German Tanks - Origins
The story of German armored vehicle development is concerned principally with tanks, which underwent considerable change since the beginning of the war. German tanks showed, in the course of 5 years of war, a gradual change from the Blitzkrieg concept of battle to greater emphasis on defensive, or at least offensive-defensive, operations for which the latest German tank, the King Tiger, heavily armed and armored but relatively slow and unmaneuverable, was suitable.
Following the First World War two schools of thought emerged governing the employment of armor in battle. The majority view, advocated by the traditional officer corps of every major military power, recognized the tank as simply another supporting arm for the infantry; the minority school, championed by a small number of independent thinkers, envisioned the tank asthe principal combat arm to be supported instead by the infantry. In Germany, the leading intellectual champions for independent armored units were Colonel Werner von Fritsch, Colonel Werner von Blomberg, and Colonel Ludwig Beck (all destined to be senior leaders in the German Army). During the mid-1920s these officers advocated the creation of independent mechanized units.
Once French occupation of the Ruhr was terminated, in 1926 the Inter-Allied Control Commission was discontinued and its representatives left Essen. The departure of the Inter-Allied Control Commission signalized the revival of Krupp work in connection with the design of tanks. In the early correspondence on this subject between Krupp and the Reich Defense Ministry, the tanks were referred to as "tractors." Besides tanks, other types of military vehicles and self-propelled gun carriages were also developed.
One interesting letter, written in November 1927 from the Ministry of Defense to the Krupp firm, set forth the specifications for an "artillery power tractor" which, according to the specifications, was to be of such a size "as to enable the tractor to be shipped on an ordinary open railroad car, considering the smallest Belgian and French loading capacity." A Krupp memorandum written in 1942 (NIK-10202, Pros. Ex. 162) tells us that, "with the exception of the hydraulic safety switch, the basic principles of armament and turret design for tanks had already been worked out in 1926."
During the late 1920s and early 1930s the Germans maintained a secret military relationship with the Soviets, where they were able to experiment with tanksand aircraft. But the small scale of the enterprise between two suspicious partnersplaced considerable constraints on what the Germans were able to learn. When rearmament began, the German Army possessed not a single tank, had few officers with any experience with armored fighting vehicles, and possessed only the most rudimentary designs for tanks on the drawing boards.
Like the initial mass production of medium and heavy artillery, the first two tank programs also rested on Krupp designs. The firm of Fried. Krupp played a pioneering role in the development of combat vehicles in Germany since the earliest beginnings in 1926. After the preliminary experiments with the 'heavy tractor,' 'light tractor,' and the L.S.K., the LaS [Landwirtschaftlischer Ackerbau Schlepper] was developed and built in series by the firm of Fried. Krupp as the first German tank (alternatively equipped with air cooled Fried. Krupp engine or water-cooled Maybach engine). Four subcontractors built the LaS to Krupp designs and specifications and were enabled thereby to work out their own designs for new types of tanks.
In 1933 Adolf Hitler witnessed a rather modest military demonstration which proved to be the harbinger of profound transformation within the German Army and, in time, was to usher in a revolution in military affairs. This exhibition introduced the militarily ambitious German Chancellor to the basic components of the newly created mechanized arm and included coordinated maneuvers by motorcycle, anti-tank, and armored reconnaissance units with a platoon of light tanks. Hitler was so impressed by the demonstration that he announced enthusiastically to the assembled officers and political leaders: "That is what I need! That is what I want to have!" While it is doubtful that Hitler recognized the true military potential of this infant force, he did provide an important institutional impetus to its further development and incorporation in the operational doctrine of the German Army; significantly, it is this doctrinal change that transformed the character of war in 1939.
Gasoline engines were initially a logical choice German panzers because such engines were both cheaper and easier for German industry to produce than diesels. The decision to stick to gasoline engines was a consequence of Germany's hasty rearmament, and chronic bureaucratic inefficiency. The dominant thought among designers in the German army procurement office (Heereswaffenamt) was that the range penalties of gasoline would not hinder operations. Few military planners, apart from a few armor specialists like Guderian, anticipated the scope of armored operations and the free-ranging distances that they would cover.
