China-U.S. Relations - Biden
Henry Kissinger, who turned 99 in May 2022, said China was the ultimate rival to the United States because "the two countries are ruled by incompatible internal systems." Due to the comparable economic resources of both countries and high technological development, this potential Cold War may be worse than the previous one between the Western world and the Soviet Union. "Waiting for China to become Western" was no longer a plausible strategy, he said. "I do not believe that world domination is a Chinese concept, but it may be that they will become so powerful. And it's not in our best interest," Kissinger said in an interview with The Times newspaper 14 June 2022.
“The period that was broadly described as engagement has come to an end,” Kurt Campbell, the U.S. coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council, said 26 May 2021 at Stanford University. Beijing's behavior was emblematic of a shift toward "harsh power, or hard power" which "signals that China is determined to play a more assertive role," he said. Campbell said Xi Jinping was at the heart of the new US approach to China. He described the Chinese president was “deeply ideological, but also quite unsentimental” and “not terribly interested in economics.” Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has “almost completely disassembled nearly 40 years of mechanisms designed for collective leadership.”
The China-US competition was heating up. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described China-US relations as "competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be." The last global realignment took place immediately following WWII. Washington wants to hold on its global dominance for as long as possible while Beijing was eagerly working to supplant the US’s superpower status, first in Asia, then in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese strategy in achieving its objectives was quite clear: unlike the US’s disproportionate investments in military power, China was keen on winning its coveted status, at least for the time being, using soft power only.
In China, the period between 1842 and 1949, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded and the country ceased to march to the beat of a Western drum, was called the “century of humiliation.” Even now, Chinese President Xi Jinping only expects China to have caught up with the West once again by 2049, a century after the country resumed its course of development.
China had warned the US against starting a new cold war and said it's not trying to replace America's role in the world. Many were saying the Phase One deal reached by the US and China was precarious to begin with and there was little chance of it being renegotiated. China had weakened its currency to its lowest level since 2008 after renewed threats from the US to slap fresh tariffs on the Chinese economy. China was committed to increasing energy imports from the US but this didn't look likely.
The Democratic Party’s proposed platform criticizes China’s trade practices, proposes less spending on national defense, and opposes “forever wars” as it seeks to lay out the party’s foreign policy goals and highlight differences with President Donald Trump. China became one of the central foreign policy issues in the 2020 presidential race, heightened by President Donald Trump’s trade war with the country as well as the coronavirus pandemic, which originated there. In their party platform, Democrats took a strong stance against China’s trade policies and sought to portray Trump’s efforts against the country as not tough enough.
"The Trump Administration has failed time after time to deliver for American workers on this crucial issue, siding with corporate interests over our workers and launching a trade war with China that they have no plan for winning—creating incredible hardship for American farmers, manufacturers, workers, and consumers in the process….
"Democrats will take aggressive action against China or any other country that tries to undercut American manufacturing by manipulating their currencies and maintaining a misaligned exchange rate with the dollar, dumping products like steel and aluminum in our markets, or providing unfair subsidies. Unlike President Trump, we will stand up to efforts from China and other state actors to steal America’s intellectual property and will demand China and other countries cease and desist from conducting cyberespionage against our companies.... We will build on this foundation to negotiate arms control agreements that reflect the emergence of new players like China, capture new technologies, and move the world back from the nuclear precipice....
"Democrats believe that if the United States does not work with its allies and partners to shape the terms of global trade, China will shape them for us—and American working families and the middle class will pay the price. That’s why we will work with our allies to mobilize more than half the world’s economy to stand up to China and negotiate from the strongest possible position.
"Democrats believe the China challenge was not primarily a military one, but we will deter and respond to aggression. We will underscore our global commitment to freedom of navigation and resist the Chinese military’s intimidation in the South China Sea. Democrats were committed to the Taiwan Relations Act and will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.
"Rather than stand with President Xi Jinping as he cracks down on Hong Kong’s autonomy, Democrats will stand for the democratic rights of its citizens. We will fully enforce the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, including by sanctioning officials, financial institutions, companies, and individuals responsible for undercutting Hong Kong’s autonomy. And we will bring the world together to condemn the internment of more than one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in concentration camps in China, using the tools provided by the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act."
