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1909 Delcasse Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry

On the proposition of M. Delcasse, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was appointed to go into the whole matter, and during two or three months it had collected at Toulon, Brest and other places, evidence which displayed negligence that can only be characterized as criminal. In addition to this, the system of red tape had developed to such an extraordinary extent in the marine department that months expired before the smallest lequirement is executed. Instances were given of requests for small articles costing only a few pence being passed from one department to another, necessitating a considerable amount of clerical work, and finally costing enormously more than the value of the articles.

The report that was issued by the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry under the Presidency of M. Delcasse confirmed on every point the lamentable shortcomings in the French Marine which had been revealed by the inquiry that had been proceeding for the previous four months. Rarely had an official document been so incisive in its condemnation of a public service as the report prepared on behalf of the Commission by M. Michel. The reasons that had brought about the existing state of things, and temporarily deprived France of her position as a naval Power, were clearly set forth, and it became evident that while a want of proper organization was mainly responsible for the decline of the Marine, much was also due to the Socialist "reforms" of a former Minister whose "attempts at leveling down everything had merely the effect of destroying discipline, order and influence".

Taking first the cost of construction, M. Michel pointed out that the plans of battleships were never completed by the time orders were given out. The plans of the Justice were altered fourteen times after this vessel was put on the stocks, and the same might be said of the other battleships and cruisers, while the contracts for the material required for the ships authorized by the program of 1906 were given out before any decision had been come to as to the design of the turrets and the types of boilers. For battleships of the Danton class the original estimate of 220,000,000 francs was exceeded by 100,000,000 france, mainly on account of the continued changes to plans. As a means of remedying this state of things the Commission invited the Chamber of Deputies to refuse permission to construct any vessel in the future until the plans were practically complete and arrangements are advanced for giving out orders.

The Commission came to the conclusion that prices all round had considerably increased, notably as regards armor plates, turrets and engines, while the cost of turbines appeared particularly high. In this latter case the high prices asked were undoubtedly due to the fact that the firms who laid down plant for the manufacture of turbines, especially for the Marine, had to allow a considerable amount for depreciation, because, for the moment at any rate, the business being done in turbines was very small. Another reason for the high cost of construction was to be found in the low efficiency of the arsenals, which may be attributed to the obsolete machinery employed and also to the suppression of piece work. This was one of the "reforms" carried out by M. Pelletan, who introduced the Socialist principle of leveling down everything and reducing the hours of work, while at the same time foremen and engineers were practically deprived of all authority over the men.

So far as concerned the high cost of material the Commission was of the opinion that the steady increase in prices was due to the fact that the Marine Department did not look sufficiently after its interests, while, by its unnecessary exactions, it compelled manufacturers to provide for contingencies that did not exist with ordinary contracts. Consequently the Commission was of the opinion that the Marine Department should suppress clauses in contracts that were not really necessary, and every other method should be adopted to secure a reduction in prices. The conclusion of the Commission as regards the arsenals was that they were not in a state to carry out rapidly the work of construction and repairs, that the plant was insufficient and out of date, that piece work should be generally adopted, that in cases where the character of the work does not allow of the introduction of piece work the men should be paid wages equivalent to those paid to men employed in other departments upon piece work, that the foremen should be invested with greater authority, and that work should only be given outside when it was found impossible to undertake it in the arsenals.

The question of boilers attracted more attention than any other when discussing the cost of building battleships. While Parliament had always advocated increasing the number of boiler firms from whom tenders are received, the Naval Department preferred to limit the types of boilers to two, with the object of unifying the steam-generating equipment and facilitating the training of stokers; but it was argued that any advantage obtained by uniformity of boilers was lost by the high prices that have to be paid to firms who look upon the business as a monopoly. The Commission inclined to this latter point of view. It regreted that during the previous ten years the Ministers of Marine had failed to utilize competition as a means of reducing prices and securing an improvement in boilers which were generally recognized as the best ; that the Minister, after obtaining from the Technical Committee a list of boiler firms from whom tenders could be invited for the nine battleships and armored cruisers under construction, ordered them from two firms on the list without inviting tenders from the others, notwithstanding that the boilers so ordered were not the types unanimously approved of by naval officers and marine engineers. Consequently the Commission recommends that in future tenders for boilers should always be invited from firms approved of by the Technical Committee.

The manufacture and storage of explosives were to be subjected to a much more rigorous supervision, and this supervision was to be assisted by naval officers who were to prepare themselves for the task by undergoing a period of instruction in the powder factories.

