Political Parties - Profiles
Since the 2011 election, the Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD) has led the government under Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane. As a multi-party system, 27 parties and alliances of parties were running for seats in the 2016 election. The PJD and Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), who both fared well during the 2015 municipal and regional elections, were generally anticipated to receive the largest share of seats. Only three parties (PJD, PAM, and the Istiqlal Party) are competing in all 92 multimember constituencies. The Moroccan Liberal party is boycotting the election.
The parties competing in the 2016 elections were the Party of Justice and Development (PJD); the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM); Istiqlal Party (PI); Constitutional Union (UC); National Independent Rally (RNI); Party of Union and Democracy (PUD); Party of Environment and Sustainable Development (PEDD); Democratic and National Party (PDN); Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS); Party of Social Center (PCS); Party of Reform and Development (PRD); Party of the Moroccan Left Green (PGVM); Democratic Party for Independence (PDI); Action Party (PA); Party of Freedom and Social Justice (PLJS); Party Al Amal; Alliance of Democratic Left Federal Parties; Democratic Society Party (PSD); Party of Neo-Democrats; Social Democratic Movement (MDS); Party of Renaissance and Virtue (PRV); Front of Democratic Forces (FFD); Party Annahda; Alliance of Pact and Renewal (AAR); and Moroccan Union for Democracy (UMD).
Popular Movement Union (70 MPs in 2006, 32 MPs in 2011)
The traditionally rural Popular Movement Union (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire - UMP) is the product of the re-constitution of Morocco's three pro-Berber parties -- the Popular Movement (MP), National Popular Movement (MNP), and the Democratic Union (UD) -- into one entity. The UMP held its constituent congress on March 24-25, 2006. Established in 1959, the Berber movement advocated unity around the monarch, Islamic socialism, the recognition of Amazigh as a national language, and opposition to the city dwellers' monopoly on government positions and preference for a one-party system. Despite their rural origins, the UMP parties made important inroads into Morocco's cities, winning seats in Casablanca, Rabat, Sale, and Ouarzazate in the 2003 municipal elections.
As the largest caucus in the lower house in 2006, the UMP had the potential of becoming a formidable political force. Its greatest strength lies in the personalities of its members, many of whom are large landowners who wield significant influence in rural communities. UMP parties tend to enlist strong candidates whose Berber identity appeals to voters. They are long-standing allies of the Palace and, according to independent weekly Le Journal, their fusion comes at the urging of the MOI.
The UMP was very much a work in progress by 2006. It was not until January 2006 when members of the executive board of the UD orchestrated a revolt to overthrow UD founder and secretary general Bouazza Ikken that UD's support for the unified UMP was secured. The mutineers objected to Ikken's unilateral decisionmaking and constant waffling on the merger, according to press reports. The new party had to overcome the steeply ingrained culture of rivalry and competition that flourished at the base of the three formations.
The UMP does what the Palace wants, has few original ideas, is aloof concerning the country's problems, and practices little internal democracy, as Ikken's clumsy ouster demonstrates. Despite being formed in 2004, the UMP caucus was undisciplined and members rarely followed the party's orders uniformly, as occurred in the elections for parliament speaker in April 2005 when a sizable group of UMP deputies refused to vote for Abdelwahed Radi (USFP) on the second ballot. Deputies did not join the UMP because of a platform (whihc did not exist) but because it is convenient.
By the 2016 election, only the Popular Movement (MP)was a force to be reckoned with.
Istiqlal Party (60 MPs in 2006, 60 MPs in 2011)
Founded in 1944, the Istiqlal Party is the patriarch of Morocco's nationalist parties. It emerged as a result of national awareness and the need to organize the activities of nationalists in their struggle against French and Spanish occupation. It seeks to uphold Islamic values and advocates democratic government. On the eve of the 1992 parliamentary elections, it joined the Koutla alliance, or national democratic bloc, also comprising the USFP, Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS), and several other parties that have since abandoned the alliance. Working together, the alliance advocated and achieved a re-writing of the constitution in 1996. In October 2005, Istiqlal renewed its commitment to the Koutla and announced a pact with USFP for the 2007 elections, despite its long-standing, often bitter, rivalry with the leftist party, according to Moroccan press reports.
Istiqlal has widespread name recognition and a well-organized, national presence at all levels of society. According to leader Abbas El Fassi, the party has instituted a 20-percent quota for women at each level of its bureaucracy and by 2006 had two directly elected women parliamentarians, the most of any party except the PJD. It has a vibrant youth wing that meets regularly. It boasts strong Islamic credentials, speaks out frequently in favor of the Palestinians, and is a leading voice on nationalist causes like the Western Sahara. It counts on the support of organized labor, including the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM). While historically pro-monarchy, it challenges the Palace, as illustrated by El Fassi's renewed appeals of late for more power for parliament and the prime minister. The party is aware of the most important social and economic problems facing the country.
