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AFSC - Alternative Platforms

With the E-7 eliminated and only a decade remaining until mandatory E-3 retirement, NATO and individual member nations have begun evaluating alternative platforms. The options under serious consideration reflect diverse strategic philosophies and operational priorities:

Saab GlobalEye: The European Frontrunner

The Swedish Saab GlobalEye has emerged as the leading candidate for NATO's AWACS replacement and represents the most immediate viable alternative to the cancelled E-7 program. Built on the Bombardier Global 6000/6500 business jet platform, the GlobalEye embodies a fundamentally different operational philosophy from traditional large-aircraft AWACS platforms. Rather than maximizing onboard crew capacity and extended endurance, the GlobalEye emphasizes survivability, multi-domain sensor integration, and cost-effectiveness through a distributed network architecture.

France has already committed to acquiring the GlobalEye to replace its independent E-3F fleet, which operates separately from NATO's collective E-3A force. This French decision carries significant weight, as France maintains one of Europe's most sophisticated defense industries and has historically prioritized strategic autonomy. Germany and Denmark have expressed strong interest in the platform, suggesting potential for a multinational European acquisition program that could provide the scale necessary for cost management and shared operational capabilities.

The GlobalEye's sensor suite represents its most distinctive feature. The primary surveillance radar is Saab's Erieye ER (Extended Range) AESA system, mounted in a dorsal fin configuration. This radar uses advanced Gallium Nitride (GaN) technology for enhanced detection range and electronic warfare resistance. Critically, the GlobalEye also incorporates a dedicated maritime surveillance radar—the Leonardo Seaspray 7500E—mounted on the aircraft's belly, providing specialized capabilities for detecting surface vessels and submarines that complement the air surveillance mission. Additional electro-optical and infrared sensors enable visual identification and tracking of targets.

This multi-domain sensor architecture makes the GlobalEye particularly effective for nations with extensive maritime boundaries or complex operational requirements spanning air, sea, and ground domains. For Arctic operations—increasingly critical for NATO as Russian activity in the High North expands—the GlobalEye's maritime radar and ground moving target indication (GMTI) capabilities offer advantages for monitoring both naval activity and ground forces across vast, sparsely populated regions.

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye: The Tactical Option

The U.S. Navy's E-2D Advanced Hawkeye has been proposed as a potential bridging solution, though significant questions exist about its suitability for NATO's requirements. Designed primarily for carrier-based operations, the E-2D is substantially smaller than either the E-7 or GlobalEye, with a typical crew of five personnel and more limited endurance. Its AN/APY-9 AESA radar provides excellent capability within its operational envelope, and its ability to operate from carriers and short runways offers tactical flexibility that larger platforms cannot match.

However, the E-2D's smaller size translates directly to reduced onboard battle management capacity, lower operational speed (approximately 600 km/h versus 850 km/h for the GlobalEye), and shorter unrefueled range. For the broad-area surveillance and extended-duration missions that NATO AWACS aircraft routinely perform—such as monitoring the entire Baltic Sea region or providing continuous coverage over Eastern European airspace—the E-2D's limitations become significant. Multiple E-2D aircraft would be required to provide the coverage area and mission duration of a single larger platform, substantially increasing operational complexity and cost.

The USAF's consideration of the E-2D appears primarily motivated by interim necessity rather than optimal capability match. As the existing E-3 fleet ages and mission-capable rates decline, some temporary solution may be necessary if space-based surveillance systems and other alternatives cannot be deployed quickly enough. For NATO's long-term replacement program, however, the E-2D seems poorly suited to the Alliance's operational requirements.

Dassault Falcon 10X and Other Business Jet Conversions

The French aerospace company Dassault Aviation proposed a modified version of its Falcon 10X business jet as an AWACS platform during the initial RFI phase. This concept would have offered similar advantages to the GlobalEye—business jet economics, lower operational costs, and reduced radar signature—while potentially providing greater cabin volume and endurance due to the Falcon 10X's larger size compared to the Bombardier Global 6000/6500.

However, the Falcon 10X AWACS concept has effectively been eliminated from consideration following France's decision to acquire the GlobalEye for its national requirement. The GlobalEye's proven operational status with multiple customers (United Arab Emirates, Sweden, and now France) contrasts with the speculative nature of a Falcon-based system that would require extensive development. Given time constraints and the imperative to field capabilities before 2035, developmental risk has become a decisive factor against unproven concepts.