The armament of battleships came in for severe strictures from the Commission. It stated that the four divisions of battleships and the division of armored cruisers in the Mediterranean did not have their full supplies of steel shells; that the division of armored cruisers forming part of the Northern Squadron had only a third of their supplies; that neither for the Mediterranean nor the Northern Squadrons were there any reserves' of steel shells, despite the fact that the types of shells were fixed upon as early as 1905 and 1906; that the type of shell for battleships of the Danton class was only settled upon at the end of February 1908, so that it was a practical impossibility to have them manufactured by the time the Danton was ready for service at the end of 1910. The Budget estimates had, in fact, made no provision for the manufacture of these shells. The Commission blamed this "want of foresight," and urges that it should be remedied without delay.

The same absence of foresight was observable in the harbor works. The law of 1901 authorizing the building of drydocks and basins had been utterly ignored. These should have been completed in 1909, but nothing had been done. No one had even thought of the necessity of building drydocks to take battleships of the Danton class. Nor was there sufficient provision for the storage of coal. When it was observed how much has not been done it may reasonably be asked what has become of the enormous sums of money voted for the carrying out of these works. The former Ministers were blamed for this state of things, as well as most of the other shortcomings, and they were likely to have anything but a pleasant time when they were called upon to defend themselves in the Chamber of Deputies.

The general organization of the marine, or rather the want of it, was summed up in the statement that "between the different services of the central administration there is no unity of views, no systematic effort, no method and no defined responsibility. There is too often negligence, disorder and confusion."

A typical example of waste resulting from an utter want of initiative is afforded in the case of a cruiser in Toulon, which required a bamboo wireless telegraph mast. Instead of getting the bamboo at home, the marine department ordered it from Indo-China, but before it could reach Toulon the cruiser had left for Saigon. The idea of utilizing the bamboo mast for another ship apparently did not occur to the administration. It had been ordered for this particular cruiser, and the cruiser must have it. Consequently, the bamboo followed the cruiser to Saigon, where obviously one could easily have been procured at small expense. Again, Saigon required a few gallons of oil that could have been bought from any local merchant. It preferred to telegraph to Toulon, which forwarded the oil at a cost of more than ten times its value. Another instance of the inconveniences of red tape was afforded in an order sent to the marine department by the Admiralty of Algiers for a fixed boiler. For two years nothing more was heard of it, and when the belated boiler arrived it did not conform to the specification, and could not be used. Examples like this could be multiplied, but one more must suffice. The new battleship Democratie left Toulon to carry out firing trials. It was then discovered that the gun sights were without springs, and the battleship had to return to Toulon. A search in the arsenal revealed the fact that there were no such springs in stock, and they had to be ordered from a local watchmaker, who took four days to make them, during which time the battleship lay idle in the port, waiting for an article that cost about five shillings.

It was found that there were not sufficient reserves of ammunition to last for an hour's fighting. This was publicly stated by the Commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, who, for communicating his views to the press without the consent of the minister, was relieved of his command. The inquiry, however, completely confirmed this sensational statement, and it was certain that had hostilities been declared at any time during the past year the French fleet would have been almost immediately reduced to a state of helplessness. At Brest it was discovered that a number of obsolete ships were kept in reserve with their full complement of crews, who were thus deprived of the training that would have been invaluable to them. When investigating the conditions under which vessels were constructed there was observable the same absence of good management and foresight.

Not only was there an inexplicable discrepancy in the costs of material, but the building of ships was considerably delayed because orders for engines, boilers and shipbuilding material were not given out simultaneously. It is true that in the case of boilers orders have frequently been delayed pending debates in the Chamber of Deputies, so that Parliament was not without some responsibility for the delays as well as for the changes of design which have been carried out to battleships under construction.

The Minister, the Conseil Superieur de la Marine and naval architects had all been adverse to taking any initiative, unless what they do was entirely approved of by Parliament. It was not too much to say that parliamentary control, with its conflicting views on every possible subject concerning the Navy, had done much to destroy any continuity of ideas in the building up of the marine. It had run through the whole gamut of commerce destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines and finally, battleships of the Dreadnought type, in a way that may reasonably be put forward as an excuse for the absence of settled policy which has characterized the naval administration for many years past.

