Théophile Delcassé - Minister of the Marine 1911-1913
Théophile Delcasse was a little man, of stocky peasant build, whose hair seemed always in disarray, whose brilliant neckties served only to emphasize a muddy complexion, and whose ill-fitting clothes looked as if they might have been bought at the Shop of the Three Balls. He had a face as hard and as strong as marble. Pity, compassion, even the emotion of hatred, seemed unknown to it. He was a Frenchman who had nothing of French volubility. He was a peasant who had the exquisite manners of a prince - when he wished to employ them. When standing beside his wife he was overshadowed by a tall lady of ample proportions, splendidly gowned as befitting the widow of a millionaire, who looked down upon her second spouse with pride. effacing herself before him so completely that the little man seemed to stand alone and to fill the room.
It is not every man who earns the reputation of being "the man who undid the work of Bismarck" and "encircled" the Germans. Bismarck's plan had been remarkably simple; to involve France with Italy in Tunis and with England on the Kongo, in Madagascar and elsewhere, and so to keep all three nations in a fractious state, unfriendly toward one another and dependent on Germany's sympathy for strength. He made his planwork well and stood by watching his neighbors weakening themselves for his ultimate benefit. All things had gone on well, up to the very point where France and Great Britain would fall out and come to blows, and then, in the person of Delcasse, the stumbling-block appeared.
Great Britain and France had been fatefully and logically brought to an issue in an African desert where the swords of Kitchener and Marchand had been upraised. It was Delcasse who dared to give the French commander at Fashoda an order to stay his blow and return the weapon to its scabbard. Delcasse had himself, as Minister for the Colonies in an earlier time been among the most responsible of French statesmen who directed a policy against British colonial ambitions. With Hanotaux, who as Foreign Minister had the responsibility, he pursued a policy of colonial expansion originally conceived years before by Jules Ferry, and helped to wrest from Great Britain coveted strips of African soil and Pacific islands. When the event of Fashoda occurred no one better than he understood the full extent of French humiliation. As Hanotaux's usefulness ended, Delcasse was chosen to succeed him and direct the destinies of France.
Two roads then lay before France. One led to Berlin and was the road that had been followed for more than twenty years - -but it carried the French people further and further away from Alsace and Lorraine and had now brought them face to face with disaster at Fashoda. The other road, utterly untried, a strange new path through an undiscovered country, led to London. It was now seen that one furthen step on the road to Berlin would lead to war with Great Britain, and Delcasse did not hesitate but chose the path of peace with Great Britain. It had suddenly dawned on him that France and Great Britain had long been playing into Germany's hands. Fashoda was their Damascus road. With this knowledge came a quick decision. France and Great Britain should compose their differences. So believed Delcasse and he proceeded to make overtures for a settlement of all Franco-British difficulties.
The Fashoda incident of 1898 threatened actual war and Germany with open arms was ready to make friends with France. but Delcasse, instead, humiliated himself before Great Britain. The English Ambassador who had called to present to France an ultimatum fumbled in Delcasse's presence at his frock-coat pocket preliminary to getting a piece of paper. "Do not undo that button," said Delcasse - so at least the story ran. "I must not see that paper. It is a threat, and if I see it France must fight. Matters will arrange themselves." So was sown the first seed for the entente cordiale. The entente cordiale was afterward built up through private informal conferences in Paris and elsewhere between King Edward VII and Delcasse. The French Ambassador in London and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, meanwhile practically stept aside.
Germany perceived that M. Delcasse was her enemy and determined to get rid of him. In 1904 she managed to do so. Having recourse to the habit of unmannerly bluster which had many times served her ends, Germany announced in April, 1904, that she would not recognize the French Agreement of Morocco, because there had been no international conference on the subject. The Kaiser embarked for Tangier where he made a noisy speech, and France was startled by the spectre of war. In 1904 she was neither in a moral nor material sense ready for war. She believed in international peace, in the friendship of nations, and in compulsory arbitration. Her arsenals were empty. Moreover, a good many Frenchmen refused to believe that this was a premeditated scheme on the part of Germany to bully and to threaten France. In short, the majority thought it necessary to yield. France yielded.
