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Guatemalan Air Force / Fuerzas de Aire - History

Established as the Military Aeronautical Corps in the late 1920s, the air force began with a few World War I French aircraft and a small French advisory mission to assist with organization, training, and main- tenance. The small air arm of the army acquired its first real combat capability after World War II when a few surplus P-51 Mustangs were transferred from the United States Army Air Forces.

In the early 1960s, Guatemala had a small air force of a few hundred men and a few dozen aircraft composed of World War II surplus trainers, P-51 Mustang fighters, B-26 bombers and some C-47 transports – pretty much the usual force for Central America in those days. As with other Central American states, the Guatemalan Air Force was the most professionally competent of all the services. Still, throughout the course of the conflict from the 1960s until the peace agreement of 1996, the training of the Guatemalan air force pilots and personnel can only be described as barely adequate. When the insurgency began in 1963 the air force supported the army with its P-51s and B-26s. At the same time, the US supplied four T-33 jet trainers as part of a comprehensive modernization program for the FAG.

The P-51s of the FAG were rapidly wearing out and parts were scarce. They had become a maintenance nightmare for the air force. On the other hand, the T-33s, which were based on the F-80 fighter that had seen action as a fighter- bomber in the Korean War, were seen by the USAF as a suitable aircraft for a low-level insurgency. So, by late 1963 the new T-33s were put into service as attack aircraft. At this stage of the war, the T-33 pilots were not trained as attack pilots and had to basically learn to conduct rocket, bomb and strafing attacks literally "on the job".

At the outset of the rebellion, against the advice of American advisors, the FAG acquired two more P-51s from an American dealer to serve as fighter-bombers. Despite the maintenance problems, the old propeller fighters were still excellent aircraft for counterinsurgency as they were able to carry a lot of ordnance and to loiter over a battle area for a long time. The major disadvantage of the T-33, aside from the fact it was thoroughly mediocre as a fighter-bomber, was that it was relatively expensive to operate. However, in 1964, the FAG received two more T-33s from the US military aid program.

By 1965 the insurgency had expanded and now covered several departments. The US delivered another pair of T-33s as well as four armed Sikorsky UH-19B helicopters, the first military helicopters in Central America. This provided the Guatemalan forces with an air assault capability. The Sikorskys were soon equipped with two .30 caliber machine guns and two 2.7 inch rocket pods for gunship support. By 1966, a rearmed and now well-trained Guatemalan Army was ready to undertake major operations against the insurgents. Under the guidance of US advisors, the FAG reorganized its combat aircraft into a "Special Warfare Composite Squadrons" composed of 2-3 Mustangs, 1-2 T-33s, a B-26, a UH-19B and a pair of C-47 transports with their own contingent of pilots and ground crews. The Guatemalan Air Force, with considerable US assistance, initiated a large scale bombing campaign against rebel-held areas in addition to supporting the army ground operations.

In 1967 the FAG acquired five Bell UH-1B and UH-1D helicopters from the US to reinforce its helicopter force. By this time the Guatemalan armed forces were a pretty formidable force. From 1966 to 1968 the greatly enlarged army and police forces conducted an all out offensive against the few hundred rebels based primarily in the northeast. In addition to going after the rebels, the army attacked the rebel infrastructure and demolished villages providing support. Aerial bombing was common and napalm was used. By 1968 the rebellion had been largely stamped out at the cost of an estimated 8,000 rebels and civilians killed.

To forestall the embarrassment of a congressionally-mandated cutoff of US aid, in 1977 the Guatemalans declared they would forgo all US military assistance rather than accept reforms that would be the price of US support. Guatemala would go it alone and handle the insurgency in its own way.

Going without US aid was especially hard on the Guatemalan Air Force, which was almost completely equipped with US-made aircraft provided under military aid programs. In 1971 the FAG had been modernized with the arrival of eight Cessna A-37B fighter-bombers under the US military aid program. Guatemala was the first nation in Central America to receive this very capable counterinsurgency aircraft. Seven more A-37s were supplied in 1974 and 1975, which enabled the FAG to establish a full strength fighter-bomber squadron and retire the P-51s and pull from service some of the T-33s.

