Myanmar - 2024 Election ?
With the junta’s extension of a national state of emergency in Myanmar, it became increasingly uncertain whether the regime will hold general elections as it previously pledged. Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, chairman of the State Administration Council, the junta’s governing body, had planned to hold an election. The general led the February 2021 coup d'état that seized power from the democratically elected government on the grounds of election fraud. Results showed that the National League for Democracy, or NLD, had won Myanmar’s 2020 general election with more than 80% of the vote.
Observers considered the 2020 national elections to be generally reflective of the will of the population, notwithstanding some structural shortcomings. The NLD won more than 80 percent of the 1,150 contested seats at the state, regional, and union levels, including 396 of 476 races for national assembly seats.
Burma’s military overthrew the democratically elected civilian government via a coup d’état on February 1, 2021, declaring a state of emergency and transferring all executive, legislative, and judicial authorities to the State Administration Council, an authoritarian military-run administrative organization led by armed forces Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing. The regime extended the state of emergency by six months in January and again in July. The opposition National Unity Government, some ethnic armed organizations, civil society groups, and deposed civilian leaders continued efforts to restore democracy and apply reforms to address military abuses.
Deposed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other leading members of the deposed civilian government and National League for Democracy party remained in detention. Armed opposition efforts, and to a lesser degree nationwide prodemocracy protests and actions by the Civil Disobedience Movement, continued to disrupt the regime’s ability to exert full administrative control over governing institutions. The regime responded with violent repressive tactics such as the continued arrest of political opponents, the reported use of extensive lethal violence against unarmed persons, torture, sexual violence, and other abuses.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the regime; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, and physical abuses or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers.
Further significant human rights issues included serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association; particularly severe restrictions on religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement; the inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; gender-based violence carried out by the regime; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes involving violence or threats targeting members of national and ethnic minority groups; trafficking in persons; the existence of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although those laws were rarely enforced; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association, including violence and threats against labor activists; and some of the worst forms of child labor.
There were numerous reports that regime security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings of civilians, prisoners, and other persons in their power. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which noted that the actual number was likely to be much higher, there were 2,096 verified reports of persons killed by the regime as of September 1. Some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and Peoples Defense Force (PDF) groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse and degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones.
The regime encouraged the development of proxy vigilantes to target prodemocracy groups and their families. Since late April, pro-military vigilante groups carried out a series of targeted killings of prodemocracy supporters and their family members. The groups – many operating under the name of Thway Thauk, or “Blood Comrades” – operated primarily in urban areas. Thway Thauk groups carried out a series of targeted killings in Mandalay, Rangoon, and Tanintharyi Regions. In April 2022, these groups killed at least 13 persons, including nine National League for Democracy (NLD) members after announcing the launch of “Red Operation,” an assassination campaign directed at NLD and PDF members and their families.
Members of regime security forces reportedly tortured and otherwise abused suspects, prisoners, detainees, and others. Such incidents occurred, for example, during interrogations and were widely reported across the country. Alleged harsh interrogation techniques were designed to intimidate and disorient and included severe beatings and deprivation of food, water, and sleep. Other reported interrogation methods described in news reports included rubbing salt into wounds and depriving individuals of oxygen until they passed out. There were also reports of security forces raping and sexually assaulting women and girls during security operations and detention.
The law allows authorities to order the detention without charge or trial of anyone they believe is performing or might perform any act that endangers the sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquility. Conditions in prisons, labor camps, and military detention facilities were reportedly harsh and frequently life threatening due to overcrowding; degrading and abusive treatment; and inadequate access to medical care (including COVID-19 treatment) and basic needs, including food, shelter, and hygiene. Conditions for women were deplorable, with a lack of access to sufficient toilets and no privacy. Prison guards denied requests for sanitary products for menstruation and other basic hygiene products.
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) estimated that there were 12,942 individuals under detention on political grounds as of November 11, an increase of 4,604 from December 31, 2021. Many former political prisoners remained subject to surveillance and restrictions following their release, including the inability to secure identity or travel documents.
Fighting between the regime and opposition forces was reported across the country, with frequent fighting in Chin, Karen, and Kayah States and Sagaing and Magway Regions. Fighting between the military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State resumed midyear when the military launched its first airstrikes since the informal 2020 ceasefire. Fighting between EAOs in Shan State continued, including between the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Shan State Progressive Party with support from the United Wa State Party, according to media reports.
