New Water-Line - Strategy
In a war with an enemy in possession ot supenor resources it was not considered advisable to defend the entire territory directly against invasion, but rather to prevent him from gaining possession of a certain definite part of the country, so that, when circumstances permit, the defenders may issue from this part and drive him across their borders. The numerical weakness of the national forces in relation to those of other European States, the absence ot natural frontiers or important obstacles in the south and east, and the extraordinary length of the coast line, are all so many reasons in favor of this course. By defending the frontiers of the kingdom the nation would be exposed to the danger of having its inexperienced Army beaten at the commencement of a campaign by an overpowering enemy, and thus the further defence of the country would be impossible. For this reason the Army must first take up a position in the interior of the kingdom, and occupy itself with the defence of a small area, defined by the natural features of the country.
Reasoning on these lines, the real defence of the country against an enemy advancing from the east would commence at the New Waterline, against an enemy from the Bouth at the Merwede, the Hollandsch Diep, the Volkerak and the Haringvliet, and against an enemy threatening the country from the sea side at the coast of North and South Holland. Thus the two last-named provinces alone, with a small part of Utrecht, Gelderland and North Brabant, form the area to be defended to the last against a numerically superior force.
The reason of the selection of this area to be defended rests upon economical as well as strategical grounds. From an economical point of view, the provinces of North and South Holland are the most important, since in them the population is densest, they are the richest, and they form the heart of the country. Moreover, they contain not only the capital, hut the three principal commercial towns, and almost all the importnnt harbors.
From a strategical point of view, the area defended has been selected, not only because it is surrounded on three sides by the sea or arms of the sea, and on the fourth by an extensive inundation, but also more especially on account of the nature of the ground. Almost the entire country consists of polders and reclaimed land, intersected with water courses, and in it a small force is able to make head against one very superior, and to defend the ground foot by foot. As a central redoubt and last place of defence against attack from the sea side or from the land side, after the New Waterline has been penetrated, the town of Amsterdam was selected, and being defended by an advanced circle of inundations and works.
Thus a sheet of water about four miles in width can be placed before the entire line of forts, the depth of which can be regulated. This is very essential, as to be effective a special depth, of less than one foot, must be maintained, at which navigation even in flat-bottomed boats is impossible, while this is sufficient to make wading out of the question, owing to the spongy nature of the soil and the innumerable deep trenches and small canals intersecting this whole territory at very short intervals which normally serve for irrigation. In a few hours the soil changes into a soggy mass and will not bear the weight of even the lightest troops.
It would, however, be erroneous to imagine that thus is formed an unbroken barrier, as such is not the case. All the great communication routes are left open and passage through the inundated area is possible along those highways. This will be obvious when we remember that in the lowlands all the highways, as well as the railroads, run along the top of dikes, for reasons easily understood, and are thus situated often many feet above the surrounding meadows. Those who have traveled through Holland are familiar with the sight of grazing cattle far below, and ships sailing above our heads. The great rivers flowing between their dikes keep the communication further open. It will be quite evident that the only available entrance to an approaching army is over those dike roads or along the rivers. At these points we shall find the strongest fortifications dominating the narrow avenues, through which only small forces can pass at a time. Superiority of numbers counts here for little. Furthermore, modern military engineering has at its disposal numerous devices for making attempts at passage difficult and hazardous for the enemy.
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