Colombia 2026 Presidential Election
Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in Colombia on May 31, 2026 in Bogotá and throughout the country. Incumbent President Gustavo Petro, elected in 2022 as Colombia's first left-wing president since independence in 1810, is constitutionally barred from seeking a consecutive second term. Colombian presidents are elected for four-year terms using a two-round system, where if no candidate receives a majority of the vote in the first round, a runoff is held between the top two candidates. The election will determine who leads a nation facing profound challenges including security deterioration, corruption scandals, economic pressures, and strained relations with the United States. Nearly one hundred presidential pre-candidates have emerged across the political spectrum, reflecting deep fragmentation in Colombian politics as the country approaches this critical electoral moment.
Colombia's Historic Pact held an internal consultation on October 26, 2025, that produced results few expected. More than 2.75 million people went to the polls to choose the ruling coalition's presidential candidate, according to the Registry Office. Cepeda's victory is only the first step on a broader path. According to the political calendar, the Historic Pact will take part in the Broad Front primaries in March 2026, an alliance of parties and social movements seeking to consolidate a single left-wing candidacy for the presidential elections. The Broad Front, inspired by similar experiences in other Latin American countries, brings together not only the Historic Pact but also sectors of the Green Party, the Unitarios movement, and various peasant, feminist, and youth organizations. Although its final configuration is still under discussion, the stated goal is to prevent the fragmentation of the progressive vote in what is shaping up to be a highly competitive electoral scenario.
The article from Colombia One identifies a fundamental contradiction in Colombia's current political landscape. The Historic Pact holds more electoral than legislative power, and more symbolic than institutional strength. Its transformative momentum continues to mobilize millions in the streets but dissipates in Congress, where alliances shift weekly and bills fade amid cross-vetoes, delaying tactics, and tensions within the government bloc itself. Despite holding the largest left-wing parliamentary representation in Colombian history, the Pact has failed to build a stable majority in Congress, where Petro's major reform promises including labor, healthcare, pension, and agrarian reform have been blocked.
President Petro has acknowledged this difficulty on multiple occasions, lamenting that congressional resistance obstructs his reform program and raising the possibility of a National Constituent Assembly as a way to reconfigure the country's political power. However, the message from the internal consultation is ambivalent. While progressive citizens remain active and organized, there still doesn't appear to be enough national consensus for an institutional transformation of that scale.
The March 2026 legislative elections are identified as crucial. It won't be enough for the Historic Pact to reaffirm its electoral leadership; it must translate that into a functional majority that allows it to govern. The partial failure of this first left-wing administration has not been a lack of votes, but a lack of votes where they truly matter: in Congress and local governments. The 2023 regional elections already showed a worrying setback for the ruling coalition, with the loss of several key mayoralties and governorships.
The consultation results can be interpreted in two ways. At best, it shows that a significant part of the electorate still identifies with the transformative project that brought Gustavo Petro to the presidency in 2022. At worst, it may suggest that the Colombian left risks closing in on its own base, effectively mobilizing the convinced but failing to sufficiently broaden its social and political reach. The Historic Pact has proven it remains the country's main organized political force with both mobilization capacity and a compelling narrative, achieving the unthinkable: building a solid base capable of advancing democratic left-wing proposals that move masses to the polls.
Beyond the sharp polarization between government supporters and critics, the prevailing social mood in Colombia is one of widespread frustration at seeing that after more than three years of Petro's administration, promises of change and deep reform remain unfulfilled due both to the lack of congressional majorities and internal disorganization within the government. The massive turnout can be read as a mandate for continuity of the progressive project, but also as a warning: public expectations remain high, and patience is limited.
The path toward 2026 will require more than ideological fervor. It will demand management, concrete results, and an alliance strategy that can turn social energy into effective political power. The coalition must move from being the movement that symbolizes change to the party that delivers it, because true political strength is not measured solely in votes but in the ability to turn those votes into tangible realities. That remains the unfinished task of the Historic Pact and Colombia's left in power. The article warns against mistaking internal support for national hegemony, cautioning that if the ruling coalition makes this error, it risks repeating the mistake of those who believed they had already won it all just as they were beginning.