The heads of Morocco's largest and most influential families continued to dominate the party's leadership structure and exerted a tight grip on the direction of the party. While party members criticize the government and Palace behind closed doors, they were not free to air their grievances publicly. Wrapped up in the glory of its nationalist past, the party had a tendency to dwell on the fruits of its struggles rather than on the design of a new and innovative social program for the country. Along with USFP, it was the primary target of the PJD-led opposition's criticism of the Jettou government. It also carried the baggage of being the pet party of Morocco's historical Fez-based bourgeoisie, which dimmed its appeal to potential supporters in the context of Morocco's highly charged regional rivalries.
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (56 MPs in 2006, 39 MPs in 2011)
Founded in 1975, the USFP traces its origins to leftist dissidents of the National Union of Popular Forces, which split from Istiqlal in 1956. Its vocal opposition to the government led to the arrest and conviction of many of its members, including first secretary and Minister of Territory Development, Water, and Environment, Mohamed El Yazghi. Ravaged by two decades of state oppression, it emerged in 1997 as just the second opposition party to lead the government and the first to take the reigns during the era of "government by alternation." The party is a strong proponent of Morocco's democratic transition. It seeks to rally all leftist parties around itself in a quest to form a united socialist left. In December 2005, it absorbed the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD) and acquired PSD's four lower house deputies. The move isolated the former Communist PPS and Parti Al Ahd, which with PSD had formed the Socialist Alliance. Also in December 2005, former secretary of state in charge of small and medium enterprises Abdelkrim Benatik left the party to create a new party, according to press; a small group of militants reportedly followed him.
The USFP has glowing credentials as a militant for democracy. It is not afraid to battle for change even at the price of self-sacrifice. In August 2005, the political bureau set up working groups to study social problems and recommend policy to the party, according to press. USFP met with citizen groups to hear ideas and incorporate them into an innovative platform for 2007, press indicated. It modernized its structures and, following its June 2005 national congress, reportedly abolished its administrative and central committees, whose work was duplicative of the national council. It established a 20-percent quota for women and 10 percent for youth in all governing bodies, except the political bureau. Its caucus was active and cohesive and its leader exerted considerable influence in parliament. The June 2005 congress appeared to have cemented El Yazghi as party leader and Radi as his deputy.
USFP's public image plummeted since it joined the government in 1997. Now publicly regarded as a party that has been "bought," its democratic and reform credentials have taken a hit. A party of heady intellectuals and academics, it has lost touch with the population since assuming power. El Yazghi is often at odds with the youth wing and has waged an open battle with dynamic, 42-year old Secretary of State to the Prime Minister for Youth, Mohammed El Gahs, according to Moroccan youth leader Ahmed Ghayet and press sources. Other intense, internal rivalries also act as an anchor on the party's march toward a modernized and democratic internal structure.
The creation of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU) following the September 2005 merger of the Unified Socialist Left with the Moroccan association Faithfulness to Democracy threatened USFP's goal of galvanizing the left around itself. as of 2006, deputies from all leftist parties accounted for just some 80 of the lower house's 325 seats, or 25 percent. This meant that the USFP will need to forge political, vice ideological, alliances with non-leftist parties to govern (like it has with Istiqlal), which may undercut its base.
Party for Justice and Development (42 MPs in 2006, 107 MPs in 2011)
The sole, legal Islamist party in Morocco, the PJD was established in 1998. Representing the union of religious hard-liners in the form of the Reform and Unification Movement with young, urban, middle class intellectuals and civic-minded volunteers, the party advocates good governance, social justice, and a strong prime minister and parliament. It opposes corruption, abuse of power, favoritism, irrational management of public finances, and inefficient public administration. It recognizes the King's religious authority, unlike the semi-legal Justice and Charity Organization. It has adopted a pragmatic and responsible approach to assuming power.
Espousing a desire to learn how to govern in a gradual manner, the party agreed to limit the number of districts in which it ran candidates in the 2002 and 2003 elections but signaled its intention to run full-bore in 2007. In November 2005, it signed a charter of cooperation with the liberal democratic Citizen Forces party, which enhanced its image as a moderate party open to all partners. Secretary general Saad Eddin El Othmani also has stated publicly that the party was considering a possible alliance with the centrist National Rally of Independents (RNI). In December 2005, Mohamed Khalidi, who resigned from the party in the summer, and a small group of former PJD militants, founded a new party aimed at creating an alternative Islamist movement based on openness, pluralism, dialogue, and co-existence, according to press.
