DR Congo Army - ORBAT 2012
The national military, the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), had an estimated 150,000 troops [as of 2012], about half of whom were deployed in the east. The core of these troops was made of soldiers from the AFDL, the insurgency that brought Kabila father to power, and remnants of Mobutu’s army. Over the years, FARDC has added on multiple layers, which largely contributes to its lack of discipline and unified command. Soldiers from the former MLC (many of whom had been soldiers under Mobutu) and the RCD joined in the 2003-2006 transition period.
For a while, integrated battalions were carefully put together under donor sponsorship in a process known as brassage (blending). Thereafter, the policy of incorporating insurgents from rebel groups, militias, and the Mai-Mai continued and expanded, but the quality of the integration, referred then as mixage, diminished dramatically as most groups remained under their previous leadership and deployed in their “home” areas, refusing to be assigned elsewhere. This was the case, for example, with the mixage of the CNDP rebel group in 2009, itself a spin-off from the original RCD. Mixage has resulted into a very fragile military in the east (where most of this integration takes place), that cannot be relied upon by the government to follow orders in all circumstances.
Defections were frequent, as individuals often return to their insurgency after becoming disenchanted with their military career, including the lack of payment and the failure of the government to deliver on many of its promises in terms of ranks, housing, and other perks. Over the years, and in large part because of the policy of systematic integration of former insurgents (but also because of paltry salaries), the FADRC in the east has turned at times into a largely unhinged and autonomous armed group that operates in many ways like local insurgents and militias and was more likely to collaborate with them than to fight them, and to oppress local populations than to protect them.
Although some 60,000-70,000 FARDC were estimated to be deployed in the east, making them by far the largest group, they have never defeated any of the local insurgents in battle. On the contrary, its soldiers — poorly trained and rarely paid — regularly engage in looting and other forms of violence, including rapes, against civilian populations. In the words of Séverine Autesserre, the FARDC “relentlessly commit horrific violations of human rights.” Two other international observers concur: “The FARDC is often the single greatest threat to the Congolese and routinely terrorizes civilians, extorting protection money, looting villages, raping and killing civilians.” [Paddon, Emily and Guillaume Lacaille, Stabilising the Congo, Refugee Studies Center, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 8, (University of Oxford, December 2011), p. 6.]
There was also ample evidence that the FARDC, including some of its top officers, were involved in criminal mining activities, including smuggling with Rwanda. They also regularly sell their weapons and equipment to local rebels. Ninety-five percent of the weapons used by the FDLR—the group that ostensibly justifies the deployment of the FARDC in the east—are said to come from the FARDC. It was based on accusations of selling weapons to rebels that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Amisi was dismissed in November 2012. Despite more than 10 years of donor efforts in SSR, the FARDC remains first and foremost a factor of instability.
In the east, it was essentially battalions of former rebels and Mai-Mai who do the majority of FARDC operations. First among them was the CNDP, a largely Tutsi group active mostly in the Rutshuru and Masisi regions of North Kivu and in some parts of South Kivu. It was often perceived as the agent of Rwandan interests in the region. Although the CNDP has officially disbanded and joined the FARDC, its leadership has continued to exploit certain mines in the east and remains in control of its battalions (refusing to redeploy away from the Kivus).
The CNDP was also involved in smuggling and illegal taxation, runs its own parallel police, and redistributes land away from “autochthonous” groups in the areas it controls. Until recently, the CNDP’s leader was Bosco Ntaganda, a general in the FARDC and deputy commander of Amani Leo operations against the FDLR, who is under an ICC indictment for war crimes. Although up to 6,000 CNDP joined the FARDC in 2009, about 1,700 of them remained unintegrated in three “hidden” battalions in charge of Ntaganda’s protection.
In April 2012, the CNDP effectively splintered, as a faction named M23, under the leadership of Ntaganda, defected and launched combat operations against the FARDC in North and South Kivu. Deriving its name from the date (March 23) of the 2009 agreement that set up their integration, M23 was the latest manifestation of the failure of mixage. M23 results in part from Ntaganda’s fear of being arrested and prosecuted by the ICC, from grievances about the lack of implementation of the 2009 agreement, and from the manipulation of local groups by Rwanda in a continuous effort to destabilize Congo and retain leverage, if not indirect control, over the region. Although it started with only a few hundred fighters, it has grown and created considerable havoc in the region including the capture of Goma in November 2012. It was estimated at more than 1.500 fighters and was actively recruiting from defeated forces.
The Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO) were integrated at the same time as the CNDP. Paradoxically, PARECO was created in 2007 as an anti-CNDP organization within local Hutu, Hunde, and Nande communities. Once in the FARDC, however, they have collaborated with the CNDP in their pursuit of material benefits. Many non-Hutu members of PARECO defected from the FARDC soon after their integration, however. The latest round of mixage, which took place in 2011, brought in the Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF), a group of Banyamulenge (South Kivu Tutsi) from Minembwe; Mai-Mai Kapopo, an ethnically mixed group; and Mai-Mai Kifuafua, a Tembo group from North Kivu.
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