DR Congo Army - ORBAT 2007
The military integration process was at the heart of security sector reforms by 2004, working toward a goal of 18 integrated brigades to be formed and deployed before 2006 elections. As of early 2007 the DRC's current Military Regions (MRs) and the 13 existing IBs deployed in them were:
- 1st MR (Bandundu): no IBs currently deployed
- 2nd MR (Bas-Congo): no IBs currently deployed
- 3rd MR (Equateur): 10th IB, deployed in Gemena
- 4th MR (Kasai Occidental): 5th IB in Kananga
- 5th MR (Kasai Oriental): no IBs currently deployed
- 6th MR (Katanga): no IBs currently deployed
- 7th MR (Maniema): no IBs currently deployed
- 8th MR (North Kivu): 2nd IB in Butembo; 9th IB in Rutshuru
- 9th MR (Orientale): 1st IB in Bunia; 4th IB in Rwampara; 6th IB in Kagaba; 13th IB in Komanda
- 10th MR (South Kivu): 3rd IB in Bukavu; 8th IB in Sange; 11th IB in Walungu; 12th IB in Baraka; 14th IB in Numbi
- 11th MR (Kinshasa): 7th IB in Maluku
Congolese military (FARDC) officials proposed in early 2007 the redeployment and renaming of the army's Integrated Brigades (IBs). Most IBs remained concentrated in eastern DRC where the biggest security risks remain, although the proposal suggested moving two brigades currently stationed in Ituri District to other locations.
- 1st MR (Bandundu): 11th IIB (formerly 15th IB, currently undergoing formation) in Kikwit
- 2nd MR (Bas-Congo): 21st IIB (formerly 4th IB) in Boma
- 3rd MR (Equateur): 31st IIB (formerly 10th IB) in Gemena
- 4th MR (Kasai Occidental): 41st IIB (formerly 5th IB) in Kananga
- 5th MR (Kasai Oriental): no proposed IIB deployment
- 6th MR (Katanga): 61st IIB (formerly 13th IB) in Kolwezi
- 7th MR (Maniema): no proposed IIB deployment
- 8th MR (North Kivu): 81st IIB (formerly 2nd IB) in Butembo; 82nd IIB (formerly 9th IB) in Rutshuru
- 9th MR (Orientale): 91st IIB (formerly 1st IB) in Bunia; 92nd IIB (formerly 6th IB) in Kagaba
- 10th MR (South Kivu): 101st IIB (formerly 3rd IB) in Bukavu; 102nd IIB (formerly 8th IB) in Sange; 103rd IIB (formerly 11th IB) in Walungu; 104th IIB (formerly 12th IB) in Baraka; 105th IIB (formerly 14th IB) in Numbi
- 11th MR (Kinshasa): 111th IIB (formerly 7th IB) in Maluku
The Government of the DR Congo [GDRC] presented the so-called military "mixage" process as part of a short-term solution to end hostilities that erupted in North Kivu province between soldiers loyal to dissident General Laurent Nkunda and the Congolese military (FARDC) in November and December of 2006. The process "mixed" Nkunda troops with soldiers from other non-integrated, but "loyal," FARDC units in unified brigades, which would not immediately be subject to the usual military integration process. Government officials portrayed "mixage" as a way to break up Nkunda's forces, bring dissident elements under nominal FARDC control, and better secure the province.
Responding to a direct request from President Kabila, President Bush committed in October 2007 to assist the DRC to develop a modern and professional army. The cornerstone of this assistance is USG development of a program to train a Congolese army (FARDC) battalion, alternatively called a commando or rapid reaction force by the GDRC. The US program, implemented by AFRICOM and private contractors, called for a multi-phase training regimen beginning with FARDC officer and non-commissioned officer leadership and staff training followed by battalion maneuvers integrating junior soldiers. Once on the ground, however, U.S. instructors discovered a force lacking even the most rudimentary soldiering knowledge. As FARDC capacity was severely lacking, the training program returned to basics. Rather than honing the skills of would-be crack commandos, the ongoing program of instruction focuses on no-frills infantry training of a light infantry battalion (LIB) training, a designation preferred by US trainers.
Mark Malan of Refugees International wrote in July 2008 that "Individuals were grouped together and groups were topped up with new arrivals until brigade strength was reached at which time the whole group entered a 45-day basic training program, upon completion of which the group became a numbered “Integrated Brigade.” Substantive training was supposed to take place after the newly formed brigades were deployed ....I t is difficult to see how the Congolese government and those countries that assisted with the process convinced themselves that cohesive, operationally proficient and combat effective brigades could be formed in such a short space of time. In most armies of the world, the formation of an effective platoon takes at least six months. The building of the small, single-brigade Liberian army is scheduled to take at least three years and the brigade will be thoroughly evaluated by the U.S.-sponsored SSR Program before it is operationally deployed."
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