The first large scale tank program initiated by the Nazis called for the production of 100 tanks by March 1934; the second, for 650 by March 1935. It is worth observing that the Versailles Treaty, under which all tanks were forbidden, was not formally repudiated by Germany until May 1935. Krupp contributed the design for these programs and shared in their execution. These illegal programs were camouflaged by calling the tanks "LaS", the abbreviation for the German words meaning agricultural tractor. The choice of name completely epitomizes the inverted scale of Nazi values; swords rather than plowshares, tanks rather than agricultural tractors.
In the wake of the creation of the first three panzer divisions in 1935, Beck (now a general and Fritsch's Chief of Staff) initiated a study to determine the feasibility of panzer corps andpanzer armies. Subsequent field exercises and operational experience in the occupation ofAustria in 1938 prompted the general staff to make ongoing improvements to the organization, training, and tactical procedures of the panzer divisions.
The German Army Chief of Staff, Ludwig Beck, published a modernization plan in 1935 that outlined two different requirements for tanks; frontally assaulting an evenly matched opponent and exploiting beyond the front line to deep objectives. Guderian realized that tanks or infantry alone could not overcome the enemy defensive zone and published an article in 1936 that focused on the combination of infantry, artillery, air support, and armor in offensive operations. A similar idea of all of the theorists was the use of tanks in waves to firstovercome the enemy defensive line, then engage the enemy artillery and defeat enemycounterattacks, and finally to exploit the penetration by seizing deep objectives. The terms used and the number of waves of tanks varied with the different authors, but the ideas for overcoming the enemy defensive zone remained similar. A constant theme was that tanks must be concentrated and that each wave must have a special, well-defined mission. The tasks associated with the first wave necessitated attacking under fire from artillery and antitank guns, as well as being able to defeat enemy armored counterattacks. Heavy tanks were to comprise the first wave and follow on waves consisted of medium and light tanks.
In 1926, when Heinz Guderian was appointed to be the General Staff officer in charge of armored warfare, he was shipped off to Sweden to look at what the Swedes were doing with tanks. As he made clear in his memoirs, it would be the first time he had ever seen a tank. In 1937, Guderian published Achtung-Panzer! This book was widely read in the German army and set forth their doctrine of mobile and armored warfare.
Guderian, Commander of Panzer Troops, published a credible overview of German armored warfare doctrine in a widely circulated work, "Achtung-Panzer!" Guderian claimed authorship for virtually all of the innovations and achievements of the armored force. While active in the development and expansion of the mature Panzerwaffe in the late 1930s, in fact, Guderian had played little intellectual role in the creation of the armored force and associated doctrine [despite subsequent assertions to the contrary].
In stressing the importance of the tank battle, Guderian wrote: "The tank’s most dangerous enemy is another tank. If we are unable to defeat the enemy armor the breakthrough has as good as failed, for our infantry and artillery will be unable to make further progress. Everything comes down to delaying the intervention of the enemy antitank reserves and tanks, and getting in fast and deep into the zone of the hostile command centers and reserves with our own effective tank forces -- and by “effective” we mean forces that are capable of waging a tank battle."
Guderian established the principle, applicable to all tanks regardless of size or mission, of concentration. This principle stated that tank forces must be concentrated and “deployed en masse in both breadth and depth.” He stated that “concentration of the available armored forces will always be more effective than dispersing them, irrespective of whether we are talking about a defensive or an offensive posture, a breakthrough or anenvelopment, a pursuit or a counterattack.”
In a memo dated 24 November 1938, the Commander in Chief of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, presented guidelines establishing a heavy tank company and assigning one to each panzer brigade. Inexplicably, in February 1939 when the German Army General Staff outlined its plans for reorganization from light panzer divisions and panzer brigades to panzer divisions, it eliminated the heavy tank company authorization from the new panzer regiment organization. In a special reorganization, the Army General Staff added a medium tank company to the panzer regiment organization in September 1939. It was this panzer regiment and division organization that fought and won in Poland, France and during the early stages in Russia. Lacking a true heavy tank, the Germans used the Panzer IV with a low-velocity seventy-five-millimeter main gun to fulfill the heavy tank role within these medium tank companies through Poland, France, and when Germany invaded Russia in June 1941.
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