FFG 01-04 Adelaide
The Adelaide Class frigates are based on the US Navy Oliver Hazard Perry design. The first four ships were built in the USA with subsequent modifications undertaken in Australia. The last two were constructed in Australia with all modifications incorporated. Each FFG ship is a long-range escort ship with roles including air defence, anti-submarine warfare, surveillance, interdiction and reconnaissance. The ship is capable of countering simultaneous threats from the air, surface and sub-surface.
These ships were the first RAN ships to be powered by gas turbine for the main propulsion and can be underway from cold in less than 30 minutes. Two forward mounted, retractable auxiliary propulsion units provide a secondary means of propulsion plus excellent manoeuvrability in confined waters. The FFG's principal weapons are the Standard medium range anti-aircraft missile and the Harpoon anti-ship missile. A 76mm gun to counter both air and surface threats is fitted forward of the funnel and one 20mm Phalanx close-in-weapon system for anti-missile defence is located above the helicopter hangars.
For long range anti-submarine tasks, the FFG is equipped with a flight deck and hangars for two S-70B-2 Sea hawk helicopters. For close in anti-submarine defence, the ships are fitted with two Mk32 triple torpedo tubes. The FFG's sensor package includes long range radars for air and surface surveillance, electronic warfare surveillance sensors and a medium range sonar for the detection of submarines. A computer based command and control system processes information as well as target data received by data link from other ships and aircraft.
Based on the recommendation of a navy review, the Labor government approved an offshore build for the two FFGs in April 1974. The builder, Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation in Seattle, was to supply the frigates under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements managed by the U.S. Navy. The decision to build offshore reflected the government's concerns about local shipyards' low productivity and high level of industrial disputation. The Coalition government approved the purchase of a third FFG from the Seattle yard in 1977, and a fourth in 1980. The Whitlam Government ordered three FFGs from the US and a fourth, HMAS Darwin, was added by the Fraser Government. It was very much in the mind of Navy, at the time Darwin was ordered, that the fourth ship should be a prototype for an Australian FFG build. The first four ships were delivered between November 1980 and July 1984, 'broadly within the required timeframe'.
As with the RAN's in-country builds, however, the offshore build of the four FFGs also met cost and capability hurdles. The projected project cost for the first two vessels — with helicopters — was $187 million in March 1974 prices. However, the FFG 01-04 project ran well over cost with the four vessels (excluding helicopters) costing over A$1 billion in December 1982 prices. Defence attributed nearly half this cost (A$497 million) to inflation and exchange rate variations. The other significant cause was the retrofit of the first three frigates to incorporate emerging technologies, notably a long range sonar system (TACTACS) and more capable helicopters (LAMPS III). The fourth FFG, HMAS Darwin, was built with several RAN requested modifications. It cost $256 million, nearly $100 million more than the FFG-03. It has been claimed that the retrofits may have been avoided had the RAN seized opportunities to incorporate modifications during the construction phase.
The other problematic aspect of the FFG 01-04 project was the Australian government's use of a Foreign Military Sales contract.30 A 1974 Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. contained a clause enabling Australia to withdraw from the project if the ships failed to meet RAN requirements or proved 'unacceptably costly'. However, the USN appeared to resist any substantial alterations and at one point, the U.S. Department of Defence instructed the USN to cease providing financial data to Australia.
The FMS contract also limited opportunities for Australian industry participation in the manufacture and supply of components for RAN and USN frigates. This was despite the 1974 Memorandum encouraging the U.S. government to limit the value of orders placed with U.S. firms so as to maximise opportunities for Australian industry participation. The Department of Defence admitted that in future, it was necessary to sign deeds of agreement with the prime contractors before negotiating a Letter of Offer and Acceptance with the U.S. government. It suggested that earlier involvement of local suppliers and a more competitive local industry would enhance Australian industry participation in foreign projects.
The Royal Australian Navy originally had six of these multi-purpose warships divided between its two main bases; Fleet Base East in Sydney and Fleet Base West in Perth. By 2010 there were only four ships still in service, with HMA Ships Adelaide (II) and Canberra (II) decommissioning in recent years.