There was in Paris at this time a German, Count Haenckel von Donnersmarck, unofficial representative of the Kaiser. To a French newspaper he gave out an interview the meaning of which was not to be mistaken: Delcasse's policy was dangerous to Germany and was leading to war; in such a war France might win, but if she did not the peace would be dictated in Paris; he meant his advice kindly - "Give up the minister." And this was done, for as late as 1905 Germany could still command and France obey. Delcasse was forced to resign, and France compelled not only to yield with respect to Morocco, but virtually forced to appear before a European conference, called to meet at Algeciras, over the bay from Gibraltar.
Delcasse had none of the intellectual admiration of M. Hanotaux for the culture of Germany, and his patriotism had its roots deeper in popular ground. He had no notion of the possibility of intimidating or coaxing Germany in the far-away future into giving back or exchanging Alsace-Lorraine against some settlement overseas. His secret hope was to insulate Germany from the rest of Europe by a chain of apparently peaceful agreements. The error of M. Delcasse, like that of M. Hanotaux, was to prepare war without preparing for war or without giving due notice to the responsible persons that they had to prepare for war.
"Germany," he said, "understands and respects only one thing - force. Those who speak of coaxing Germany or of making concessions to her, stupidly deceive themselves. If you are so unlucky as to allow Germany to get hold of even one finger, she will seize your whole hand, then your arm, then your shoulder. Your whole body soon will be in her clutches. There is no need to provoke Germany; but when one is face to face with her and sure of one's position, one must be bold and resolute. No weakness!"
M. Delcasse in dignified retirement, set himself to work. He devoted his attention to the navy, wishing to see France take her place among the great naval powers. In May 1906 he again became a member of the Chamber of Deputies and in 1909 was appointed chairman of a committee of deputies appointed to investigate various matters in connection with the navy. The report of this committee, when presented to the Chamber, drew an attack on Delcasse from Georges Clemenceau, the Premier. Delcasse, saw his naval plans adopted in 1910.
In 1911 he returned to office as Minister of Marine and remained in that position for two years, laboring incessantly for the replenishment of arsenals, the letting of armor contracts, and the building of the fleet which was destined, when the time came, to join England's navy in the task of assuring to the Allies their supremacy upon the sea.
Théophile Delcassé was Ministre Marine from 02/03/1911 to 27/06/1911 in the government of Ernest Monis, from 27/06/1911 to 14/01/1912 in the government of Joseph Caillaux, and from 14/01/1912 to 21/01/1913 in the first government of Raymond Poincaré.
The new naval program which had been formed in 1911 was submitted to the Chamber on 12 February 1912, and was carried by a vote of 452 to 53. It provided for the construction of 28 battleships by 1920. The general naval policy of France was set forth at that time by M. Delcasse, minister of marine, as aiming at the creation of a strong enough navy to proceed anywhere and to constitute a superior force in those waters in which France had vital interests. At present and for a long time to come the Mediterranean waters are and will remain the most important sea for French naval progress. He said that France should proceed on this principle and not on the principle of any particular number of ships merely because some other power was laying down a similar number.
In June 1912 the government decided to transfer the Atlantic squadron to the Mediterranean, and on 10 September 1912 that decision was definitely announced. M. Delcassé, the minister of marine, ordered the six vessels which constituted the squadron at Brest to sail to Toulon on 15 October 1912 and join the Mediterranean fleet. The latter would then comprise 18 battleships and six large armored cruisers. This was explained in the French press as due to the belief that a single powerful fleet was a better protection than divided forces, and that the Brest squadron of six old vessels would be of little use in the Atlantic, but might in the event of war be valuable in the Mediterranean. It was urged that in no sense was it an aggressive movement, but a mere return to the situation of 1909. Nevertheless it was associated in the public mind with the recent increase of the Italian and Austro-Hungarian navies, and in Austria there was bitter comment on it as a proof of an offensive and defensive alliance between France and Great Britain.
Had there been in 1914 no formal declaration of war between France and Germany, the appointment by Viviani of Delcasse, as Minister of War, would have been sufficient, for Delcasse had been like a flare of scarlet to the Teutonic bull. As recently as January 1913, Germany had virtually ordered his dismissal from the French Cabinet.
In 1914, when war was declared, all turned to M. Delcasse. He had foreseen the war. Now that it had come, if France found herself not isolated, but with strong allies, she owed this state of affairs to him. Therefore, when the French Ministry of National Defence was formed on the 2d of September, 1914, M. Delcasse once more took charge of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, retaining his portfolio until October 1915. After an absence of ten years, he reentered the office on the Quai d'Orsay where he had signed agreements with England and Russia, and where he had laid the foundations of the alliance which united all the nations of the Entente.
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