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PLAAF Modernization - 1990s

Jiang Zemin's Short Message to Air Force 11 November 1999 Chinese President Jiang Zemin wrote an inscription for the 50th founding anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force, which falls on November 11. Jiang was also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Jiang's inscription reads, "Strive to build a powerful, modernized People's Air Force that is capable of both attacking and defending."

Until the mid-1980s, China'smilitary doctrine focused on defeating technologically superior invadingforces by trading territory for time and employing China's vast reserves ofmanpower. In 1985, China adopted a new military doctrine thatemphasizes the use of modern naval and air power in joint offensiveoperations against regional opponents. Lacking equipment needed toimplement its new doctrine, China began buying small amounts of militaryitems from other nations, including the United States and some European nations. However, the 1989 massacre of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square led to the imposition of the U.S. and EU arms embargoes - disrupting China's access to these sources of modern military technology.

By the late 1980s the Air Force had serious technological deficiencies -- especially when compared with its principal threat, the Soviet Union -- and had many needs that it could not satisfy. It needed more advanced aircraft, better avionics, electronic countermeasures equipment, more powerful aircraft weaponry, a low-altitude surface-to-air missile, and better controlled antiaircraft artillery guns. Some progress was made in aircraft design with the incorporation of Western avionics into the F-7 (a copy of the MiG-21) and F-8 (an indigenous model derived from various Soviet designs), the development of refueling capabilities for the B-6D bomber and the Q-5 attack fighter, increased aircraft all-weather capabilities, and the production of the HQ-2J high-altitude surface-to-air missile and the C-601 air-to-ship missile.

At the end of the Cold War the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) were equipped with over 4,500 fighters of mostly obsolete Soviet design. Modernization efforts through the 1990's were highlighted by the purchase of Su-27 and Su-30 FLANKER fighters from Russia and a license agreement to produce additional Su-27s in China. Beijing also has continued to pursue domestic aircraft programs, including the FB-7, and upgrades to the F-7 and F-8 fighters.

By the end of the 1990s the Chinese air force had rid itself of many elderly aircraft, and acquired a few modern units by the late 1990s. The total number of PLA AF fighter aircraft decreased by one-third over the decade, from about 4,000 to about 2,500. Force improvements have been limited almost exclusively to the addition of a few dozen first-rate Su-27s purchased from Russia, with the remaining inventory consisting of obsolete designs which date from the 1960s. The large force of J-6 and J-7 aircraft [Chinese-equivalent MiG-19s and MiG-21s] are so antiquated as to be useless against Taiwan's F-16s and Mirage 2000s. The PLA Air Force has no in-flight refueling tankers or airborne warning and command platforms in service, though both are under development. As of early 1998, some 1,300 aircraft were stationed at the air bases within 500 nautical miles from Taiwan, of which some 600 airplanes had a radius of operation over Taiwan proper.

The PLA used some of its increased modernization funding to purchase modern arms from Russia, to include Su-27 air defense fighters and Su-30 multi-mission fighters. Domestic production of the Su-27 is proceeding, albeit very slowly. China also continues to upgrade fighters already in the inventory. The primary focus is on improving sensors, weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and information connectivity on aircraft in order to increase the lethality of the otherwise outdated airframes. To bolster strike capabilities, China reportedly is developing an improved version of the FB-7. The twin-engine FB-7 is an all-weather, supersonic, medium-range fighter-bomber with an anti-ship mission. Improvements to the FB-7 included a better radar, night attack avionics, and weapons. Production efforts for the air forces were expected to focus on an indigenous 4th generation-type aircraft, the improved FB-7 fighter-bomber, and possible upgrades to the Su-27/Su-30.