When the US aid was cut off, Guatemala had a fairly capable small air force of about 650 officers, NCOs and airmen with its principle combat squadron the A-37 unit. In all, the FAG constituted 5 flying squadrons (the fighter bombers, a reconnaissance squadron with light observation aircraft, two transport squadrons and a helicopter squadron) operating out of four major bases: La Aurora (at Guatemala City and the Headquarters of the FAG), San Jose on the coast, Santa Elena and Puerto Barrios). The FAG’s mission was to support the army that had grown to about 27,000 men by the early 1980s.

Cutting loose from dependence on US aid was a bold move for the government but hurt the air force’s ability to conduct operations. The FAG lost three A-37s to operational accidents in the 1970s and these could not be replaced. With the T-33s worn out, Guatemala searched the world aviation market for affordable aircraft to replace losses and retirements. A deal was made in 1979 to import 12 Swiss Pilatus PC-7 turboprop trainers-, which could also be modified as very capable counterinsurgency fighters. Guatemala was able to reinforce its small helicopter fleet in 1981-82 by purchasing at least 8 Bell 206B helicopters as well as at least three Aroespatiale Alouettes. Four Fokker 27s light transport planes were acquired in 1982.

The Israelis stepped in to also play an important role in Latin America, selling and providing arms and assistance in this period. Between 1975 and the early 1980s Israel supplied 11 Arava IAI-201 twin engine transports. Indeed, the Aravas are ideal transport aircraft for combating an insurgency-- able to bring several tons of people or equipment into small, rough landing fields and also easily modified as a gunship with the addition of rocket pods and side-mounted machine guns. The FAG acquired a variety of other surplus aircraft in this period, including a variety of civilian helicopters and 3 ex-French Air Force Fouga Magister CM-170 trainers – another aircraft suitable for conversion into a counterinsurgency craft.

Rebel villages were bombed and, if the rebels engaged the army in battle, they could expect attack from a flight of A-37s or attack helicopters to retaliate. In the campaigns of 1981-1983 the Arava and C-47 transports of the air force dropped paratroop units to seize territory deep in rebel country or to set up blocking positions. Although the fighting was sustained, it was generally on a low level with squad and platoon actions. The small Guatemalan Air Force was simply not capable of mounting anything resembling a large operation. A lack of modern maintenance facilities and personnel coupled with the shortage of spare parts caused by the US military aid cutoff, meant that no more than 50% of the air force was operational at any time. This meant that the FAG usually had no more than four attack or trooplift helicopters available to support operations- scarcely enough to support a single platoon or company in action.

The Guatemalan Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Guatemalteca), commanded in early 1983 by Colonel Fernando Castillo Ramirez, had a total strength of about 650 officers, NCOs, and airmen (plus an attached infantry "tactical security group" battalion). In the overall Guatemalan defense structure, the air force is part of the army. Despite its size and subordination, however, it is generally considered as a separate force, and Colonel Castillo operated from a separate headquarters located at La Aurora Air Base colocated with the international airport in Guatemala City.

Its principal fixed-wing combat aircraft in 1983 consisted ofTO Cessna A-37Bs, all assigned to the fighter squadron. The remaining aircraft in inventory consisted of a variety of trainers, transports, utility planes, and helicopters. The air force deployed seven squadrons: ground support, reconnaissance, maintenance, training, and helicopter, and two transport. In addition to La Aurora, there were air bases located at Santa Elena (Flores), Puerto Barrios, and San Jose. Although there had been frequent reports asserting that the government intended to modernize the aging fleet of A-37Bs, no move to acquire new fighters had been made, probably because of the cost involved. As of mid-April 1983 the government had not purchased the helicopter spare parts that the United States had made available after lifting the long embargo.

For its small size and lack of modern equipment, the Guatemalan Air Force played an important role in the war. Throughout the war, the air force saw a high attrition due to operational accidents—probably caused by deficiencies in maintenance and pilot training. For example, of 13 A-37B fighter-bombers supplied to the FAG only one is known to have been lost as a result of combat, shot down by ground fire in a close support operation in 1988. Four A-37s were lost to accidents in the 1970s and one withdrawn from service in 1986 due to wing spar and bolt problems. It remained on the "dead line" as there were not enough parts and funds to fix the airplane Maintenance for an air force with less than 1,000 personnel flying an assortment of 15 different fixed wing aircraft and several helicopter models coupled with US aid cutoffs and a shoestring budget must have been close to impossible. Indeed, given the problems that Guatemala faced and the restrictions on US aid caused by the government policies, it was a significant accomplishment to have kept the air force going as an effective force.