Biden claimed credit for paving the way to the Paris Agreement by convincing China to enter into an earlier landmark climate deal with the United States, in 2014. But his rhetoric changed in recent years as U.S.-China relations have deteriorated. In a June 2020 op-ed in Foreign Affairs, Biden said his climate agenda would include “insisting that China — the world’s largest emitter of carbon — stop subsidizing coal exports and outsourcing pollution to other countries by financing billions of dollars’ worth of dirty fossil fuel energy projects through its Belt and Road Initiative.”
"To win the competition for the future against China or anyone else, the United States must sharpen its innovative edge and unite the economic might of democracies around the world to counter abusive economic practices and reduce inequality.... The United States does need to get tough with China. If China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies of their technology and intellectual property. It will also keep using subsidies to give its state-owned enterprises an unfair advantage—and a leg up on dominating the technologies and industries of the future."
At a Democratic campaign event in Florida in October 2018, Biden said the U.S. was "better positioned than any nation in the world to own the 21st century," adding that China was "a divided country in 1,000 ways ... Don't tell me China's going to own America. It's not possible."
"China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man — They can't even figure out how to deal with the fact that they have this great division between the China Sea and the mountains in the West. They can't figure out how they’re going to deal with the corruption that exists within the system. They’re not bad folks, folks … They’re not competition for us." Biden said at a campaign stop in Iowa on 02 May 2019.
On 22 May 2020 Biden said "For more than three years, President Trump has given Xi Jinping and autocrats around the world a pass on human rights. Trump has repeatedly turned a blind eye to China’s deepening repression in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and throughout China. In fact, just last November, Donald Trump declared that he was “standing with Xi Jinping” on Hong Kong and praised China’s leaders for acting “very responsibly.” Now we see the consequences: leaders in Beijing were proposing a law to further erode Hong Kong’s autonomy and the rights of its citizens. It was no surprise China’s government believes it can act with impunity to violate its commitments. The Administration’s protests were too little, too late — and Donald Trump has conspicuously had very little to say. We need to be clear, strong, and consistent on values when it comes to China. That’s what I’ll do as president."
“Right now, by every key metric, China’s strategic position is stronger, and America’s strategic position is weaker,” Antony Blinken, now U.S. secretary of state, told the U.S. Chamber of Commerce two months before the November 2020 presidential election.
President-elect Joe Biden planned to sign a series of executive orders soon after being sworn into office on 20 January 2021, demonstrating that the country’s politics had shifted and that his presidency would be guided by new priorities.
- Biden said on Day One he’ll reassure the US’s allies that “we’re back and you can count on us again.”
- rejoin the Paris climate accords
- reverse President Trump’s withdrawal from the World Health Organization
- repeal the ban on almost all travel from some Muslim-majority countries
- reinstate the program allowing “dreamers,” who were brought to the USA illegally as children, to remain in the country,
But pushing major legislation through Congress could prove to be a challenge. In a 14 July 2020 speech, Biden promised that if elected, he would reverse Trump’s rollbacks used to enable fossil fuel extraction, like orders that allowed oil and gas companies to speed through permitting processes for new pipelines. Biden could also issue a number of his own executive orders to reduce extraction, like directing the Department of the Interior to halt oil and gas leases and fracking on federal lands.
Voice of America reported a list of US president-elect Joe Biden's potential advisors on China policies, including former deputy secretary of state Antony Blinken, former ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Kurt Campbell, deputy director at the Center for a New American Security Ely Ratner, former national security advisors Jake Sullivan, Susan Rice and Thomas Donilon. According to their resumes, almost all of them come from the administration of former president Barack Obama.