Further difficulties had arisen from the condition imposed upon the marine of purchasing all its material at home. To take the case of turbines for the new battleships, the firm constructing them had to lay down a costly plant, the depreciation of which must be set solely against the orders under execution, because the firm was not sure they will get any more. Thus a far higher sum has to be paid for these turbines than if they were purchased abroad. Until the battleship Danton was completed with its turbine machinery there was no large vessel in France fitted with turbines, except one in the merchant service, and thus the equipment of the new battleships of the Dreadnought class with turbines was regarded as of an experimental character, although, of course, there is plenty of justification for launching out upon the construction of turbine battleships by the increasing employment of these engines in the British and German navies. Nevertheless, the evidence of the engineers of the Danton, taken during the inquiry, was not quite so favorable as had been expected, the main objection being the old difficulty of reversing. This does not imply that there is any doubt in the minds of French naval engineers that the turbine is superior to the reciprocating engine for battleships, but with the limited experience so far obtained it must be admitted that they show a somewhat qualified approval of the new propelling machinery.

The inquiry also turned largely upon the question of fuel contracts, where the discrepancies in prices were perhaps larger than for other material, and it has long been urged that the practice of Government, in limiting the tenders to a few firms, tended to create a monopoly which enables the coal owners and manufacturers to obtain high prices. Justification of this policy was urged alike on behalf of the Government and of the manufacturers, the latter declaring that they are obliged to make allowance for the procrastination of the marine in paying for its fuel and material, while the naval department argued that it is obliged to restrict tenders to firms who are capable of supplying the most suitable coal and the best material.

One of the principal complaints made in Parliament was the excessive price paid for boilers, and the naval department had often been urged to extend tenders to boiler firms other than the two or three who at present have a monopoly of this business. While this plea may appear sound enough from a financial point of view, it was not regarded with favor by naval engineers, who naturally consider that the types of boilers employed should be restricted as far as possible. The fewer the types the better for the training of engineers and stokers, as well as, of course, for repairs, and the keeping of the generators in a high state of efficiency.

The guns mounted on recent battleships, were already coming in for severe criticism. The failure of a gun on the testing ground at Gavres, and again on board the Republique, suggested to many experts that the high muzzle velocities adopted by the French artillery were detrimental to the life of the gun. Doubts were also expressed concerning the shells, and the bombardment of the Jena was being awaited with considerable interest, as it was understood that the final type of shell to be adopted by the French Navy would not be settled until after these experiments. It is certain that, with their high muzzle velocities and the new explosive, which was reported to have given extraordinary results, the French possessed a powerful artillery, but the point to be demonstrated was the reliability of the guns and shells.

While all departments of the marine had come in more or less for severe strictures, one of the most serious complaints put forward was with reference to the defective material supplied by certain private firms. Considerable prominence was given to this matter by the action which M. Picard was alleged to have brought against Creusot for supplying turrets in which defective parts have been repaired by oxy-acetylene welding. So far as the oxy-acetylene process is concerned, it had, of course, been abundantly proved that a piece properly repaired by this method is as strong as if it had never developed fault. The claim made against Creusot, however, was to the effect that the firm delivered material in which a defect had been repaired by oxy-acetylene welding after a similar piece, treated in the same way, had been rejected. Creusot urged that it did nothing of the sort, and thus the matter stood pending the action. It almost appeared as if this action had been taken, not so much with a view to giving a salutary lesson to firms who contract to supply the Government with material, as of impressing the public with the idea that Government intended in future to take strong measures for the protection of its interests.

The department itself was not entirely above reproach. Much of the material supplied for one of the submarines constructed in the Toulon arsenal was found to be defective, and there were so many mistakes in the plans that the assembling of the parts entailed considerable extra cost. Serious charges had been laid against certain officials of accepting material that had previously been rejected, and as the matter will probably come up in the law courts it was expected that the inquiry would result in a plentiful crop of scandals.

This report effectually cleared the way for the reforms in the organization of the marine which the country was determined to carry out. There was enough in the Commission's recommendations to occupy attention for a considerable time, but it covered much of the ground previously gone over by M. Picard, whose proposals were for the most part merely emphasized. The Commission, moreover, showed the necessity of undertaking work which M. Picard was obliged to leave in the background for fear of frightening the country over the expenditure that would have to be incurred. The Commission, on the other hand, did not hesitate to make the most of the situation in order to clear up arrears of work in the way of harbor improvements, stocks of explosives and shells, and the equipment of existing ships as soon as possible. Until this was accomplished, and it was likely to occupy some years, it was difficult to see what can be done with the new shipbuilding program beyond preparing plans and advancing preliminaries, so as to push forward the construction as soon as funds are available. The Government was committed to such a huge expenditure in other directions that fresh sources of revenue would have to be found before a new shipbuilding program could be started upon.