The Pacto Histórico coalition decided to transform from a coalition structure into a single unified left-wing party ahead of the 2026 elections, holding a national convention on June 16, 2025 in Colombia. Senator Gloria Flórez, president of Colombia Humana which is President Petro's party and the coalition's main political organization, explained that this decision responded to the need to strengthen unity and present a coherent proposal to voters. Parties agreeing to join the unified Historic Pact included the Alternative Polo Democrático PDA, Colombia Humana, Unión Patriótica, and MAIS indigenous party. With the exception of MAIS, the parties are democratic socialist. Groups organized under the platform Unitarios including the party of the former FARC guerrilla Comunes, the Colombian Labor Party, and Democratic Hope Esperanza Democrática chose not to join the unified organization to retain their legal status. The difference lies in their push for open lists for Senate and House elections, while the unified party supports closed lists which achieved gender parity in Congress for the first time in history in 2022. The party's program consolidates policies around peacebuilding, environmental protection, social investment, land reform, democratization and minority rights, with the goal to win the 2026 elections and make Colombia's democratic transformation irreversible.
On the right wing of Colombian politics, former President Álvaro Uribe's Democratic Center party announced it would unveil its presidential candidate on November 28, 2025 in Colombia. The party will use an internal poll to select from five candidates: Senators María Fernanda Cabal, Paloma Valencia, Paola Holguín, and Andrés Guerra, plus Miguel Uribe Londoño, father of the assassinated Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay. If consensus cannot be reached, the decision falls to party founder Álvaro Uribe as established in party statutes. María Fernanda Cabal, age 59, is one of the party's most prominent and controversial voices, known for her hardline stance and anti-communist rhetoric naming the left as a threat to the established order. She has doubled down on militaristic security approaches following the election of Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro as a reference, emphasizing threats from Venezuela and defense of private property of landowners and ranchers. Paloma Valencia, age 47, a senator and lawyer from Universidad de los Andes and granddaughter of former President Guillermo León Valencia during whose administration 1962 to 1966 the FARC and ELN guerrillas were formed, represents a more technical line within Uribismo. She was a leading voice of the No campaign against the 2016 peace deal with FARC in the plebiscite. Valencia emphasizes decentralization, institutional reforms, and innovation policies, and is seen as having potential to attract moderate sectors of the conservative electorate with her strong argumentative skills and national projection. The party's decision will reveal whether it opts for a hardline or more moderate approach.
Following the presidency of Iván Duque from 2018 to 2022, the Democratic Center failed to position a candidate from its own party with a real chance of winning a presidential election. Gabriel Vallejo, current director of the Democratic Center, recently held a political meeting in Colombia with former President César Gaviria who leads the Liberal Party. Gaviria has stood out as a staunch opponent of President Petro's government, steering the traditionally progressive Liberal Party toward a more right-wing stance. Other leaders from right-wing political groups also participated in this meeting, representing one of several moves by these parties aiming to form a potential bloc between conservative sectors and opposition parties to Petro, with the goal of consolidating a joint force capable of preventing another left-wing victory in 2026. The fragmentation on the right means that success hinges on alliances that extend far beyond any single party, as was the case in 2022.
Journalist Vicky Dávila, former director of Revista Semana and known for her investigative work and outspoken political commentary, led polls among right-wing voters with 13.9 percent to 15.1 percent support across various surveys conducted in early 2025 in Colombia. Running as an independent candidate, Dávila brought on Alicia Arango, a key ally of former President Álvaro Uribe, as her political strategist. This move signals alignment with the center-right and Uribista elite base, potentially strengthening her organizational capacity though raising questions about her independence. German Vargas Lleras, who served as Vice President from 2014 to 2017, represents the Radical Change party and gained 5.6 percent to 8.7 percent support among right-wing voters in early 2025 polls. Enrique Peñalosa, who served two terms as mayor of Bogotá with emphasis on urban mobility projects, is again being mentioned as a possible contender for the Colombian right in 2026. Although not a member of the Democratic Center, he maintains long-standing closeness with factions of that party and with Uribe, making him a viable name in efforts to consolidate a unity candidacy. His technocratic profile and administrative experience represent a moderate option within the right removed from maximalism and rhetoric, capable of attracting support beyond the hardline Uribista base.