L3Harris similarly pitched a Bombardier Global 6500-based solution utilizing a Conformal Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) radar system during the RFI phase. While technically feasible, this approach would compete directly with the more mature GlobalEye offering while potentially lacking Saab's specialized multi-domain sensor integration and operational experience.

System-of-Systems Concepts

Beyond individual platform replacements, NATO continues to explore more ambitious "system of systems" architectures that would distribute surveillance and battle management functions across multiple platforms and domains. This approach might combine high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicles for persistent surveillance, space-based sensors for strategic early warning, ground-based radars for regional coverage, maritime platforms for sea control, and manned command-and-control aircraft for tactical battle management.

The theoretical advantages of such distributed architectures include enhanced survivability (no single point of failure), greater coverage area, and the ability to tailor sensor deployment to specific operational requirements. However, the technical complexity of integrating multiple systems with different data formats, communication protocols, and command structures presents enormous challenges. NATO's experience with multinational operations demonstrates the difficulty of achieving seamless interoperability even among similar systems operated by different nations. Expanding this to fundamentally different platforms across multiple domains multiplies these integration challenges.

Moreover, system-of-systems approaches typically require longer development timelines and involve greater programmatic risk than acquiring proven platforms. With the 2035 deadline approaching rapidly, NATO may lack the time necessary to develop, test, and operationalize such complex architectures. More likely, distributed capabilities will evolve gradually over time, supplementing rather than replacing traditional airborne platforms in the near term.

Comparative Analysis: E-7 Wedgetail vs. Saab GlobalEye

Understanding the strategic implications of NATO's choice between continued pursuit of the E-7 (despite American withdrawal) and adoption of the GlobalEye alternative requires detailed examination of how these platforms differ in capability, operational philosophy, and strategic fit.

Platform Specifications and Design Philosophy

Feature	Boeing E-7 Wedgetail	Saab GlobalEye
Airframe	Boeing 737 Next Generation airliner	Bombardier Global 6000/6500 business jet
Length	39 m / 128 ft	30 m / 99 ft
Wingspan	36 m / 118 ft	29 m / 94 ft
Maximum Takeoff Weight	79,000 kg / 174,000 lb	45,000 kg / 99,000 lb
Cruise Speed	850 km/h / 530 mph	900 km/h / 560 mph
Service Ceiling	12,500 m / 41,000 ft	15,500 m / 51,000 ft
Primary Radar	Northrop Grumman MESA L-band AESA in dorsal "top hat"	Saab Erieye ER AESA in dorsal fin
Radar Coverage	Full 360-degree continuous coverage	Primary coverage to sides; requires maneuvering for continuous 360-degree area surveillance
Maritime Radar	None (air surveillance optimized)	Leonardo Seaspray 7500E belly-mounted maritime surveillance radar
Operator Consoles	10-12 standard, up to 19 augmented	5-6 stations
Operational Range	~7,000 km / 4,300 mi	~9,200 km / 5,700 mi
Mission Endurance	~10 hours, extendable via in-flight refueling	~11 hours, no in-flight refueling on current models
In-Flight Refueling	Standard capability	Not equipped on current customer aircraft
Operating Cost per Flight Hour	~$20,000 USD	~$15,000 USD
Acquisition Cost (estimated)	$2.0-2.5 billion per unit	$1.5-2.0 billion per unit

Operational Philosophy and Strategic Implications

The E-7 and GlobalEye represent fundamentally different approaches to airborne early warning and control. The E-7 embodies traditional AWACS philosophy: a large, capable platform functioning as a flying command center with extensive onboard crew capacity for complex battle management. Its design assumes operations in permissive or semi-permissive airspace where the platform can remain on station for extended periods, orchestrating air operations across theater-wide areas. The E-7's 360-degree radar coverage and large operator complement enable it to simultaneously track hundreds of targets, coordinate dozens of friendly aircraft, and manage complex air-to-air and air-to-ground scenarios.

This capability comes with inherent vulnerabilities in contested environments. A Boeing 737-sized aircraft presents a large radar cross-section easily detectable by modern surface-to-air missile systems at ranges exceeding 250 km (155 mi). Against adversaries equipped with S-400, S-500, or advanced fighter aircraft, an E-7 would need to operate well behind front lines, potentially reducing its effective sensor coverage of forward areas. The platform's size and heat signature make it vulnerable to long-range air-to-air missiles, and its relatively modest speed (850 km/h) limits its ability to rapidly reposition or escape threat envelopes.

