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Iraq-Iran Border

During Saddam Hussein’s regime, the mission of guarding the Iran-Iraq border fell upon fivedivisions of the Iraqi Army (about seventy thousand men). The CPA Order Number Two effectively ended border security along this section of the border. Along Iraq’s border with Iran, the Coalition had far fewer troops.

At the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May of 2003, the United States and coalition forces started operations to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure and government. However, plans, policy, and forces were not applied to secure the integrity of Iraq's borders, principally its borders with Syria and Iran. Border forces were destroyed or had deserted. Foreign fighters, arms, and supplies would flow at a steady rate across Iraq's border and fuel an insurgency that is still being fought by U.S. and coalition forces. Iraq’s borders remained a problem for Coalition forces throughout the counterinsurgency campaign. Iraq has over 3,600 kilometers of border, of which almost one-half is with Iran (1458 kilometers) and shorter distances with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.

The long Iraqi border with Iran remains a concern. Planners assumed that the threat of a sizable Coalition force in the region combined with Iran’s traditional animosity toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq would mean that the Iranians would stay out of the fight. In the early part of the Coalition campaign in Iraq it appeared that this assumption was correct. However, as early as May 2003, reports filtered in that a group of Iranian radicals had made its way into Iraq with the intent of influencing the post-Saddam government. Coalition leaders noted that Iranian foreign fighters in Iraq seemed to increase over the following year.

On the border, the Coalition maintained only enough troops to monitor the official points of entry (a situation similar to that found in areas controlled by the US military). In the spring of 2004, the United States closed sixteen of nineteen points of entry along the border with Iran in order to reduce the number of spots at which Iranian agents could potentially enter the country. This left three points of entry and fifteen manned “denial points” to control the border. These positions were undermanned and inadequate to the task of stopping border traffic entering from Iran. However, traffic was still able to cross the border in areas not controlled by border guards.

Even at the controlled points of entry, border guards allowed Shia pilgrims headed to Najaf and Karbala to pass without passports. According to Iraqi border officers, Shia politicalparties (SCIRI and Dawa) paid guides to circumvent official points of entry and carryIranian pilgrims across the border. Many of the men brought across the border aspilgrims may have actually been Iranian agents entering Iraq to provide support for Shiaextremist groups.

In the spring of 2004, the Coalition took active steps to police the border, including closing down 16 of 19 open border crossings, funding 8,000 more border guards, and setting up a computerized passport system. The unsecured Iraqi border also allowed munitions as well as sophisticated weapons designed to defeat coalition armored vehicles to move across the Iranian border. These munitions in particular have proved deadly to coalition forces and produce the highest amount of casualties. By the fall of 2005, reports indicated that the increased deadliness of insurgent improvised explosive devices came in part from new supplies of Iranian TNT, which one guerrilla called “about seven times stronger than the TNT available in Iraq.” In March 2006, US General John Abazaid confirmed such reports, telling the Senate Armed Services Committee that the insurgents had started using Iranian IED components and that "terrorists in northeastern Iraq used the Iranian northwestern border to move back and forth across the border."

The most public and detailed display of evidence came on 11 February 2007, when military intelligence officers displayed a variety of weapons captured in Iraq with Iranian markings. Included in the weapons displayed were TNT (with Farsi markings) seized on the Iraqi border inDecember of 2005, Misagh surface to air missiles (SAM) used by insurgents in 2004, 81-millimeter mortar rounds seized in 2006, and Iranian anti-tank rocket propelled grenades seized in Baghdad in early 2007. Coalition forces also seized numerous explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), a particularly effective type of improvised explosive device, in numerous locations throughout Iraq. The EFPs lacked Iranian markings, but are similar to weapons supplied to Palestinian insurgents by Iran. Coalition officials believed that the EFPs (especially those found with passive-infrared triggers) were beyond themanufacturing capabilities of insurgents inside Iraq.

The assessment from "The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq" dated September 6, 2007, states that border security in Iraq is not much better now than it was at the end of major combat operations. The United States has conducted significant border security operations in other regions of the world that may provide lessons learned on this issue.

Iran posed a significant challenge to Iraq’s long-term stability and political independence. Iran also continues to pursue economic, cultural, and humanitarian outreach to the Iraqi public. The GoI, through reciprocal visits with Iran at the Head-of-State and Foreign Minister levels, has sent strong messages warning Iran against interference in Iraq’s internal politics, while encouraging improved bilateral relations, economic cooperation, and cultural and religious exchanges. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and other senior GoI leaders are reportedly developing a comprehensive policy on Iran that encourages constructive, peaceful relations.