In 1998 Australia passed up the opportunity to acquire four surplus US Kidd class destroyers for $30 million each in favor of a [so far problematic upgrade] of existing guided missile frigates. The upgraded FFG class is a formidable capability. It operates with: state of the art Anti-Ship Missile Defence capabilities, including SM-2 Block IIIA and Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, and a Vertical Launching System; improved air surveillance and fire control radars; a new Electronic Surveillance system; and new torpedo warning, mine avoidance, and hull-mounted search sonars.
FFG Upgrade project
The FFG Upgrade project is a A$1 billion contract for the upgrade of four frigates' combat systems. The first ship, HMAS Sydney, was returned to the Navy on 28 April 2006; HMAS Melbourne completed the docking phase in August 2006. ADI described the FFG Upgrade project as 'the most sophisticated naval systems integration task ever undertaken by an Australian company…' ADI was the only company in Australia to have performed the complex design and engineering required to replace operating systems through the FFG's hull. In terms of the technology required to perform the upgrade, the key is the ADI-designed and developed Australian Distributed Architecture Combat System.
In terms of project management, the DMO's deputy CEO, Mr Kim Gillis, noted that 'with the cooperative working relationship now existing between DMO and ADI, I am confident of our ability to successfully deliver the FFG Upgrade Project'. However, the early stages of the FFG upgrade program were significantly delayed at considerable expense to the taxpayer. The upgrade of HMAS Sydney was originally scheduled for delivery in August 2003. However, work on the vessel at Garden Island only commenced in September 2003 before it was eventually delivered to the RAN in April 2006. The upgrade contract was significantly redrawn, reducing the number of ships from six to four and extending the delivery schedule. A June 2005 Australian National Audit Office report noted that by August 2002, DMO had had to revise ADI's contract schedule on six separate occasions. The report also noted: "A high level of audit assurance is not able to be provided on the FFG Upgrade Project given deficiencies in the FFGSPO information management systems and deficiencies in the level of design and development disclosure provided to SPO personnel by the FFG Upgrade Prime Contractor."
ADI overcame most of its project management difficulties. The experience and expertise gained by the Prime Contractor during the first FFG platform upgrade provided a higher degree of confidence in their ability to complete the upgrade'. The Navy magazine commented in January 2006 that "thanks to a reshaped project organisation, new management team and sharper project management focus, the FFG Project upgrade has turned the corner". ADI anticipated that subsequent upgrades of the FFGs are likely to run to, or ahead of, schedule. Defence is currently renegotiating the contract to base payment on achievement of capability milestones rather than earned value.
The FFG Upgrade became a Project of Concern because of substantial schedule delays. When the Government was elected this $1.5 billion project was over four and a half years behind schedule, with serious concerns about whether it was even achievable. These delays resulted from a significant underestimation of the complexity of the Upgrade task at project inception in the late 1990's. It was an ambitious project, updating the capability and supportability of the ageing Adelaide Class guided missile frigates. It was critical to improve the ability of these vessels to defend themselves against the growing capability of anti-ship missiles.
Changes in Project scope, from six to four ships, and decisions in 2006 regarding the prime contract, resulted in an agreed new program schedule which has been achieved. As a result of close and effective cooperation between Defence and the prime contractor, Thales, Defence has now contractually accepted the upgraded FFGs from Thales. The employment of the ships during the upgrading has provided Navy with the opportunity to make preliminary assessments of the materiel capabilities. These assessments culminated in the Chief of Navy approving Initial Operational Release of the capability, allowing Navy's formal program of Naval Operational Test and Evaluation to proceed.
The last of the Royal Australian Navy's Adelaide class guided missile frigates was decommissioned at a ceremony 26 October 2019 at Garden Island. After nearly 28 years' of service, HMAS Melbourne (III) was given a fitting farewell after completing her final tour of duty. The warship was the only missile frigate left in the fleet of six, after HMAS Newcastle was decommissioned in June 2019.
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