Former Senator David Luna of Bogotá who served from 2022 to 2025 called for forming a grand national table to agree on a single candidacy representing all opposition to the Petro government in Colombia. Luna's call included diverse names from centrists Sergio Fajardo, Juan Manuel Galán brother of Bogotá's current mayor, and Juan Daniel Oviedo, to politicians more clearly on the right-wing spectrum such as German Vargas Lleras and Enrique Peñalosa, Democratic Center Senators María Fernanda Cabal and Paloma Valencia, former governors Juan Guillermo Zuluaga, Aníbal Gaviria and Héctor Olimpo Espinosa, Liberal leaders Mauricio Gómez Amín and Mauricio Cárdenas, and independent journalist Vicky Dávila. The idea is to form a broad-reaching proposal going beyond simply finding a consensus name. Peñalosa asserted in October 2025 that talks had been ongoing for several months among politicians from the same conservative sphere, stating that citizens could rest assured that candidates who believe in democracy, security, the market economy and real progress would go to elections united and win in the first round. The opposition faces the challenge that they cannot campaign solely on anti-Petro sentiment but rather need a compelling agenda, and must consolidate behind a single candidate before the first election round to remain competitive.
Centrist candidates include Sergio Fajardo, who served as Governor of Antioquia from 2012 to 2016, representing the Dignity and Commitment party. Polls in February 2025 showed Fajardo with 11.5 percent support. Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá from 2020 to 2024, led voter preferences in early polling at 8.8 percent in June 2024, though by April 2025 this had decreased to 4.7 percent. Other centrists mentioned include Juan Manuel Galán of the New Liberalism party, Senator from Bogotá who served from 2006 to 2018, and Juan Daniel Oviedo, Councilor of Bogotá. The center faces particular difficulty in Colombia's highly polarized political environment and must consolidate behind a single candidate before the first round to remain competitive against the organized left and the increasingly unified right wing opposition.
The assassination of Democratic Center Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay became a major turning point in the 2026 election landscape. In June 2025 in Colombia, the 14-year-old assassin was allegedly linked to the Segunda Marquetalia guerrilla group. Uribe Turbay had been leading polls at 13.7 percent in July 2025 and was a prominent presidential candidate when he was killed. The assassination, along with recent terrorist attacks in Cali that left 18 dead and dozens injured in 2025, demonstrated how fragile Colombia's security situation remains and how deeply insecurity could shape the political agenda in 2026. The killing was not just a tragedy but amplified fear and reminded voters how fragile the country's democracy could be. In many ways, the current political climate is a reminder of the volatility that has long defined Latin American politics, with moments of crisis opening doors to both instability and uncertainty. Violence remains a daily reality in Colombia, with 81 social, political and environmental leaders killed in 2025 alone.
Corruption ranks as the top voter concern ahead of Colombia's 2026 elections according to surveys conducted in multiple municipalities throughout 2025. President Petro's government has been tainted by multiple corruption scandals, including one nicknamed Nannygate involving publishing of recordings of then-ambassador to Venezuela Armando Benedetti speaking with Petro's Chief of Staff Laura Sarabia about possible illegal activities. This scandal lowered approval of Petro significantly, being viewed by the public as an indication of corruption inside the government. His presidential approval rating dropped to a low of 26 percent in July 2023 according to Datexco survey, though it stabilized around 37 percent through 2024 and 2025 according to AtlasIntel surveys conducted in Bogotá. Petro maintained this stable approval rating not because of his policies but because of what he represents as the first government that looks like the country, including Afro-Colombians and individuals from marginalized backgrounds, giving him strong symbolic appeal. In 2025, Petro fired his entire cabinet in Colombia to reassess his previous choices in light of appointing Armando Benedetti as Chief of Staff and promoting 30-year-old Laura Sarabia to Foreign Minister, both embroiled in campaign finance scandals. The arrest of Petro's son in a money laundering scandal involving campaign financing further contributed to decreased public support.
