France - Africa Relations
Outside of NATO and Europe, France had numerous military agreements with former colonies, especially nations in Africa. France was the old colonial power of many African countries. So the question of a French military intervention was always sensitive. At the same time France was trying to reduce its intervention in Africa, the African countries also tried to have several partners. France was not the main partner in terms of trade and other sectors. France had military bases in many of its former colonies and retains rapid response troops in Chad, Central African Republic and Ivory Coast. Nicolas Sarkozy intervened militarily in West Africa, carrying out airstrikes in Ivory Coast in 2011 that helped end a longstanding conflict there.
France had long maintained five permanent military bases with responsibility for Africa -- in Cote d'Ivoire Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and on Reunion Island, the French overseas department near Madagascar. There was a de facto sixth "base" consisting of the long-term operational deployment in Chad (Operation Epervier, in Chad since 1986). Basing issues in the four continental African states (Cote d'Ivoire Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal) are governed by bilateral Defense Agreements, which include certain provisions obligating France to defend those states from external aggression.
In 2006 (i.e., before Sarkozy's election in 2007), the French began implementing a new command structure in Africa featuring four geographic commands, each of which would generally conform to an analogous regional sub-grouping. Notably, Cote d'Ivoire was dropped from this scheme. Given the regional (vice bilateral) focus of the new commands, the orientation of the new commands may allow more ready interaction and cooperation with the USG's new AFRICOM, once the later becomes more present and operational in Africa.
- French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ): Responsible for Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda, or, roughly, the IGAD countries.
- French Forces in Cape Verde (FFCV): Despite its name, a command located in Senegal responsible for Senegal, Cape Verde, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, roughly paralleling ECOWAS.
- French Forces in Gabon (FFG): Responsible for Gabon, Chad, C.A.R., Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, DRC, Congo Brazzaville, and Angola, corresponding with ECCAS.
- Armed Forces in the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean (FAZSOI): Located on Reunion Island and responsible for Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, South Africa, and Madagascar, mirroring SADC.
Establishing the four commands appeared to be only the first step in France's plan to consolidate and centralize its military presence in Africa.
François Hollande declared on a visit to Senegal in 2012 that “La Francafrique is over”, referring to longstanding attempts by French officials to influence African leaders and events even after independence from France. But a long history of French support for governments perceived as corrupt remained a major point of contention. Civil society groups and NGOs have accused Paris of complicity in undermining human rights as well as economic development in places such as in Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Togo whenever it suits French political or business interests.
Compounding these resentments was France's status as a favorite destination for the ill-gotten gains of African elites with a taste for Parisian opulence. Others had been accused of illegally funneling cash to French political figures: Former president Nicolas Sarkozy was facing court over allegedly accepting generous campaign contributions from late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.
The 2013 Mali intervention symbolized a changed French relationship with Africa -- and the presidency of French leader Francois Hollande. It marked a dramatic change in the old, so-called "France-Afrique" -- a relationship once marked by lack of clarity, cronyism and questionable business ties. Since Hollande came to power, tried to normalize relations with France's former colonies, by reporting to parliament and sending missions to Africa with clearly defined goals. While the change began with Sarkozy, Hollande offered his own branding that highlighted human rights -- although French business interests in Africa also shape policy.
France criticized the Conte government's closed-door immigration policies in Italy, while Italy said France had a "colonial" attitude toward Africa and that it should do and pay more to help resolve the problem. Relations between Italy and France continued to deteriorate in February 2019 after France recalled its ambassador to Italy and issued a statement comparing relations between the countries to when they were on opposite sides during World War II. The Italian coalition government headed by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte had continually clashed with the European Union since taking power in June 2018.
The war of words between France and Italy escalated with Italian Deputy Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio accusing France of being the prime cause of the ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe. Luigi Di Maio, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the populist Five Star Movement, asked the European Union to consider imposing sanctions on France for their colonial history in Africa, but ironically failed to mention Italy’s own colonial past in the continent. He said France had "never stopped colonising tens of African states".
The far-right leader added: "France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts.... If people are leaving today it's because European countries, France above all, have never stopped colonising dozens of African countries.”
According to him, “If we have people who are leaving Africa now it’s because some European countries, and France in particular, have never stopped colonising Africa….If France didn’t have its African colonies, because that’s what they should be called, it would be the 15th largest world economy. Instead it’s among the first, exactly because of what it was doing in Africa.”
Critics of the CFA do not only see it as a colonial vestige but also as a goldmine for the political elite and the super-rich in the francophone monetary zone. Calls for the abandonment of the CFA have gained momentum across the francophone monetary zone and even among citizens of the francophone countries. The Pro-CFA extrapolate a catastrophic economic result tantamount to the one which gripped the francophone monetary zone in 2004; however, on the other hand, CFA-exiteers are of the conviction that no developing country whose currency rate was determined by a banker sitting hundreds of miles away in a developed country can progress.
The changes that Paris managed to postpone during the Cold War caught up with it three decades later. In the former French West Africa, they are looking for new allies abroad. On September 30, a coup d'état shook the state of Burkina Faso. For decades, EU-friendly governments had replaced one another, and troops sent by France protected local residents from jihadists. The result, contrary to expectations, was disappointing: loss of control over 40% of the territory, famine in the abandoned areas, undivided dominance of European business to the detriment of local production. On the wave of anti-French sentiment, the military had an opportunity, seeking help from Russia, China and Turkey. In 2021, a similar coup had already occurred in the neighboring state of Mali. The example was contagious: judging by sociological data, a turn to the East was not excluded in Niger, Chad , Cameroon - everywhere where the French colonial empire used to exist.