The GlobalEye adopts a different philosophy emphasizing survivability through reduced detectability and distributed operations. Its business jet airframe produces a significantly smaller radar cross-section and infrared signature, making it harder to detect and track at long ranges. Operating at higher altitudes (15,500 m versus 12,500 m for the E-7) further reduces vulnerability to many surface-to-air missile systems while actually improving radar line-of-sight to distant targets. The GlobalEye's faster cruise speed (900 km/h) provides better ability to reposition quickly or evade threats.

Rather than concentrating battle management functions onboard, the GlobalEye emphasizes data streaming to ground stations and integration with broader network architectures. Its 5-6 operator stations handle immediate tactical tasks and sensor management, while extensive surveillance data flows to ground-based command centers where larger analyst teams can process information and coordinate operations. This distributed approach means that loss of a single GlobalEye aircraft, while serious, does not eliminate the entire battle management capability as might occur with an E-7 carrying 19 operators managing theater-wide operations.

Radar and Sensor Performance

The E-7's MESA radar is generally considered to provide superior raw performance in terms of maximum detection range against aerial targets, primarily due to its larger physical aperture and L-band frequency selection. L-band radars offer advantages for long-range detection and better penetration through atmospheric conditions and certain types of jamming, though with reduced resolution compared to higher frequencies. The MESA's 360-degree coverage without physical rotation represents a significant advantage over the older E-3's mechanical rotodome, providing continuous surveillance without blind spots during rotation cycles.

The GlobalEye's Erieye ER radar uses more modern Gallium Nitride technology, which provides improved power efficiency, better electronic counter-countermeasures capability, and enhanced reliability compared to older gallium arsenide-based systems. However, the Erieye ER's configuration optimizes coverage to the sides of the aircraft rather than providing uniform 360-degree surveillance. To maintain continuous coverage of a specific area, GlobalEye aircraft must fly in oval or circular patterns, which may be less efficient for on-station time than the E-7's typical racetrack pattern.

Where the GlobalEye demonstrates clear superiority is in multi-domain surveillance. Its dedicated maritime surveillance radar provides specialized capabilities for detecting surface vessels, submarine periscopes, and maritime activity that complement its air surveillance mission. The Seaspray 7500E radar operates in X-band for high-resolution imaging of surface targets and includes modes for synthetic aperture radar (SAR) ground mapping and ground moving target indication (GMTI). This multi-domain capability makes the GlobalEye particularly effective for scenarios requiring simultaneous air, maritime, and ground surveillance—increasingly common in modern military operations.

Battle Management and Command Capacity

The most significant operational difference between platforms lies in onboard battle management capacity. The E-7's 10-19 operator positions enable extensive onboard command and control functions. Multiple operators can simultaneously manage air-to-air engagements, coordinate close air support for ground forces, direct air defense assets, manage airborne refueling tracks, and oversee search and rescue operations. This concentration of capability proves particularly valuable for large-scale coalition operations where rapid decision-making and complex coordination across multiple mission types occurs simultaneously.

The GlobalEye's 5-6 operator stations require a different operational model. Routine surveillance and immediate tactical responses can be handled onboard, but complex battle management typically involves ground-based command centers. High-bandwidth data links stream radar tracks, sensor imagery, and other information to these facilities where larger teams can analyze situations and coordinate responses. This distributed model offers advantages in redundancy and scalability (ground facilities can support multiple aircraft and be hardened against attack), but requires robust communication infrastructure and may introduce latency in decision cycles.

For NATO operations, this difference has significant implications. The Alliance's command structure traditionally emphasizes airborne command posts for major operations, with senior commanders and battle staffs operating from aircraft like the E-3 to maintain mobility and survivability. Transitioning to a ground-centric model would require substantial changes to NATO doctrine, command facilities, and operational procedures. However, modern communication technologies and the vulnerability of large aircraft in contested environments may make such changes strategically necessary regardless of platform choice.

Strategic Assessment: Implications for NATO and European Defense

The European Strategic Autonomy Dimension

Beyond technical considerations, NATO's AWACS replacement decision carries profound implications for European strategic autonomy and transatlantic defense relationships. The E-7 cancellation—initiated by American withdrawal—underscores European vulnerability to U.S. strategic decisions that may not align with European security priorities. If the United States determines that manned AWACS platforms are too vulnerable for future warfare and pivots to space-based surveillance, European nations must decide whether to follow American strategic logic or pursue independent paths based on different threat assessments and operational requirements.