Donilon in 2019 published an article in Foreign Affairs magazine, arguing that US incumbent President Donald Trump's trade war was "the wrong way to compete with China," and the US should focus on renewal, rather than protectionism. Blinken said in September that, "China's strategic position is stronger and ours is weaker as a result of President Trump's leadership." He also said that Trump left "a vacuum in the world for China to fill." Campbell and Sullivan wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2019 that, "the goal should be to establish favorable terms of coexistence with Beijing in four key competitive domains - military, economic, political and global governance."
Judging from the narratives from these advisors, the goal of Biden administration's China policy was almost identical to that of the Trump administration, albeit more tactfully stated. The Biden administration will continue to regard China as its main rival, seeing China as the biggest threat to maintain its position as a global hegemony. However, Biden will differ from Trump on dealing with this challenge.
Blinken said Trump had weakened American alliances, abandoned US values and gave China a green light to trample on so-called human rights and democracy. This reflects the reality that the Biden administration will underline human rights and democracy, and will create an ideological alliance by uniting its allies such as Europe, Japan and South Korea in a bid to pile pressure on China.
Biden used his first visit to the Pentagon as commander in chief 10 February 2021 to announce the formation of a new Defense Department China Task Force, charged with reexamining the U.S. approach in areas from strategy and force posture to technology and intelligence. “The task force will work quickly, drawing on civilian and military experts across the department to provide within the next few months recommendations to [Defense] Secretary [Lloyd] Austin on key priorities and decision points so that we can chart a strong path forward on China-related matters," Biden told reporters.
A March 2021 Pew poll found that Americans express substantial concern when asked about eight specific issues in the U.S.-China relationship. About three-quarters or more say that each issue was at least somewhat serious. Still, four problems stand out for being ones that half or more describe as very serious: cyberattacks from China, the loss of U.S. jobs to China, China’s growing military power and China’s policies on human rights. Tensions between mainland China and Hong Kong or Taiwan were seen as less serious problems for most Americans. While about three-quarters say these two geopolitical issues were at least somewhat serious problems, only about three-in-ten say they were very serious.
The Biden administration’s interim national security strategy guidance, published in March of 2021, demonstrated a small step toward reinvigorating US liberal hegemony via multilateralism to combat Chinese aggression and “ensure America, not China, sets the international agenda.” This strategy placed an emphasis on strengthening ties with Allied and partner nations to unite the world’s democracies for collective security, reinvesting in innovation to maintain US technological advantages, and defending democratic values at home and abroad to promote open and free societies to advance American interests.
Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi elaborated China's three bottom lines in effectively managing and controlling divergences in China-US relations during his meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on 26 July 2021 during Sherman's visit to north China's port city of Tianjin.
- the US should not challenge, smear or seek to subvert the Chinese path and system
- should not seek to interrupt or disrupt China's development
- should not violate China's national sovereignty or territorial integrity
Such a proactive way of laying out Beijing's bottom lines and elaborating major concerns to Washington followed a hardline diplomatic approach, first used at the China-US Alaska meeting in March 2021.
On 26 July 2021 Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng handed down a "List of US Wrongdoings that Must Stop" and a "List of Key Individual Cases that China Has Concerns". This came in a meeting between US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng, who was in-charge of the US-China relations. In the List of U.S. Wrongdoings that Must Stop, China urged the United States to:
- unconditionally revoke the visa restrictions over Communist Party of China (CPC) members and their families
- revoke sanctions on Chinese leaders, officials and government agencies
- remove visa restrictions on Chinese students
- stop suppressing Chinese enterprises
- stop harassing Chinese students
- stop suppressing the Confucius Institutes
- revoke the registration of Chinese media outlets as "foreign agents" or "foreign missions"
- revoke the extradition request for Meng Wanzhou
In the "List of Key Individual Cases that China Has Concerns", China expressed serious concerns to the United States on some key individual cases, including:
- some Chinese students' visa applications being rejected
- Chinese citizens receiving unfair treatment in the United States
- Chinese diplomatic and consular missions being harassed and rammed into by perpetrators in the United States
- growing anti-Asian and anti-China sentiment
- Chinese citizens suffering violent attacks
China had been more proactive in handling relations with the US. In the past, it was the US bringing up the lists toward which China responded. By taking the initiative, Chinese officials also demonstrated a 'new normal' in diplomacy. This solidified an important posture adjustment in China's approach to dealing with the US that began with the Anchorage talks: We will no longer make unilateral efforts to maintain the public opinion atmosphere in China-US relations.