Access to healthcare and the cost of living rank among top voter concerns in Colombia heading into 2026. The health sector faces a structural deficit, with 29 health insurers EPS having debt of 32.9 trillion Colombian pesos as of July 2025, equivalent to 1.3 percent of GDP. Only six EPS meet legal financial requirements for capital, reserves and solvency. The capitation payment unit UPC is deemed insufficient even for EPS under government intervention. Petro's healthcare reform has stalled in the legislative branch despite being a centerpiece of his agenda. The economy grew 2.7 percent in the first quarter of 2025, mostly driven by private consumption which represents more than three-quarters of the country's GDP. However, Colombia faces a difficult fiscal situation with a deficit expected to surpass 5.3 percent of GDP announced in February 2025. The finance ministry announced expenditure cuts equivalent to 1.2 percent of GDP in June 2025, though this was seen as insufficient. A similar cut would be needed in the second semester to avoid violating Colombia's fiscal rule. The ministry presented a 2025 budget including a public investment cut of over 17 percent. Moody's Ratings lowered Colombia's credit outlook from stable to negative in 2024. Annual inflation reached a 22-year high of 9 percent in 2022, with higher food and fuel prices alarming an already restive population.
Public safety and insecurity have become paramount concerns for Colombian voters in the lead-up to the 2026 elections. President Petro's Total Peace plan, meant to bring simultaneous negotiations with guerrilla groups and criminal networks, has largely failed. The government's security policy has weakened state authority according to security analysts speaking in October 2025 in Washington. The armed forces have been reduced by 25 percent, territorial control has eroded, and nearly all indicators of violence including extortion, kidnapping and forced displacement have risen throughout Colombia. The only decline in homicide rates reflects not improved safety but loss of state presence in areas now dominated by armed groups. The Clan del Golfo criminal organization operates in 392 municipalities as of 2025, the ELN guerrilla in 232 municipalities, and FARC dissidents in 299 municipalities, all showing significant expansion since 2022. In August 2025 in Colombia, armed groups reportedly used a drone to shoot down an antinarcotics helicopter, killing 12 Colombian police eradicators. The deteriorating security environment poses serious risks to the upcoming presidential elections. Colombia's Electoral Observation Mission MOE flagged several threats to the 2026 elections including violence and control by illegal armed groups that restrict political participation in many regions, illegal campaign financing tied to corruption, and spread of fake news on social media that can distort electoral outcomes.
The rise of security populism represents a regional trend favoring radical law-and-order narratives over balanced security policy, posing risks to democratic governance in Colombia. The opposition's message that Petro's bet on peace negotiations has worsened security conditions has revived a militaristic vision of the state advocating for military confrontations with guerrillas such as the ELN and dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC, and a restart to combat operations. With Petro's Total Peace agenda in limbo after the ELN bombing in the eastern region of Catatumbo in 2025, the right-wing opposition has sought to mobilize voters on a renewed security agenda emphasizing military solutions. There is growing distrust in Colombia's political institutions, with a report noting that over 70 percent of Colombians distrust political parties and government bodies. More concerning, according to Colombia's National Civil Registry, 17 percent of citizens believe an authoritarian regime might be better than the current system, posing serious risk to democratic stability.
Drug trafficking and coca cultivation have become central issues in Colombia's relationship with the United States and in the 2026 election campaign. Colombia is the world's leading producer of cocaine according to the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime UNODC. The amount of land dedicated to cultivating coca, the base ingredient of cocaine, has almost tripled in the past decade to a record 253,000 hectares in 2023, about triple the size of New York City. According to a UN report, coca cultivation reached record levels and cocaine production grew approximately 50 percent in 2023 compared to previous years. In 2023, 2,664 metric tons of cocaine were produced in Colombia and 746 metric tons were seized, meaning 28 percent of cocaine produced was seized, a reduction of almost ten percentage points compared to 2022. Coca crop eradication levels declined by 83 percent from 2022 through 2024, and violence related to eradication efforts has increased significantly throughout regions of Colombia.