Tehran continues to invest heavily to gain and sustain political and economic influence in Iraq. Iran has the capacity to influence Iraqi elections by leveraging its soft power capabilities — economic, political, religious, and humanitarian outreach — and with violence if necessary through its sponsorship of Iraqi Shi’a militant groups. Iran may also attempt to influence Iraqi leaders by virtue of longstanding personal and political ties. Although the number of high-level Iranian visits to Iraq declined as Iran approached its own elections in June 2009, Iran remained focused on achieving its political goals in Iraq through reciprocal visits of lower-level officials.

By late 2009 levels of monthly explosively-formed penetrator (EFP) incidents had slightly decreased. ISF and U.S. force pressure, as well as the removal of key extremist leaders, significant cache recoveries, and more effective policing of Iraq borders have reduced logistical and financial support to the networks involved in improvised explosive device (IED) and EFP attacks. Increased border and clearing operations in southern and central Iraq also disrupted the movement and storage of EFP components to Shi’a militants.

Days after the Iraqi Interior Minister, Lieutenant General Abdul Amir al-Shammari, announced that the border with the Syrian side was almost completely secured, Baghdad began implementing a plan to erect “the largest barbed wire barrier with Iran.” An Iraqi security source announced, on 10 March 2024, “the start of implementation of the largest barbed wire barrier within the valleys and slopes deep on the Iraqi-Iranian border,” at a time when the military spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces reported the launch of a new version of the “True Promise” operation. To pursue ISIS cells, with the aim of besieging what remains of the “terrorist organization” in its “most dangerous incubators” between the areas of the Anbar and Diyala governorates.

The Iraqi Minister of Interior announced during his participation in the “Al-Rafidain Forum” in Baghdad that “it has become certain that the border with Syria is (sealed) with cameras,” but he considered the situation to be “concerning” with the Turkish neighbor due to the presence of the “Kurdistan Workers Party” on the territory of the Kurdistan Region.

The minister confirmed that “the Turkish intervention has seized border areas to use them as a battlefield against the (Kurdistan Workers’ Party),” and explained that “the border on the side of Dohuk (north) is subject to Turkish intervention, and has turned into a conflict with the party.” While Al-Shammari stressed that “the situation with Turkey requires time for the region to become difficult,” it was announced that the implementation of the largest barbed wire barrier on the Iraqi-Iranian border had begun.

According to an Iraqi security source, “In accordance with higher orders, the border engineering and its supporting formations began implementing the largest barbed wire barrier extending from eastern Diyala, within the axes of Mandali, Qazaniya, and the rest of the regions as an extension of the Wasit and Sulaymaniyah governorates.” He added, "The wire barrier (which is the first measure of its kind after 2003) will be reinforced with advanced thermal cameras and surveillance towers at distances to enhance the holding force in order to prevent any cases of infiltration or smuggling."

He pointed out, “Opening roads deep into the border strip with repositioning, which comes within the strategy of strengthening the border control force in a way that enhances internal security and prevents the smuggling of prohibited materials of all kinds.” The start of implementation of the project comes in the context of a joint security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran that was signed during November 2023, which is the second stage with the border control agreement between the two countries.

It is noteworthy that there is a joint security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran to secure the border strip between the two countries, especially from the Kurdistan region, and to prevent any factors that contribute to raising tension and security instability, and in conjunction with the decision to remove the headquarters of the Iranian opposition parties from the contact areas.

In this context, the military spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Major General Yahya Rasool, announced that “in light of the directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani, the security forces launched a new version with Operations (The True Promise), according to which the Iraqi forces are responsible for pursuing (the organization ISIS) in some areas that still serve as incubators for it.”

Rasoul said in a statement, “The third (Waad al-Haq) operations were launched in Salah al-Din and Kirkuk at dawn (Sunday), to pursue terrorism,” indicating that “the operation was carried out under the supervision of the Joint Operations Command, as these broad operations come according to accurate intelligence information, and with the support of heroes in The Air Force, Army Aviation, and some supporting security agencies and departments.”

In the same context, the Joint Operations Command announced, on Sunday, the killing of 10 ISIS members during the ongoing “Waad al-Haq” military operations in Anbar and Diyala governorates. The command said in a statement, “In continuation of the offensive operations during Operation (Waad Al-Haq), and while tracking terrorists in the Wadi Al-Tharthar desert by the Western Mobilization Regiment and the Al-Qaim Mobilization Regiment, a pickup truck with 4 terrorists inside it, one of them wearing an explosive belt, was pursued.” The statement added that “the force executing the duty was able to kill them all, and thus the number of terrorists killed during the past 24 hours was 10,” and explained that “the operation was launched with the aim of continuing the leadership’s approach in tracking and pursuing defeated terrorist elements, and to maintain pressure on these loose fleeing groups and pounce on them.”