The fundamental reason for the deadlock in China-US relations was that some in the US always see China as an "imaginary enemy," Xie told Sherman. "Washington has been trying to contain China, thinking that will solve its problems, as if the only way for the US to become great again was to contain China's development," Xie said.
The US hope may be that "by demonizing China, it could somehow shift domestic public discontent over political, economic and social issues and blame China for its own structural problems. It seems that a whole-of-government and whole-of-society campaign was being waged to bring China down," Xie told Sherman at the meeting. Before Sherman's visit to Tianjin, China used its newly enacted Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law for the first time to impose reciprocal sanctions on six US individuals and one entity, including former US secretary of commerce Wilbur Louis Ross. China seems to have no worries that this may affect the atmosphere of the Tianjin talks during Sherman's visit.
An unsigned editorial in Global Times [ie, representing the official Chinese Communist Party line], stated "Chinese society has become fed up with the bossy US and we hold no more illusion that China and the US would substantially improve ties in the foreseeable future. The Chinese public strongly supports the government to safeguard national dignity in its ties with the US and firmly push back the various provocations from the US. In the face of the malicious China containment and confrontational policy adopted by the two recent US administrations, the Chinese people were willing to form a united front, together bear the consequences of not yielding to the US, and win for the country's future through struggles. In other words, Chinese society would unconditionally support whatever tough counterattacks the Chinese government would launch in the face of US-initiated conflicts in all directions toward China. The US should abandon forever the idea of changing China's system and policies through sanctions, containment and intimidation.
"China must accelerate the building of its comprehensive strength and prepare for the worst-case scenario of escalating confrontation with the US and its main allies. The US wants to use strategic containment to crush China, and we must use continuous development and strength building to crush the US' will."
The Deputy Secretary raised concerns in private about a range of PRC actions that run counter to American values and interests and those of allies and partners, and that undermine the international rules-based order. In particular, she raised concerns about
- human rights, including Beijing’s anti-democratic crackdown in Hong Kong
- the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang
- abuses in Tibet
- the curtailing of media access and freedom of the press
- Beijing’s conduct in cyberspace
- the Taiwan Strait
- the East and South China Seas.
- the cases of American and Canadian citizens detained in the PRC or under exit bans
- the PRC’s unwillingness to cooperate with the World Health Organization and allow a second phase investigation in the PRC into COVID-19’s origins
At the same time, the Deputy Secretary affirmed the importance of cooperation in areas of global interest, such as the climate crisis, counternarcotics, nonproliferation, and regional concerns including DPRK, Iran, Afghanistan, and Burma.
A rare extended virtual meeting between the top leaders of the world's two major powers on 15 November 2021 concluded with the leaders agreeing on two consensuses in principle such as rejecting a new cold war and reaffirming the importance of China-US relations. Chinese President Xi Jinping had thorough and in-depth communication and exchanges with US President Joe Biden in a face-to-face virtual meeting between the two leaders which lasted three-and-a-half hours. It was a highly expected and closely watched interaction after the two leaders spoke twice on the phone, in February and September, since Biden became US President.
During the meeting, which came at the request of the US, Chinese President Xi Jinping laid out three principles and four priorities for growing bilateral ties in the new era. In terms of principles, the two countries first need to respect each other's social systems and development paths, respect each other's core interests and major concerns, and respect each other's right to development. They also need to treat each other as equals, keep differences under control, and seek common ground while reserving differences. The other two principles include peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.
Xi demonstrated Beijing's "high-minded manner and full confidence in pushing Washington to correct mistakes that have led the bilateral relationship to deviate in recent years", Chinese experts said. Beijing drew up several red lines not only on matters related to sovereignty like the Taiwan question but also those concerning its social system and development path. After the struggles in recent years, China was now trying to push the US to correct and reset its problematic policy toward China, and this was China's new diplomatic stance "from the position of the strength" and "on a fair and equal basis," experts said.