Reports of killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, disregard for civilian life, sexual and gender-based violence, and other abuses committed by regime security forces were common; some EAOs and PDF groups were accused of similar abuses.
Freedom of speech was severely limited. Those who spoke openly against the regime or in favor of the NLD, NUG, or democracy more broadly risked abuse and punishment by regime authorities. The regime used the revised privacy law to allow authorities to review content on individuals’ cell phones at checkpoints and during neighborhood raids. After the coup, the regime banned independent media outlets that did not self-censor reporting on the prodemocracy movement. The regime also banned the use of certain terminology in reporting, such as “junta,” “coup d’état,” and “military council.”
The regime continued to practice zero tolerance of online dissent. The regime surveilled and censored online content, restricted access to the internet, and prosecuted its online critics. Even before the 2021 coup, the telecommunications law included broad provisions giving the government the power to temporarily block and filter content for the “benefit of the people.” The regime arrested a man from Maubin Township, Ayeyarwady Region and charged him with sedition for filming and sharing online a recording of heavy rains brought about by a cyclone. In regions perceived as supportive of the opposition, the regime at times simply shut down internet and related communications.
Min Aung Hlaing extended emergency rule in Myanmar for another six months on 31 July 2023, thereby delaying the date by which elections must be held according to the country’s constitution. Previously, the junta had said it planned to hold elections by August 2023. The military leader had said that he would hold elections and hand over power to the winning party, but the state of emergency that allows him to rule the country had been extended repeatedly.
Analysts said there was little chance of holding elections wracked by fighting – in Sagaing, Magway, Bago and Tanintharyi regions as well as in Kayin, Kayah, Chin and Mon states. Myint Htwe, a National League for Democracy lawmaker from Ye-U township in Sagaing region, told RFA that the junta is citing the country’s instability due to the fighting as an excuse to not hold elections and to continue its rule. Western governments and international rights groups say that any election held under the junta is unlikely to be free or fair.
Though the ruling military council considers holding elections as a political exit for the junta, it will not solve Myanmar’s current situation of turmoil and fighting wracking the country, said San Aung, executive director of the New Myanmar Foundation, an election monitoring group. “Since they have already announced that an election would be held, they will try to hold one as a political exit, but if they think it won’t politically benefit them much, then they won’t,” he said. “But the political solution for the current situation is not an election,” added San Aung, a former minister of health and education. “It is through dialogue and political negotiations.”
Neither the junta nor the shadow National Unity Government that emerged after the coup have discussed holding political negotiations. Because of nationwide armed resistance to the junta, officials have not been able to complete a census – a major step in preparation for an election — though the regime claims it completed a count of 90% of Myanmar’s populations of roughly 54 million people.
Min Aung Hlaing mentioned two possible election scenarios at a 31 July 2023 meeting of the National Defense and Security Council. The first is to hold elections nationwide, while the second is to hold elections only in areas the military controls and to exclude politically unstable regions and states. The military commander-in-chief did not decide on one or the other, but rather concluded his speech by saying that security must be increased throughout the country. At a military council meeting in Naypyidaw on Aug. 7, Min Aung Hlaing said the 2023 election could be delayed if peace and law and order are disturbed.
The military council could try to continue to hold power instead of holding elections. The junta leader said that he would set aside six months to prepare for the election after the initial yearlong state of emergency the military declared following the coup and the two previous six-month extensions.
The junta’s new Political Parties Registration Act applies to political parties that wish to contest in 2023 elections, and those that fail to register are automatically de-registered or excluded from participating. The Union Election Commission under the junta also dissolved the National League for Democracy [NLD] in March 2023 after its leadership chose not to re-register under the new registration law. As of 27 July 2023, the junta’s Union Election Commission had allowed 30 political parties to re-registered under the new law and five new ones to register for the elections.
Political parties not aligned with the military were denied the rights to assemble and protest peacefully. The regime, moreover, conducted politically motivated investigations into prodemocracy political parties and their leaders, particularly the NLD. Corruption was widespread in all dimensions of political life, including especially the judicial system. Petty extortion by police was paralleled by more serious graft at higher levels, such as demanding bribes from victims to conduct criminal investigations.
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