Since the Gulf War, China sought to improve the capabilities of its special-mission aircraft, with a focus on electronic warfare aircraft, C4ISR platforms and tankers. China reportedly has developed jamming versions of several of its larger aircraft, and may have several programs underway to deploy new standoff and escort jammers using bombers, transports, tactical aircraft, and UAV platforms. China has been actively pursuing an advanced airborne surveillance and control aircraft since the early 1990's. In 1999, it introduced an airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, the Y-8AEW. The cancellation of the more capable PHALCON program forced Beijing to pursue other alternatives, to include the possible acquisition of A-50 MAINSTAY AWACS aircraft from Russia.

Chinese aircraft modernization has followed four parallel tracks, none of which have entirely solved the twin challenges of improving the combat capabilities of individual aircraft while maintaining some approximation of existing force structure:

1. Mid-Life Updates to existing models, notably the J-7 "Super 7" and J-8IIM modifications which reworked the front end of the aircraft, adding a much larger radar and ventral air inlets, along with various other less pronounced improvements.
2. Indigenous development of new models, which has produced results ranging from the indifferent J-8 and Q-5 to the evidently problematic JH-7.
3. Domestic development of foreign designs, including the FC-1 derived from the abortive Russian MiG-33 and the J-10 based in some measure on the Israeli Lavi, with neither effort having born fruit after a decade of effort.
4. Importing and producing foreign designs, which despite considerable negotiating publicity has thus far resulted in the deployment of a few dozen Su-27s, with the promise of dozens more in coming years.

Within a few years the increasingly elderly Jian-6 fighters would be retired from military service, creating a substantial replacement problem. The efforts of the PLAAF to develop a low-cost replacement have not proven particularly successful, and the service life of the J-6 is almost certainly being extended beyond original plans as a result. With the PLAAF mainly composed of the Jian-7, Jian-8, Jian-10, and Jian-11 [SU-27SKM] series, the overall quality of China's Air Force would be considerably enhanced, though the total number of combat aircraft will be substantially reduced.

China acquired aerial refueling drogue systems from Iran. An Israeli firm [Bedek Aviation] installed these on the Xian B/H-6D bomber/refueling tankers, and China has set up a training base in aerial refueling at Zhanjiang. China began developing its air-to-air refueling capability in the mid-1980s using a converted B-6/BADGER bomber as an aerial tanker. PLANAF fighters and tanker aircraft successfully transferred fuel during aerial operations over the South China Sea in April 2000, suggesting that the PLANAF has achieved a very limited, clear weather, daytime aerial refueling capability. Training, however, remains rudimentary and it will be several years before either the PLAAF or the PLANAF incorporate aerial refueling into routine operations.

China is investing considerably in the development of UAVs. China already has a number of short-range and longer-range UAVs in its inventory for reconnaissance, surveillance, and electronic warfare (EW) roles. Research efforts also are underway across a range of UAV technologies with several developmental UAV programs underway related to reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, and EW.

Since China received its first 4th-generation fighter, the Su-27, in 1992, training, tactics and operational concepts progressed slowly as China integrated the new technologies and capabilities into the force structure. This protracted learning phase has allowed China to prepare for the introduction of larger numbers of 4th-generation aircraft into its inventories. Over the past two years, new Su-27s and Su-30s have been more rapidly integrated into operational units. Meanwhile, air combat tactics continue to evolve and training is becoming more advanced. By 2010, the PLA will have all the elements of a modern air force and should have developed the operational concepts and the training needed to fight as an integrated force. Although not all the PLAAF and PLANAF will be equipped with modern weapons by that time, a core of units will be in place to allow the PLA to execute the type of regional combat operations envisioned by its current military doctrine.

China's airlift was largely obsolete, consisting of roughly 600 aircraft, some of which were inherited from the Nationalists. In a small step towards overcoming these shortcomings, China has acquired at least 14 large IL-76 transports from Russia.

At least some reported Chinese modernization plans have evidently been abandoned. In May 1992 Russia agreed to supply China an initial batch of 24 MiG-31 long range interceptors. The MiG-31's were expected to be assembled at a factory at Shenyang, which would eventually manufacture as many as 200 MiG-31's. As of 2000, there was no evidence that any part of this agreement would be fullfilled.