On September 15, 2025 in Washington, the United States decertified Colombia as cooperating to fight drug trafficking for the first time in nearly 30 years, though it granted a national interest waiver to maintain aid and security cooperation. President Trump's administration released its determination of major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries for 2026, naming Colombia alongside Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, China, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. The Presidential Determination praised Colombia's security institutions and municipal authorities while criticizing President Petro's drug policies and failed attempts to seek accommodations with narco-terrorist groups. Trump notably stopped short of fully decertifying Colombia's compliance, opting for a partial move that avoids sweeping aid cuts and sanctions that full decertification would trigger, but still has significant chilling effect on investment and tourism in Colombia. With Colombia's 2026 presidential election approaching, analysts suggested Trump may be hoping the additional US economic pressure helps push the country's politics back to the right.
President Petro expressed his unhappiness at the designation in September 2025, noting deaths of police officers, soldiers and civilians who were trying to impact cocaine trafficking. Petro defended his policy which moves away from repressive approaches and prioritizes reaching agreements with growers of coca leaf to encourage them to switch to other crops, pursuing major drug lords and combating money laundering rather than forced eradication. Petro vowed to ignore US pressure to use forced eradication on coca crops despite the decline in eradication levels. The Petro government appealed for higher rates of voluntary crop substitution in which farmers are given economic incentives to remove coca, and said it would work with two groups of FARC dissidents to voluntarily remove a further 55,000 hectares of crops in Catatumbo along Colombia's border with Venezuela and in Nariño and Putumayo along the frontier with Ecuador. The 2023-2033 National Drug Policy of Petro's government explicitly prioritizes development, public health and human rights objectives over traditional goals such as reducing coca cultivation or drug use.
The escalation of tensions between Trump and Petro reached new levels in October 2025. On October 24, 2025 in Washington, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on President Gustavo Petro and family members over drug trade allegations. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that Petro has allowed drug cartels to flourish and refused to stop this activity, and that President Trump was taking strong action to protect the nation and make clear that the US would not tolerate trafficking of drugs into the country. The move ramped up a growing clash between the Republican US president and Colombia's first leftist leader, notably over deadly American strikes on alleged drug-carrying boats off South America. The Trump administration expanded its crackdown to the eastern Pacific Ocean where much of cocaine from the world's largest producers including Colombia is smuggled. In an escalation of military firepower in the region, the US military sent an aircraft carrier to waters off South America, with the Pentagon announcing this on Friday October 24, 2025. The Trump administration has surged military ships and planes to Latin America to target traffickers, with strikes killing at least 37 people since they started in September 2025. Petro repeatedly feuded with Trump throughout 2025, initially rejecting US military flights of deported migrants which led Trump to threaten tariffs. The State Department revoked Petro's visa when he attended the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025, and several days later Petro took to the streets of New York City to call for the US military to disobey the US president.
After Trump called him a thug and a bad man on October 23, 2025, Petro pushed back stating he would defend himself through legal channels in US courts. Petro stated on October 23, 2025 that the magnitude of Trump's insult to Colombia and himself no longer aimed to achieve an effective anti-drug trafficking strategy but to affect Colombia's elections the following year. Petro accused Trump of seeking once again the triumph of the extreme right, which is strongly and provenly linked to drug trafficking but obedient in complying with invasions. Petro said the US government seemed to reject its own experience built with Colombia and was changing strategy to a mistaken one that undermines sovereignty of Latin American and Caribbean countries. The US-Colombia relationship entered its most difficult chapter in recent memory with tensions proceeding at a dizzying pace. On October 21, 2025 in Washington, the United States announced cancellation of US assistance to Colombia. This represented a dramatic shift for Colombia which has been a key US security partner in South America for decades and the top recipient of American assistance in the region, with the United States having invested over ten billion dollars in counternarcotics and security efforts in Colombia since 1999.
US interest and influence in Colombia's 2026 election extends beyond drug policy to broader security cooperation and geopolitical concerns. The two countries have worked together closely to combat drug trafficking, organized crime, human and arms trafficking, and environmental destruction. In May 2022 in Washington, the United States designated Colombia as a major non-NATO ally. Colombia is such a strong, trusted partner that the US pays for Colombian military and police to train forces in at least eight other Latin American countries in counter-narcotics techniques. Deployment of Colombian troops as the US Southern Command's favored trainers across Latin America, teaching counterparts how to inspect containers for drugs or trace criminal trafficking routes, may be imperiled by decertification and aid cuts. Decertification could lead Washington to lobby against Colombia in international financial institutions. The US has already made clear it will not support multilateral loans for projects that involve Chinese companies, such as construction of a metro system in Bogotá now under way. Should Washington decide to broaden effects of decertification to maximum extent, it could result in higher tariffs on trade, withdrawal of visas for key officials, and curbs on the Colombian banking system.