The PJD advocates a specific platform and holds its members accountable to defending it in all aspects of their political activities. Its serious and conscientious political action is inspired by a strong, faith-based, personal conviction. It invests heavily in protecting its public image; its deputies take pride in taking public transportation to attend parliamentary sessions and often refuse to attend events where alcohol is served. It enjoys the public perception of being a "no nonsense" organization. It is the single most active party at the grassroots level, especially in urban areas, and is a strong practitioner of the politics of proximity. The PJD fines its caucus members for missing sessions in parliament. It gives its young militants opportunities to shine. It has a strong record on internal democracy and has advanced the role of women in its governing structures. The PJD caucus had the highest percentage of women deputies than any other party in the lower house. It was the only party that can accurately quantify the level of its support in terms of number of likely votes in every electoral district.
The party's principle weakness lies in its religious reference. The GOM, which has warned us on several occasions that the "Islamists are not to be trusted," is very suspicious of the party's real intentions should it come to power. The 16 May 2006 terrorist bombings were a huge test for the party. It continues to try to differentiate itself from Islamic extremists by denouncing terrorist acts and being on the front lines of calls for tolerance and moderation. The public anti-alcohol and pro-hijab stands of party hard-liners make potential supporters nervous and lend weight to its rivals' arguments that it is too radical to be entrusted with public administration.
Although its reputation for having strong internal democracy is well deserved, it remains to be seen whether the behind-the-scenes struggle between hard-liners and moderates would overly strain the party in the event it comes to power. As an example of this struggle, the general secretariat reversed the party's election of hard-liner Mustapha Ramid as caucus leader in favor of the more moderate Abdellah Baha in October 2004. In October 2005, however, the party chose Ramid to chair the Committee on Justice, Legislation, and Human Rights in the lower house.
Because of the Palace's misgivings about the party and the nature of Morocco's multi-party system, the PJD would need to seek an alliance with another party to form the majority; any potential partner is likely to have already been tainted by participating in previous governments.
National Rally of Independents (39 MPs in 2006, 52 MPs in 2011)
RNI emerged from a caucus comprising 61 deputies elected to parliament with no party affiliation who grouped together in 1978 after municipal and parliamentary elections in 1976 and 1977, respectively. The party is criticized for its close association with the monarchy -- indeed, it is widely believed that RNI was created by the Palace. Ex-prime minister and brother-in-law of former King Hassan II, Ahmed Osman, has led the party since its creation. RNI split in the 1980s, leading to the formation of the National Democratic Party. Osman's allegedly undemocratic management of party affairs prompted a mini-revolt in January 2006 when, under the threat of leaving the party, a group of deputies led by former Minister of Human Rights Mohamed Aujjar prevailed upon the executive board to agree to reform the party and consider a change in leadership, according to Moroccan press. Press sources indicated that Osman had reasserted control by making concessions, including holding weekly meetings with the executive board and establishing 16 committees to suggest ways to reform the party. In December 2005, Osman said the party, which had not yet been contacted by current majority partners USFP and Istiqlal concerning 2007 elections, was considering an alliance with the PJD, according to Aujourd'hui Le Maroc. RNI could play the role as a moderating force in a PJD-led government.
Despite its dubious beginnings, the party evolved to represent the political interests of big business. Its main supporters and deputies still come mainly from the ranks of Morocco's wealthiest farmers, landowners, and bankers. RNI had a strong presence in both houses of parliament in 2006; its caucus in the Chamber of Councilors (upper house) comprises 47 councilors (17 percent) and is the largest, while its lower house caucus was the fifth largest of seven with 39 deputies (12 percent).
Because RNI represented the interests of privileged landowners and bankers, which are closely linked to those of the monarchy, it had little appeal among the masses and has no popular base, as borne out in IRI's 2006 poll on popular political attitudes. Osman's 28-year-long stranglehold on the party had extinguished most of the party's dynamism and further dimmed its appeal to its natural power base in business circles. The party desperately needed an infusion of new energy and a rebirth under new leadership. Yet Osman, who in 2004 was not engaged and gave the impression of being aloof from his party and disengaged from Morocco's socio-economic realities, remained at the helm and would be difficult to unseat (should he wish to stay).
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) (17 MPs in 2006, 18 MPs in 2011
Former Communists, the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) is a well-organized, democratic, modern party that is in close touch with societal and political realities in Morocco and is motivated to stay near the top. However, it is not the most effective party at translating its ideas into a platform and an election strategy that appeal to voters. Its main weaknesses lie in a paltry voter base and in the USFP's efforts to force its hand by isolating it politically.
The PPS had a two-pronged economic program to help decrease unemployment in Morocco. First, the PPS supported an environment where both the public and private sectors would work in concert to create more jobs, for example by promoting small- to medium-sized enterprises. Second, the PPS believed there should be a convergence of forces between business owners, workers unins and the government to better understand the fundamental factors causing high unemployment. In 2007 the party's campaign platform centered on three primary pillars: combating corruption, creating jobs, and improving living conditions; but was heavily tilted towards anti-corruption themes.
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