There were major differences in Chinese and US readouts following the virtual meeting. In a shorter statement from the White House, compared to the nearly 4,000-word Chinese statement, Biden recognized the importance of managing strategic risks as well as "the need for common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict." Chinese top leader drew up several red lines for the US not only concerning sovereignty-related matters like the Taiwan question, but also on China's social system and development path, with Biden reiterating that the US does not seek to change China's system, the revitalization of its alliances was not anti-China, and the US has no intention to have a conflict with China.
The Biden administration announced 06 December 2021 a diplomatic boycott of the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing. No government officials will attend. US athletes will still be allowed to compete. The Biden administration decided on a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Games because of the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and other issues. The Biden-Harris Administration concluded the PRC had become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad in challenging the interests and values of the United States and allies and partners. China was the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order, and, increasingly the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Implementing the core pillars of the PRC strategy “invest, align, compete”, was intended to position the United States to out-compete China and maintain an enduring competitive edge. The US was investing in the foundations of strength at home – competitiveness, innovation, democracy - with bipartisan bills like the CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. The US was aligning efforts with an unrivaled network of allies and partners, acting in common cause on an approach to build collective resilience, close off vulnerabilities and advance a shared affirmative vision, including for an IndoPacific region that was free and open, connected, secure, prosperous, and resilient. The US was competing with the PRC to defend US interests and build a vision for the future. The contest to write the rules of the road and shape the relationships that govern global affairs was playing out in every region and across economics, technology, diplomacy, development, security, and global governance. The US would continue to stand up to PRC threats and provocations, whether in the South and East China Seas or across the Taiwan Strait; to its economic coercion; to the PRC’s attempts to exploit our cutting-edge technologies to advance the PLA’s military modernization; and to the PRC’s increasing acts of transnational repression around the world, including in the United States. Sun Yun, co-director of the East Asia Program and the China Program at the Stimson Center, noted that as the first Democratic administration after the start of the great power competition between the United States and China, the Biden administration's China policy was subject to many constraints of domestic politics due to domestic political polarization and the constraints of the Republican Party. After four years of ups and downs, US-China relations will eventually move towards a new stage, new definition and new challenges brought by Trump's second term. However, as 2024 came to an end, it was still of great practical significance to analyze and comment on US-China relations during the Biden administration. Regarding the US policy toward China during the Biden era, there were at least four different narratives between the United States and China, and between the Democratic and Republican parties. For the US side, the Biden administration's first "National Security Strategy" clearly stated that the Biden administration followed the basic positioning of China as the primary strategic opponent during the first term of the predecessor Trump, and that the goal of "competing" with China should be achieved through "investing (in the United States)", "forming alliances" and "shaping the strategic environment for China's rise". In Secretary of State Blinken's statement, "cooperating as much as possible when we can, and competing with all our strength when we should" was the main line of the Biden administration's China policy. A main thread running through the Biden administration's four-year China policy was to avoid "derailing" bilateral relations while competing fiercely with China - that is, to avoid conflicts. In the eyes of the United States, this was a manifestation of responsible management of great power competition. However, in the eyes of China, the Biden administration's China policy ran through "two sides" from beginning to end, and these two sides were undoubtedly negative. Whenever the United States had positive actions and trends toward China, there would inevitably be sanctions against Chinese companies, "301 investigations", export controls, and arms sales to Taiwan. China certainly believed that this was the result of a tough consensus in the United States on China, forcing the Biden administration to improve relations with China without balance, but the result was that many people in China believe that Biden was just as anti-China as Trump, or even worse. Especially considering that the Biden administration had successfully targeted and isolated China by strengthening allies and friendly countries, such as the US-UK-Australia (AUKUS) nuclear submarine cooperation, the US-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination, the NATO version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, etc., all of which have China as a potential target, China cannot help but believe that the challenges and long-term damage brought to China by the Biden administration were no less than Trump. There were also two different views on the Biden administration's China policy in the