1943 - Revision of Production Program
The end of the year 1942 marked a turning point both in the war and in the panzer production program. The great defeat at Stalingrad and the landing of Allied forces in North Africa set under way the long series of continuous retreats, broken only by a few minor offensive actions, which finally ended in surrender. The quantities of panzer equipment for current front-line operations and for replacement of losses increased enormously. As the scale of the conflict widened, it automatically increased the proportion of stocks which had to be used in the frontlines rather than held in reserve.
The battle of Stalingrad, beginning in November 1942, brought wastage rates to new heights, with a loss of 500 panzer vehicles in that month alone, followed by 200 in December, 700 in January, and 2,200 in February when the encircled forces finally surrendered. The jump in attrition rate is best indicated by a statement of General Thomas, Chief of the Economic and Armament Office of the Wehrmacht High Command until January 1943, that losses in the Russian campaign up to the battle of Stalingrad were the equivalent of equipment for perhaps 50 divisions (of all types) whereas in that one battle equipment for 45 divisions was lost. Stocks of panzer vehicles, which had been built up to a total of almost 6,000 by 1 November, dropped yo 5,000 on 1 March 1943.
The 1942 summer campaign in Russia had changed the entire conception of panzer requirements before the Stalingrad debacle; the new viewpoint had dictated an immediate revision in the scale of the panzer production program. Where previously the program of facility expansion undertaken in 1942 had been considered adquate to provide all needed panzer equipment it became apparen that it would fall far short. Although Speer had at times conveyed the impression that production programs formulated by his organization always met requirements as set by the military, the evidence does not bear him out. The record at this time is is one of constantly rising demands by Hitler and of explanations by Speer and Dr. Saur, his chief aide, that the demands could not be immediately or fully met. All indications are that military demand caused continuous upward revisions in programs proposed by the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, but that even the revised programs aimed at goals short of the desires of the military. In short, after the end of 1942 the brake upon panzer production was no longer a modest level of military demand but rather the capacity of the German economy as then organized.
The development of the new panzer program in the late 1942 provides one of the best illustrations of the role of the Fuehrer in war production. Hitler had in September 1942 asked for a production goal of 1,400 armored fighting vehicles per month including 800 tanks of which 600 were to be Panthers and 50 Tigers, 300 assault guns and 300 self-propelled guns. He directed that this goal be reached by the spring of 1944 and that special measures be taken to provide the labor and machine tools necessary to assure its achievement. In December at a meeting called by Hitler to consider the formulation, the Chairman of the Main Committee for Panzer Production, Dr. Rohland, presented a report which pointed out the difficulties involved in obtaining enlarged factory space, additional raw materials and machine tools, and other prerequisites of expanded panzer production but Hitler demanded that in spite of the difficulties the panzer production program be carried out "whatever the cost".
Despite this insistence by their chief, the "Adolf Hitler Panzer Program" as formulated by Speer and his colleagues aimed at the production of only 1,200 Panzer vehicles per month, and that goal not to be reached until the end of 1944. On 17 January 1943, before the program had been officially approved but when it had already been unofficially announced, Speer and Saur were summoned by Hitler and informed that their program was completely inadequate and must be revised upward. They agreed, but explained that although immediate increases might be achieved in output of assault guns and Mark II and IV tanks, Tiger and Panther output could not possibly be expanded within five months. Dr. Rohland and other officials directly responsible for panzer production considered the new committment - a revised program aimed at 1,500 to 2,100 panzer vehicles by the end of the month - utterly fantastic.
What impressed the experts most was the difficulty of expanding production capacity to the extent necessary; they believed that the program could be effected only at considerable expense to other armaments production.
The need for fulfilling the Adolf Hitler Panzer Program was so urgent, however, that the required steps were taken. On 22 January 1943 Hitler issued a decree directing that all necessary measures be taken immediately to increase the production of panzer vehicles "even if by these measures other important branches of the armament industry are adversely affected for a time." Specifically, the decree authorized the Reichsminister for Armaments and War Production to provide plants producing panzer vehicles and their components with abundant supplies of technicians, raw materials, machinery and electric power, and for this purpose to draw upon the capacities of other was production industries. The decree also prohibited the drafting of men from the panzer industry and cancelled all drafts made after December 1942.
The enormous increases in production which resulted from this program failed to satisfy the mounting demands. Military leaders knew that panzer production after 1942 was deficient both in numbers and in quality. The prodigious advance planned for German production in 1944 - even if fully realized - would have left German panzer output at less than half the estimated Allied level. Estimates prepared for the Wehrmacht High Command indicated that in 1942 and 1943 Allied production of armored fighting vehicles was more than five times as high as Germany's; Russian production alone was three times that of Germany in 1942, twice as high in 1943. The comparative output figures for 1943, as compiled by the Germans, showed a total of 68,000 for the Allies (US, British Empire, Soviet Union) against 12,000 for Germany.
German army leaders, as for example General Thomas, have said that the effects of panzer shortages in 1943 were not more serious in the field only because the troops in the west were not in action and so could absorb mcuh of the deficiency. When reductions in output were later brought about by bombing, the strength of the front forces was considerably weakened.
The only air attack on the tank industry that caused any serious interference with output was the one in October 1943 on the Alkett plant, Berlin. This raid reduced the year's production by some 300 to 400 tanks (about four percent). Between the beginning of 1942 and the end of 1943 the value of the output of the tank industry (in relation to the whole armament program) more than doubled.
During 1943 bottlenecks appeared in the supply of finished components. As strategic bombing up to this time had had little or no effect on production, it is probable that the spreading out of the component product section of the industry during this period was primarily for the purpose of increasing production and not as a means of protecting the output of finished tanks. The most notable example of this is the starting up of Maybach engines at the Siegmar plant of Auto-Union. However, the potential capacity of this new source of engines was such as to make it evident that the Germans had not overlooked the possibility of bombing crippling the then existing engine output. Naturally, bottlenecks offer a highly vulnerable target to precision bombing so tha the expansion of component manufacturing automatically reduced the vulnerability of the section of the industry.
The light Mark II and 38 t tanks went out of production during 1943 although their chassis were for some time thereafter used as mounts for a variety of self-propelled guns. Production of the Mark III medium tank was also discontinued in favor of assault guns on the same chassis. The Mark IV chassis was produced during 1943 in greatly increased numbers for use both as a tank and an assault gun, but principally as an assault gun in 1944. Heavy tanks also increase particularly in the case of the Panther.
1943 Panzer Production by Model and Producer
Model | Producer | Units Produced | Percent of Total Tank Production |
---|---|---|---|
Mark I and II | MAN | 77 | .8 |
Mark III and IV | Krupp | 785 | 8.3 |
Vomag | 816 | 8.7 | |
Alkett | 2,500 | 26.6 | |
Nibelungen | 1,289 | 13.7 | |
Miag | 1,350 | 14.3 | |
Marienfelde | 1 | 0.0 | |
Totals | 6,741 | 71.6 | |
Mark V Panther | MAN | 525 | 5.5 |
MNH | 781 | 8.3 | |
Marienfelde | 544 | 5.8 | |
Totals | 1,850 | 19.6 | |
Mark VI Tiger | Henschel | 647 | 6.9 |
Nibelungen | 2 | 0.0 | |
Totals | 649 | 7.0 | |
Mark 38 t | BMM and Skoda | 87 | 1.0 |
Self-Propelled Guns* | 2,659 | ||
Total Panzers | 12,013 | 100 |
* Breakdown to producer unavailable
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