The GlobalEye represents the only viable near-term AWACS solution produced by a European manufacturer. Choosing this platform would strengthen European defense industrial capacity, maintain critical aerospace engineering expertise within Europe, and reduce dependence on American defense exports for strategic capabilities. France's early commitment to GlobalEye reflects longstanding French emphasis on strategic autonomy and willingness to invest in European defense alternatives even when American options might offer superior technical performance.

However, strategic autonomy comes with costs. The E-7 benefits from extensive American operational experience, integration with U.S. communications and data systems, and the logistics advantages of a widely-operated commercial airframe. European militaries have decades of experience working with American AWACS technology and doctrine. Transitioning to a new platform from a different manufacturer with different operational concepts requires substantial investment in training, doctrine development, and systems integration.

Moreover, the relatively small European market for AWACS platforms raises questions about long-term sustainment. If NATO members collectively acquire perhaps 15-20 GlobalEye aircraft to replace their E-3A fleet and meet individual national requirements, will this provide sufficient production volume to support an economically viable industrial base? The E-7 benefits from a much larger potential market including ongoing U.S. military interest (despite the current cancellation), allied nations in the Indo-Pacific region, and potential future customers. A small European fleet might face higher per-unit costs and reduced economies of scale for upgrades and sustainment.

Operational Suitability for NATO Requirements

Assessing which platform better meets NATO's operational requirements depends on assumptions about future conflict scenarios. In a major conventional war against Russian forces—the scenario that has dominated NATO planning since 2014—both platforms face serious survivability challenges. Modern Russian integrated air defense systems, including the S-400 and upcoming S-500, can engage aircraft at ranges exceeding 400 km (250 mi). Neither the E-7 nor GlobalEye could safely operate within effective sensor range of heavily defended Russian territory during high-intensity conflict.

This reality suggests that future AWACS operations will increasingly occur in a "sensor support" role, operating well behind friendly lines and relying on forward-deployed ground radars, fighter aircraft sensors, and unmanned platforms to provide coverage of contested areas. In this operational model, the E-7's extended endurance through in-flight refueling and large operator capacity for managing complex operations offer advantages. However, if AWACS platforms must operate 300-400 km behind front lines to avoid Russian air defenses, sensor range limitations may reduce the significance of platform-specific radar performance differences.

For lower-intensity operations—peacetime surveillance of Alliance airspace, maritime patrol, counter-terrorism, and stability operations—the operational differences between platforms become less critical. Both can perform routine surveillance missions effectively, though the GlobalEye's multi-domain sensor suite offers advantages for missions requiring simultaneous air and maritime surveillance, such as monitoring the Baltic Sea or Eastern Mediterranean.

Arctic operations present a specific operational challenge where platform characteristics matter significantly. The Arctic's vast distances, harsh weather, and increasing strategic importance as Russian military activity expands require capable surveillance platforms. The E-7's in-flight refueling capability provides obvious advantages for extended missions over enormous areas. However, the GlobalEye's maritime surveillance radar proves valuable for monitoring both Russian Northern Fleet activity and ground forces in the High North, where distinguishing between civilian and military activity often requires multi-domain sensor fusion.

Cost and Procurement Timeline Considerations

With mandatory E-3 retirement approaching in 2035, NATO faces severe time pressure for any replacement program. The GlobalEye offers significant advantages in procurement timeline and development risk. The platform is currently in operational service with multiple customers, Saab has demonstrated production capability, and integration with NATO communications systems has been validated through Sweden's status as a NATO member and Saab's extensive work with Alliance nations.

Pursuing the E-7 despite American cancellation would face substantial obstacles. Without U.S. participation, European nations would need to negotiate directly with Boeing for aircraft production, work with Northrop Grumman for MESA radar integration, and assume all development risk and integration costs for NATO-specific requirements. Boeing's focus on its commercial 737 MAX program and the uncertain future of military 737 production create additional risk that the industrial base might not support a small European order. Lead times for E-7 production and delivery could easily extend to 2030-2032, leaving minimal margin before the E-3 retirement deadline.

Operating cost differentials favor the GlobalEye significantly. At approximately $15,000 per flight hour compared to $20,000 for the E-7, a fleet of 15 GlobalEye aircraft operating 300 hours annually per aircraft would save approximately $22.5 million per year in operating costs. Over a 20-year service life, this represents nearly $450 million in savings—substantial for budget-constrained European defense ministries. Lower acquisition costs per unit (estimated $1.5-2.0 billion versus $2.0-2.5 billion for the E-7) provide additional financial advantages, potentially allowing acquisition of more aircraft for the same budget.

