Indian Coast Guard - Coastal Security
An Offshore Security Coordination Committee (OSCC) was constituted to ensure smooth and efficient functioning of offshore security arrangements, and to identify peace-time threats to offshore installations, such as terrorism and sabotage. The OSCC develops contingency plans to be implemented by various agencies in respect of offshore security. The DGICG is the Chairman of the OSCC, and the first meeting was held in 1978 under the Chairmanship of the then DGICG Vice Admiral VA Kamath. The exponential growth in the offshore Oil and Natural Gas sector has necessitated a manifold increase in the responsibilities of the ICG, in terms of responding to breaches of security, or likely threats, as well as fishing activity in the vicinity of oil platforms that could jeopardize safety.
The ICG contributes towards development and implementation of an effective security mechanism to combat seaborne threats. The security matrix attended by the ICG encompasses a host of operations and involves measures undertaken to address coastal security, offshore security, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy and port security. The ICG also provides support to the Indian Navy to ensure the maritime security of the country. After the Mumbai attack in 2008, there has been a paradigm shift in the maritime security apparatus with increased emphasis on surveillance, intelligence gathering and information sharing among the various stakeholders to ensure an effective response to any emerging situation.
'Boarding' is an operation of stopping and entering a ship or a boat with the intention of inspecting it for any illegal activity such as anti-smuggling, anti-poaching and drug trafficking. Regular boarding operations are undertaken by ICG ships based on intelligence inputs and also at random.
Following the March, 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai, the Government launched in April, 1993 Operation Swan, a joint operation of the Indian Navy and the ICG aimed to prevent smuggling of arms/ammunition and other contraband and carry out intensive surveillance on high seas, maintain surveillance in the territorial waters and patrol the shallow waters near the shore along the Maharashtra and Gujarat Coast. Unfortunately, this operation was not conducted in rig.ht earnest as the Coast Guard had not been involved in the inner layer operations in Maharashtra till December, 2010 due to manpower and resource constraints. Joint Coastal Patrolling undertaken by the Indian Navy in Maharashtra, was discontinued by September, 2005 based on the decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs to establish coastal police stations to provide the coastal security and check smuggling of arms and ammunition. The coastal patrolling was thereafter left to the State Marine Police and Customs, which had meagre operational assets to handle the operation.
Though the proposal for establishing additional three Coast Guard Stations was approved in January, 2005 to take over the extra responsibilities of Operation Swan, none of these stations could be activated prior to 26/11. In all, the attitude and approach of those at the helm of affairs for securing the Country's maritime interest and security especially in the Ministry of Home Affairs were lackadaisical and irresponsible resulting in the overall failure of Operation Swan.
Had Operation Swan been conducted successfully and intense coastal patrolling sustained, an incident like 26/11 terror attack on Mumbai could have been avoided. Ironically, even after this colossal marine security failure the attitude and approach of the Ministry of Defence remained unchanged when· they claimed that "Joint coastal patrolling was not discontinued at any point of time". This was erroneous since the decision of the Indian Navy to discontinue the Joint Coastal Patrolling was based on the decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the year 2005 itself to establish coastal police stations and these police stations came into existence much later, thereby negating the Ministry's claim.
The meagre resource which was available with the ICG in terms of ships, aircraft and manpower were grossly inadequate to patrol/ undertake surveillance of India's vast EEZ. The problem was compounded due to the presence of 1.8 lakhs (approx) fishing boats operating in an unregulated manner. Provision to identify ships, boats and other crafts were non-existent. However, post 26/11, great impetus was given to maritime surveillance and coastal security in particular with a slew of initiatives by Govt. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in its meeting on 16 February 2009, approved setting up of a robust coastal security mechanism along the entire Indian coastline.
After the Mumbai attacks in 2008, there has been a paradigm shift in the maritime security apparatus that increased emphasis on surveillance, intelligence gathering and information sharing amongst the various stakeholders to ensure an effective response to any emerging situation. In Feb 2009, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) was additionally designated as the authority responsible for coastal security in territorial waters, including areas to be patrolled by the Coastal Police. The Coast Guard is also responsible for overall coordination between Central and State agencies in matters relating to Coastal Security.
As part of Coastal Security mechanism, a surveillance system, called Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN), comprising of Chain of Static Sensors having Radars, Automatic Identification System (AIS), Day/Night Cameras and Met Sensors at 46 locations along the coastline and Islands has been established by the Indian Coast Guard. In order to achieve near gap-free surveillance of the entire coastline, 38 additional Radar Stations and 08 Mobile Surveillance Systems apart from VTMS connectivity at Gulf of Kutch and Gulf of Khambat, are being installed under CSN phase-II.
The ICG has promulgated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for ensuring coordination and cohesion among various agencies involved in Coastal Security. Regular exercises are conducted to validate these SOPs. To revalidate the coastal security mechanism and bring awareness among the fishermen at sea, regular boarding operations are also being conducted to validate and check the credentials of the occupants of the vessels including their Identity Cards and Registration Documents. Based on intelligence inputs, Coastal Security operations are conducted by the ICG in coordination with other stake holders.
Community Interaction Programmes (CIPs) with the fishers and coastal populace are conducted periodically by the ICG to sensitize them on security and safety issues, that in turn enables them to act as ‘Eyes and Ears’ in the overall coastal security construct. In order to develop their capacity, the ICG has been imparting regular training to Marine Police personnel since 2006. The training which is conducted at Coast Guard District Headquarters corresponding to the Coastal States/ UTs comprises of three weeks of orientation module and one week of OJT. The ICG and Marine Police are working in 'Hub-and-Spoke' concept, the 'Hub' being the ICG Stations and the 'Spoke' being the Coastal Police Stations.
The ICG contributes towards development and implementation of an effective security mechanism to combat seaborne threats. The security matrix of the ICG encompasses a host of operations, and involves measures undertaken to address coastal security, offshore security, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy and port security. The ICG also provides support to the Indian Navy to ensure the maritime security of the country.
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