France - Africa Relations - 20th Century
France had a long and fraught history with Africa, whose last former French colonies achieved independence in the 1960s. Recent attempts to reboot relations on a more equal footing have sometimes been undermined by various French leaders’ tone-deaf comments and other missteps.
In March 2008, former French President Jacques Chirac was quoted as saying, “Without Africa, France will slide down into the rank of a third world power”. His predecessor, the enigmatic François Mitterrand already prophesied as far back as 1957 that, “Without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century”. Corroborating the Conquistadores, former Gabonese strongman Omar Bongo had this to say: “Gabon without France is like a car with no driver. France without Gabon is like a car with no fuel…”
Cote d'Ivoire President Houphouet-Boigny reputedly coined the phrase "France-Afrique" (in French, the more evocative "francafrique" with a cedilla under the "c") to describe the complex web of economic, military, political, social, and cultural ties that linked France with its former colonies and to a lesser extent non-francophone Africa. These ties, built over decades of colonial rule, persisted after independence in the 1960s, and provided a mutually beneficial environment for both sides, with Africans enjoying French protection, military and security support, and, not least, foreign aid.
The governmental, educational, legal, military, bureaucratic, and administrative systems and methods of many former African colonies were modeled on French structures, and many still are. French is often the official language and lingua franca (sometimes in competition with a dominant local language) in several African countries. Often, air travel between nearby African countries could only be done by transiting Paris. These factors alone guaranteed continuing French influence post-independence in many African societies. Other "benefits" were manifest: African leaders were able to amass private fortunes sometimes transformed into vast real estate and other holdings in France and elsewhere in Europe, cases of which the press continues to uncover to this day. France profited from a ready-made set of compliant client states and leaders, easy access to resources and markets for exports, and a tacitly accorded freedom of action, both private and official, for French and locals alike, of the sort that produced cases like the "Falcone Affair," the long-running arms trafficking case in Angola.
Culturally, Africans of the colonial and independence eras were deeply steeped in French ways, with some achieving high positions in France, e.g., Houphouet-Boigny's serving in the French government and Senegal President Senghor's rise to the very pinnacle of French society with his election to the Academie Francaise. The African elite and their children were often schooled in France, with the ever-expanding "francophonie" movement ensuring that they remained part of France's global network. At the other end of the scale, tens of thousands of African colonial troops fought for France during the World Wars and other conflicts, with surviving veterans still receiving pensions for their service to France.
France-Afrique operated well for decades, under the tutelage of a succession of "Mr. Africas" at the French Presidency, beginning with the legendary and controversial Jacques Foccart, Africa Advisor to de Gaulle, Pompidou, and, briefly, Mitterrand and Chirac. Others in that role included Mitterrand's son Jean-Christophe. For many years, the Africa Advisor at the Presidency did not report to the President's Diplomatic Advisor (the French equivalent of our National Security Advisor) but directly to the President, thus enjoying a status equal to or perhaps even greater than that of the Diplomatic Advisor (who had to worry about the rest of the world), a fact not lost on those currying favor at the Presidency.
As the 20th century drew to a close, France-Afrique as an effective model began having trouble adjusting to a changing global landscape. These include shrinking older generations on both sides wedded to France-Afrique; younger generations lacking such knowledge and experience and less reflexively inclined to view relations through the France-Afrique optic; increased exposure of Africans to other parts of the world, either first hand or through the omnipresent global media; aggressive pursuit of African resources and commerce by hitherto outsiders (e.g., especially China); and, culturally and socially, a growing exposure to non-French films, fashions, sports, music, and literature, with the U.S. enjoying an advantage in this area. Francophone Africans began to lose their tendency to look to France as their model. In short, France-Afrique began falling victim to several of globalization's effects.
For France, the cost of maintaining France-Afrique started becoming less commensurate with its returns, both political and economic. France shifted to an all-volunteer military in 2001, which immediately increased the cost of sustaining a global military presence. EU requirements limit deficit spending, France's traditionally generous safety net and an aging population strain finances, and booming and resource-hungry economies elsewhere raise the cost of commercial transactions, threatening French privilege in Africa. Cost-cutting, at home and abroad, has become a priority for the GOF, and maintaining the qualitative and quantitative investment France-Afrique entailed is becoming harder to accomplish.
Politically, brush fires occurred that were harder and more expensive to put out. The French were quite bitter about Cote d'Ivoire, once a crown jewel of France-Afrique, which spiraled into chaos after the death of one of France-Afrique's biggest advocates and beneficiaries, Houphouet-Boigny, reaching a nadir with the November 2004 bombing by Cote d,Ivoire of French forces in Bouake. Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire, perhaps France's last unilateral military intervention in the old style, cost France about 250 million euro per year, or well over a billion euro in total, without yielding decisive results.
Other brush fires and scandals, which in earlier days might have been ignored or covered up, have erupted with regularity: Borrel in Djibouti, Kieffer in Cote d,Ivoire, and Falcone in Angola, to name a few. In addition to Falcone, other renegade French had been making mischief across the continent -- Bob Dennard repeatedly in the Comoros, Gnassingbe advisor Charles Debbasch and arms dealer Robert Montoya in Togo (with effects in Cote d'Ivoire), and the Zoe's Ark "rescue" mission of Darfur children.
In the past, France might have tacitly or openly tolerated or even supported some of these activities. Now, with an instant global media and the weakened cover afforded by a deteriorating France-Afrique, these become problems, if not major scandals, that must be addressed in a less sheltered environment. One old-timer, commenting on Sarkozy's trip to Chad in the Zoe's Ark case to seek the partial release of French and other Europeans implicated in the "adoption" scandal, sniffed that "it used to be that one phone call from the Elysee would have settled this. How far we have come that the President himself has to go there, and even then, doesn't really finish the job." In pushing for good governance, transparency, accountability, and a free press as part of its democratization, foreign assistance, and human rights agendas, France became its own victim, as those forces have helped bring scandals to light.
France-Afrique provided privileges to France but carried a burden of expectation that has become harder to shoulder. Everyone acknowledged France's primacy in parts of Africa, but this created expectations that when problems arose, "the French will take care of it." France was long able and willing to face these challenges when everyone accepted this reality, but that was no longer the case. France-Afrique had sometimes been a double-edged sword, with some, including Africans, wanting France to intervene forcefully when problems arise, but with others happy to accuse France of acting unilaterally or as a "neo-colonialist" when it does. "Damned if you do, damned if you don't" has become an underlying theme in the debate over France's role in Africa.
The Chirac government, while aware of France-Afrique's stagnation, was disinclined to do much about it and tried to preserve France-Afrique's facade. Acting in the old style, Chirac, to some embarrassment, was quick to mourn the 2005 death of his "friend" Eyadema in Togo and to accept quickly the questionable process that led to his son's taking power. The Presidency, citing "executive privilege," refused to turn over records to judicial authorities investigating the Borrel case, although Michel de Bonnecorse, the Presidency's last "Mr. Africa," had to suffer the indignity of having his personal home and vacation house searched. As in the heyday of France-Afrique, the French military was given a relatively free hand in responding militarily to rebel incursions in Chad and C.A.R. prior to the end of the Chirac era.
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