Disillusionment with the special relationship with France was widespread across vast areas of West Africa, where independence in the 1960s took a form that was far from a break with the old order. Unlike Britain, Spain and Portugal, which abandoned their colonies once and for all, France chose a staged retreat into the shadows. In the middle of the last century, eight African states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) formed a currency union, regulated by their own central bank, at the suggestion of Paris. Half of its assets were placed in French banks, and banknotes began to be printed on French territory. Paris acted as a guarantor of the stability of the currency: that is, it deprived governments of the right to devalue it . The situation that developed was unprecedented: political independence was ensured, but there was no talk of economic independence.
The financial order proposed by France was based on the free circulation of capital between the former colonies and the metropolis. Taking advantage of the tax breaks that remained in force and relying on the historical advantage they had gained, the companies of the Fifth Republic easily seized control of local markets and did not give them up to competitors. Usually, this soft presence of France was enough, but from time to time it intervened with brute force: in 1979, when its troops overthrew the dictator of Central Africa Bokassa, or in 2011, when the Fifth Republic’s special forces removed the anti-French president of Côte d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo on charges of election fraud, and the air force took part in settling scores with the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Around 2015, French intervention in Africa reached its peak: military operations (all against Islamists) were carried out simultaneously in the Central African Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. It was the ultimate strain: none of them were victorious.
In the 2020s, it became clear that the French role in Africa was leaning towards the one the US had assumed in Afghanistan. Numerous tactical victories over jihadist groups did not lead to their destruction. Strikes at enemy positions suffered from inaccuracy. Support from the local population melted away as unnecessary casualties accumulated. Military elites began to think that defeating the jihadists with French help would not work, and even Paris’s proposal to reform the monetary union by softening its rules did not save the situation. As a result of these failures, regimes friendly to Paris began to collapse on their own.
The coup that took place on September 30 in Burkina Faso affected the interests of France, but Russia unexpectedly found itself in the spotlight. First it became known that supporters of the new authorities, who had gathered for a rally, brought Russian flags with them and began shouting the name of our country, waiting for a reaction from Moscow. Then Captain Ibrahim Traore, who had taken over the leadership of the state, headed to the capital Ouagadougou at the head of a military convoy and took a television crew with him. The crowd, which was captured on camera, greeted him with pro-Russian slogans.
The victors wanted nothing to do with France. Traore announced that his predecessor, Paul-Henri Sandago Damiba, had tried to hide in a French military base from where he was planning a counter-offensive. In response, Traore's supporters attacked the French embassy and the French Institute. Paris was forced to intervene, announcing that it would not support Damiba. But this did not influence the position of the new authorities: they announced that they needed to learn from the past and turn to " new partners in the fight against terrorism." Western media saw these words as a hint at Russia.
One of the main complaints against France, as the supporters of the new government formulate it, was its direct disregard for the interests of its ally and its stinginess. In contrast to Ukraine, which Paris provides with its most modern weapons, the allies in the fight against jihadists, the Burkinabés, have been suffering from a lack of the most basic necessities for decades. "It happened that our volunteers had to go into battle armed only with their courage and amulets," complains one of the former prime ministers of Burkina Faso, who went over to Traore's side, Yacouba Isaac Zida, calling for rearmament following the example of neighboring Mali.
It was hard for those living in Africa to doubt that Burkina Faso needs this. In 2022, the total number of Islamist attacks on the country jumped to a record high, and the proportion of refugees displaced by jihadist attacks rose to 2 million people – 10% of the entire population. But France, distracted by European problems, was not up to the task. That’s when long-simmering frustrations took the form of a military coup that reduced the geopolitical borders of French Africa.
In the European media, the turn of African states from France to Russia was often presented as a slide towards authoritarian orders. In reality, this was not the case: Traore, who was counting on friendship with Moscow, came to power by removing Damiba, who himself, in turn, came to power as a result of a coup. In 2021, a similar scenario was realized in Mali. Supporters of the turn from France to the East took power by force. But their predecessors, much more loyal to Paris, were a military junta.
By rejecting France's participation and demonstratively emphasizing their readiness to cooperate with Russia, the new authorities of African states are seeking to rely on the support of their own citizens — acting in an uncharacteristic role for them as democratic politicians. Sociological surveys conducted in Mali, Senegal, Togo and 14 other states in the region by sociologists from the African Youth Survey in 2020 revealed strong anti-French sentiments among the majority of local youth. The reduction in humanitarian aid amid the pandemic played a role in this. By accusing Russia of spreading hunger, Western media are convincing only their own audience. In Africa, the mood was different: they notice a decrease in supplies from previous benefactors, on whom they had already managed to rely, and are becoming even more embittered against the West, which decided to spend less in difficult times.
Unlike Eastern European countries, which are optimistically counting on joining the EU, the vast majority of Africans realize that, despite their common past in the colonial empire and knowledge of its language, they will not have any common destinies with the Old World and, therefore, there was no other alternative but to find their own path. France, for its part, was also hinting at the same thing. Back in the 1980s, it introduced entry visas for its former citizens, and over time it had only tightened the rules. The current procedure for Mali, for example, exactly corresponds to the one that France established for Russia in 2022. Naturally, it does not contribute to the preservation of previous ties between the states.
In the 21st century, even those with whom it was necessary to maintain ties – the political elites – suffer from the un-African coolness: in 2021, the CAR Foreign Minister and the Vice-Speaker of the local parliament complained about visa refusals . For their part, the Europeans are concerned about the African birth rate and are trying to lock the doors in advance. But under such circumstances, further alienation of the former colonies from their metropolis was only a matter of time.
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