President Diouf and MFDC leader Abbe Diamacoune, which was the beginning of an effort to establish a peace process in the Casamance. The MFDC had demanded the release of all political detainees in connection with the Casamance conflict as a condition for dialog. According to the AI report issued in June 1999, 110 suspected MFDC rebels remained without trial in prisons throughout the country; however, on 30 December 1999 the Government released 44 persons who had been detained in connection with the Casamance conflict.
The internal talks of the rebellion movement hosted in Banjul during June and July 1999, marked an historic turning point for the Casamance peace settlement process which seeks to end the conflict in this region. These talks and the end of the crisis in neighboring Guinea-Bissau had helped pave the way for direct peace negotiations between the GOS and the MFDC during late December 1999.
On 26 December 1999, the Government and MFDC leaders met in the Gambia to begin negotiations on the future of the Casamance. During these talks, the two parties agreed to an immediate ceasefire in the Casamance. The parties also agreed to meet face to face at least once a month to negotiate a peaceful future for the region. At year's end, neither side had a concrete proposal to bring to the negotiating table; however, the parties developed a framework for discussion.
President Wade said he wanted to meet with rebel leaders to hammer out a broader peace agreement. But despite the truce, hard-core elements of the MFDC's armed wing had continued to fight, even attempting to disrupt Senegal's presidential election in February 2000. The militant wing of the MFDC had ignored the recent political changes in Senegal -- including Mr. Wade's election - and remains committed to independence at any cost.
President Wade had advanced a liberal agenda for Senegal, including privatizations and other market-opening measures. He had a strong interest in raising Senegal's regional and international profile. The country, nevertheless, had limited means with which to implement ambitious ideas. The liberalization of the economy is proceeding, but at a slow pace. Senegal continues to play a significant role in regional and international organizations.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