The weakening of US-Colombia security cooperation compounds Colombia's challenges heading into the 2026 elections. Recent cuts to US foreign assistance in January 2025 have placed immense strain on Colombia's economy particularly regarding the ongoing Venezuelan migrant crisis. Historically, much of funding to support Venezuelan migrants came from the United States, but this assistance declined sharply following the cuts, putting greater pressure on domestic resources in Colombia. As Colombia gears up for presidential elections in 2026, resurrecting a stronger bilateral relationship will be a top foreign policy issue across campaigns according to analysts speaking in October 2025. That is what led to decades of bipartisan support for the relationship in the United States. While the long-time collaboration is unlikely to be enough on its own to appease the Trump administration, both countries should remind themselves of how important this relationship is for their shared goals. The US-Colombia relationship has repeatedly overcome challenges in the past and remains essential to both nations despite facing a critical moment.
Political party fragmentation poses significant challenges for all sides in Colombia's 2026 elections. The Colombian political system historically maintained dominance by the Liberal Party and Conservative Party, but has evolved into a multi-party system. The Liberal Party, founded in the 19th century and member of the Socialist International since 1999, aims to reduce inequality and address the country's competitiveness gap, though it has lost significant support to recently created parties. The Conservative Party, founded in 1849 and characterized by support for the Catholic Church and consistent anti-communism, once held 44 consecutive years in power between 1886 and 1930. The Party of the U, formed in 2005 by Uribe supporters who defected from the Liberal Party, is known for its leading role in the peace agreement with FARC under Juan Manuel Santos and could be defined as third way politics attempting to integrate right and left-wing elements. Cambio Radical Radical Change, created in 1998 by dissatisfied Liberal Party members, supports pro-business economic policies and calls for more efficient health systems, though has been embroiled in corruption charges. The Alianza Verde Green Alliance, distinguished by progressive politics, supports the peace agreement and advocates social justice, electoral reform and economic sustainability.
The fragmentation of Colombia's political opposition represents a major factor heading into 2026 elections. Unlike prior electoral cycles in which singular figures such as Álvaro Uribe could unify opposition in Colombia, the current field is highly fragmented with multiple aspirants competing for influence and often prioritizing personal advantage over coalition-building, complicating efforts to present a strong opposition candidate. The left must prioritize coalition-building with traditional parties and select candidates capable of transcending ideological boundaries. The center must consolidate behind a single candidate before the first election round to remain competitive. The right cannot campaign solely on anti-Petro sentiment but needs a compelling agenda. Colombians are heading into an election clouded by uncertainty where Petro's mixed legacy collides with a wave of insecurity and political violence. The current political climate recalls volatility that has long defined Latin American politics, with moments of crisis opening doors to both instability and opportunity. With almost 100 presidential pre-candidates as of October 2025, Colombian voters will head to polls on May 31, 2026 to determine the future direction of their country amid these profound challenges.
The recent internal consultation of the Historic Pact, held on October 26, 2025, generated strong reactions in the Colombian political sphere. Former Attorney General Francisco Barbosa harshly criticized President Gustavo Petro after low turnout was recorded and Iván Cepeda was established as the coalition's official candidate for the 2026 presidential elections. Upon learning the results of the referendum, the former prosecutor stated that "Petro and his gang lost today. Their government is over." He emphasized that the decline in participation in the internal referendum of the Historic Pact demonstrates a considerable setback compared to the results obtained by the left in previous electoral cycles.
The former prosecutor emphasized that the figure is a warning to those within the ruling party who projected electoral superiority. "This vote shows that their 2 million votes are insufficient to win the presidency. To achieve that, they will need 12 million votes ," he declared, highlighting the wide margin the ruling party must cover if it intends to remain in power.
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