Current Operators and International Interest

GlobalEye Operations and Experience

The United Arab Emirates pioneered GlobalEye operations, having ordered five aircraft in 2015 with deliveries beginning in 2020. UAE operational experience has been generally positive, with the platforms providing effective air and maritime surveillance across the Persian Gulf region. Swedish Air Force operations began more recently as Sweden acquired two aircraft for homeland defense and Baltic Sea surveillance, with operations beginning in 2022-2023. France's commitment to GlobalEye, announced in 2025, represents the most significant European adoption and validates the platform's suitability for NATO-standard operations.

Operational experience has revealed both capabilities and limitations. The GlobalEye's multi-domain sensors have proven effective for complex surveillance scenarios involving simultaneous air and maritime threats. However, the platform's requirement to maneuver for 360-degree coverage and its limited onboard battle management capacity have required adjustment to operational procedures developed for traditional AWACS platforms. UAE and Swedish operators have adapted by emphasizing ground-based command centers and treating GlobalEye aircraft as sensor platforms feeding broader surveillance networks rather than as self-contained command posts.

E-7 Wedgetail Global Fleet

Despite the recent U.S. and NATO cancellations, the E-7 Wedgetail maintains an international user base. The Royal Australian Air Force operates six aircraft that have demonstrated excellent performance in regional surveillance and coalition operations. South Korea operates four E-7s for air defense and maritime surveillance, while Turkey has ordered four aircraft with deliveries ongoing. The United Kingdom's commitment to three aircraft remains firm despite NATO's program cancellation, with the RAF expecting initial operational capability in 2026-2027.

Australian operational experience spanning nearly 15 years provides extensive validation of the E-7's capabilities. RAAF Wedgetails have participated in operations over Iraq and Syria, provided surveillance for major exercises in the Pacific, and demonstrated the platform's effectiveness for both air defense and battle management roles. However, Australian operations have occurred primarily in permissive environments where platform survivability against sophisticated air defenses was not a primary concern. Whether E-7 capabilities justify survivability risks in contested operations against near-peer adversaries remains an open question that the Pentagon answered negatively in its cancellation decision.

Conclusion: The Path Forward

NATO's AWACS replacement program has reached a critical juncture following the twin cancellations of the E-7 Wedgetail acquisition. The Alliance faces a strategic decision that extends beyond technical platform comparisons to encompass fundamental questions about European defense autonomy, transatlantic burden-sharing, and operational concepts for surveillance and command in contested future environments.

The Saab GlobalEye appears increasingly likely to become NATO's chosen platform, representing the only viable near-term solution produced by a European manufacturer. France's commitment provides a foundation for potential multinational procurement, while German and Danish interest suggests broader European adoption. The platform's lower costs, proven operational status, multi-domain sensor capabilities, and enhanced survivability characteristics address many of NATO's requirements, though questions remain about onboard battle management capacity and the absence of in-flight refueling.

However, adopting the GlobalEye requires NATO to fundamentally rethink AWACS doctrine and operations. The Alliance must transition from airborne command posts with extensive onboard battle management to distributed architectures emphasizing ground-based command centers fed by airborne sensors. This transition presents both challenges and opportunities—challenges in doctrine development and infrastructure investment, but opportunities to create more survivable and resilient command-and-control architectures less vulnerable to single-point failures.

The 2035 deadline approaches rapidly. NATO has approximately one decade to select a platform, negotiate procurement contracts, establish production schedules, develop operational doctrine, train crews, integrate with Alliance communications systems, and achieve full operational capability. This timeline permits little margin for error or extended development programs. The collapse of the E-7 program, while representing a setback for transatlantic defense cooperation, may ultimately accelerate decision-making and force overdue modernization of NATO's surveillance and command architecture.

Regardless of platform selection, the AWACS replacement program highlights broader trends in European defense. American strategic priorities increasingly diverge from European security requirements as the United States focuses on Indo-Pacific challenges and peer competition with China. European nations face growing pressure to develop autonomous capabilities in critical defense areas, accepting the costs and inefficiencies of smaller-scale production in exchange for strategic independence. The GlobalEye program may prove a bellwether for European defense industrial policy, demonstrating whether the continent can sustain high-technology military capabilities without American participation.