Political Parties
The series of splits, mergers, and coups that dotted Morocco's already fractured political landscape since November 2005 attest to the fact that posturing for the 2007 parliamentary elections was in full swing. They also spoke volumes about the force that King Mohammed VI's words about the direction of Morocco's political development play out within the political establishment. The King, whom the constitution endowed with supreme power over all political matters, set the tone and defined the limits for Moroccan political parties. His repeated calls since 2004 for a rationalization of the "Balkanized" political landscape culminated in parliament's passing in December 2005 of an Interior Ministry-drafted law on political parties that restricts public funding for parties to those who win at least 5 percent of the national vote. The new law also required parties to practice more democracy and ensure greater financial transparency in their internal affairs.
Of Morocco's 28 plus legally registered parties as of 2006, because of their conviction-based platforms and comparatively stronger internal democracy, the Islamist Party for Justice and Development (PJD) and leftist Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) appeared to be the two most likely to emerge to fulfill the King's vision of a "coherent" majority and "constructive" opposition in 2007, assuming that elections continued their trend of being freer and fairer than under former King Hassan II.
As a party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Morocco is bound to Article 7.3, which stipulates that “each state party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this Convention and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties.” The 2011 constitution contained provisions that uphold this obligation. Article 7 notes that the law determines “regulations on the activities of political parties, criteria for state financial support, and the modalities of controlling their funding.”
Although each political formation is unique, all Moroccan parties are subject to the same constraints inherent to the political environment in which they operate. Despite being led by a generally progressive, reform-minded monarch, Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which supreme authority rests with the King. Political parties exist at the King's discretion. During the reign of former King Hassan II, the Palace fragmented the political class, manipulated elections, co-opted or removed political opposition, and set up new parties to undercut the nationalist movement and encourage the development of a multi-party system. Since his arrival in 1999, King Mohammed has granted parties more political space and invited them to participate more in the exercise of power.
Yet, according to the constitution, the King still appointed the government, presided over the Council of Ministers, and has the authority to, at his discretion, remove any minister, dissolve parliament, or rule by decree. Accordingly, Morocco's traditional parties were structured to confront the authority of the state rather than share in its power. They were oriented to fight for democracy rather than live it. The experience of their leaders programmed them to believe that power and legitimacy come from the top of the pyramid where the King rules rather than from the bottom where the people are. The King's steady opening disoriented most parties, which, wary perhaps of a possible rollback, had not fully adjusted to the new reality. Rather than reorienting themselves entirely toward the population, parties instead intensified calls for constitutional reforms as a means to ensure that the opening is genuine and lasting.
In the meantime, internally, most parties remained undemocratic and their structures anachronistic. Heavy-handed, aging leaders have taken possession of "their" parties, and their individual ambitions trump the party's collective action on behalf of the public interests it supposedly represents. This culture creates an environment where dissent within parties is quieted or marginalized and, because leaders see youth and women as threats rather than tools for restoring party legitimacy, prospective leaders are stifled and women's access to political power is restricted. Party structures lack a robust framework for airing disputes. Militants who question the direction of their parties are left with few formal mechanisms to express disagreement, and internal revolts or party splits proliferate. Parties also suffer from the poor image that their parliamentarians have in the eyes of the population. Research by MEPI/USAID-funded National Democratic Institute (NDI) showed that deputies are widely perceived as not taking their jobs seriously and are accused of protecting their own interests rather than representing those of citizens. The negative perception of parliament, where deputy absenteeism remains a serious concern, is well deserved in our view. A paltry 68 parliamentarians (21 percent) voted in the lower house's October 2005 vote on the political party law, for example, and just 102 (31 percent) were present during the November 2005 vote on the budget law, despite the fact that these two bills were arguably the most important pieces of legislation passed by parliament during its fall session. According to Istiqlal executive board member and upper house councilor Mohamed El Ansari, "only 10 percent of all deputies can be considered legitimate public servants; we're the ones who do all the work." Many deputies view their jobs as no more than a stepping stone to one day becoming a minister.
Another part of the problem stems from the institutional deficiencies of parliament. Bureaucratically, it remains subordinate to the monarchy and is the last institution -- after the government, which proposes the bulk of Moroccan legislation, and civil society -- to deliberate legislation. The King reserves the right to veto any laws, dissolve either house of parliament, and set election dates. Deputies complain that the government is indifferent toward the legislature and lacks respect for the prerogatives delegated to the parliament in the area of legislative functioning and oversight of the executive branch. They also complain that the government, in the interests of the state, too often gives parliament too little time to deliberate draft laws, as was the case with U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement-related, patent/trademark and copyright legislation passed in December 2005. Meanwhile, the government was slow to take action on proposed legislation that originates in parliament.
Stuck between a monarch calling for a democratic reorientation of parties and a political system in which the same monarch holds and exerts supreme power, the political action of Morocco's leading parties -- with rare exception -- was rendered divided and ineffective. Preoccupied with the imbalance of power between parties and the Palace, parties expend tremendous energy and resources militating for expansion of the competencies of parliament and a strengthening of the prime minister's prerogatives. This effort diverts parties' attention away from their fundamental role as organizers of society and mouthpieces for the people, and it exacerbates the public's perception that politicos only care about their own interests and are out of touch with the people, as a 2006 poll by the MEPI/USAID-funded International Republican Institute found. This is one of the reasons that the King pushed for the adoption of a new law on political parties, passed by parliament in December 2005, which raises the standards for internal democracy and financial transparency in party affairs.
Of Morocco's leading parties, the PJD and USFP were in the best position to take advantage of the political opening by King Mohammed. Each party is politically active, connected to the population (though USFP less so than PJD), and has a unique vision for the country. Each appeared to be individually respected by the Palace as a formidable political force, judging by the Palace's oppressive treatment of the USFP since the 1970s (which has relaxed since it joined the government in 1997). Each was vocal about its desire to strengthen parliament's powers and expand the prerogatives of the prime minister in a tug of war with the monarchy. The PJD's Islamic-framed political values gave it wider appeal among everyday Moroccans, 60 percent of whom are uneducated and illiterate and therefore more prone to the PJD's appeals to the heart than the USFP's appeals to the intellect.
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