United States. For the Biden administration, competition + cooperation + avoiding derailment was the main line of China policy. The "small courtyard and high wall" curbs the development of China's high-tech industry, multilateral joint efforts to prevent China's global influence from expanding, military pressure to prevent China from making rash moves in the Western Pacific, and diplomatic means to avoid Sino-US conflicts were the achievements that the Biden team was quite proud of. Some team members even said that the Biden administration's China policy was not fundamentally different from that of the Trump administration, but more diplomatic means were used to avoid conflicts. However, in the eyes of critics of the Biden administration, the Biden administration's China policy was almost equivalent to appeasement and had caused significant losses to the United States. In terms of high-tech industries, although the Biden administration had passed a series of "small courtyard and high wall" measures, it had left a "big back door" for the "small courtyard and high wall", that is, exemptions for specific categories of chips and products. On strategic issues, the Biden administration was believed to have failed to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine by drawing clear red lines, and had failed to prevent China from providing dual-use products and technologies to Russia through high-pressure means. Especially since the official relationship between China and the United States gradually recovered in 2023, China and the United States have returned to the past interactive mode of bargaining with each other at the technical level to a certain extent. In addition, China had always emphasized the "leadership of the head of state diplomacy". With the Democratic Party's disastrous defeat in the 2024 election, everyone was waiting to see to what extent Trump's second term in office can bring new changes to China's policy and Sino-US relations. The Biden administration's four-year term had seen ups and downs in its China policy and different focuses every year. In the 2021 high-level Alaska talks between the United States and China, both sides said their own words and parted unhappily. The Chinese side was disappointed to see that the Biden team had no intention of reversing the "wrong position" during the Trump era. The US side made it clear through this occasion that Biden had no intention of conflict but welcomed competition and had major concerns about China. In the first half of 2022, China and the United States were caught in a diplomatic and public opinion offensive and defensive battle over the Ukrainian war, and a tug-of-war was launched over whether China was an accomplice of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In the second half of August, the visit of then-Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi to Taiwan was a landmark event in the U.S.-China relations throughout the year. Although the policy community did not define China's subsequent military exercises and the de facto short-term blockade of Taiwan as the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis between China and the United States, China subsequently canceled a number of cooperation and dialogues with the United States, including military dialogues and working meetings between the two countries, cooperation in criminal justice, transnational crime and drug control, and consultations between the two countries on climate change, which brought a huge impact on U.S.-China relations. At By the end of 2022, China ended the COVID-19 control measures and reopened its borders, and calls for improved relations with the United States intensified. China believes that there will be no domestic elections in the United States in 2023, and China will also end the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, so there will be no major domestic pressure, so the easing of tensions between the United States and China will gradually improve. However, Blinken's visit to China in February was disrupted and even canceled by the "balloon incident", and he finally visited China in mid-June. After that, many cabinet members of the Biden administration visited China one after another, which eventually paved the way for the bilateral meeting between the two heads of state during the APEC summit in San Francisco in November. One of the major focuses of the Biden administration's China policy in 2023 - restoring military exchanges - will gradually unfold in 2024. Other types of working-level meetings, consultations and cooperation will be promoted one by one. The US election was certainly the most important event in the US political ecology throughout the year, but it does not seem to have a significant impact on China's efforts to promote working-level dialogue and cooperation. It can be imagined that since China was unable to influence the results of the US election, it was obviously the most certain and effective choice to try to establish more dialogue platforms, working-level channels and cooperation mechanisms in US-China relations in order to cope with the uncertainty of the future of US-China relations. Although some critics believe that the Biden administration was not tough enough on China, and had to make China policy a secondary focus due to the two major crises of the Ukraine War and the Gaza War, some supporters believe that the Biden administration had neutralized the two major points of competition with China and crisis control by combining water and fire, and the way of civil and military, while effectively weakening China's influence and competitiveness in the alliance system and technology control. Trump's second term was about to begin, and US-China relations were about to enter a new chapter. Biden's China policy and US-China relations during his term will provide important reference value for analysts and decision makers.
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