• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Niger - Politics

Niger was ranked 189 out of 189 in the 2021 UN Human Development Index and has the fastest population growth rate in the world at 3.9 % per year. More than half the population of 24 million is under the age of 15. The literacy rate is below 30% among adults and even lower among women. Niger is a secular democracy, but Niger's political culture, even in the age of democratic politics, is still short of inner restraints. the country remains divided politically among the supporters and clients of the leading political personalities. Nigerien civil society does not currently constitute a strong counterweight to government abuse of power. Many are fronts for politicians and those seeking to use their organizations as a base for launching political careers in the future.

Niger went through a period of political turbulence between 2009 and 2011 that started with the end of the Tuareg rebellion, Mamadou Tandja’s efforts to seek a third term as president and his removal through a military coup. The military regime organized a referendum to approve a new constitution in 2010 and then kept its promise to restore civilian rule by organizing national presidential, legislative and regional elections in 2010 and 2011.

Nigeriens regard the conspicuous consumption by Niger’s political elite and the favoritism shown to their friends, families, and supporters in allocating state resources as sure signs of corruption. There appear to be few differences between government coalitions and opposition parties in terms of the seriousness with which they approach political and economic reforms. A disconnect between the government and the people seems to be growing as promises of reform, improving government services, and providing more employment opportunities, have not materialized.

A disconnect between the government and the people seems to be growing and undermining the legitimacy of the government as promises to reform the system, improve government services, and provide more employment opportunities have not yet materialized This trend undermines trust in the government and its legitimacy.

Characterized since colonialism by a highly-centralized state that often undercut traditional rulers, Niger has embraced a system of political decentralization based on democratically elected local governments. While on paper, these "commune" governments have taken over some of the functions of the chiefs and the central government administrators, the reality is more complex. While chiefs are agents of the state, government control over the chiefs varies in practice, as do chiefs' conceptions of their role. Chiefs often dominate the locally elected commune governments, and are in a position to dictate their success or failure.

Chiefs usually enjoy more popular support than local or national politicians. Their presence can make local democracy awkward in practice. Their role vis-a-vis modern judicial and governmental institutions invites criticism from the secular civil society. Yet, in the world's least developed country, where better than eighty percent of the people live in rural areas, traditional chiefs remain a major source of authority for most Nigeriens.

While some chiefs complicate efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law, the institution serves as a break on radical Islam, a viable mechanism for cross-border and local conflict resolution, and an essential -- if often un-tapped -- partner and guide for development interventions.

In an important departure from colonial policy, independent Niger has largely allowed local communities and noblemen to select chiefs for themselves via a quasi-democratic mechanism. Consequently, the quality of individual chiefs is often high, and the institution's legitimacy has re-bounded since the colonial period.

In July 2004, Niger held nationwide municipal elections as part of its decentralization process. Some 3,700 people were elected to new local governmental positions in 265 newly established communes. Although the ruling MNSD party won more positions than any other political party, opposition parties made significant gains.

In November and December 2004, Niger held presidential and legislative elections. Mamadou Tandja was elected to his second 5-year presidential term with 65% of the vote in an election that international observers called generally free and fair. This was the first presidential election with a democratically elected incumbent and was a test of Niger's young democracy. In the 2004 legislative elections, the ruling MNSD, the CDS, the Rally for Social Democracy (RSD), the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), the Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP), and the Social Party for Nigerien Democracy (PSDN) coalition, all of which backed Tandja, won 88 of the 113 seats in the National Assembly.

In February 2007, a previously unknown rebel group, the Movement of Nigeriens for Justice (MNJ), emerged as a formidable threat to peace in the north of Niger. The predominantly Tuareg group issued a number of demands, mainly related to development in the north. It attacked military and other facilities and laid landmines in the north. The resulting insecurity devastated Niger's tourist industry and deterred investment in mining and oil. The government labeled the MNJ members criminals and traffickers, and refused to negotiate with the group until it disarmed.

Niger is a multiparty republic. In February 2021 Mohamed Bazoum won the presidential election with an estimated 56 percent of the vote in the second round of voting. He assumed office the following April in the first peaceful transfer of power in the country’s history, although the office stayed within the ruling party. International and domestic observers considered both rounds of the presidential election to be peaceful, free, fair, transparent, and inclusive. In 2020 legislative elections, conducted in tandem with the first round of presidential elections, the ruling party won 79 of 171 seats, with 127 seats for the ruling coalition, and opposition parties dividing the remainder. International and local observers found the legislative elections peaceful, free, fair, transparent, and inclusive.

Observers report poverty and lack of economic opportunity, exacerbated by climate change’s effect on agricultural production and animal husbandry, are primary driving factors of human trafficking. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Niger, and traffickers exploit victims from Niger abroad. Hereditary and caste-based slavery practices perpetuated by politically influential tribal leaders continued. Some Arab, Zjerma, and Tuareg ethnic groups propagate traditional forms of caste-based servitude in the Tillaberi and Tahoua regions, as well as along the border with Nigeria. Slaveholders exploit victims of hereditary slavery in animal herding, small-scale agriculture, or domestic servitude; experts assert victims of hereditary slavery frequently do not self-identify or file complaints against the traffickers due to a lack of support services and ingrained dependency on the trafficker.

Another form of traditional bondage known as “passive” slavery consists of powerful community members preserving complete control of former servants’ individual freedoms. Estimates of the numbers of persons exploited in traditional slavery vary widely, but one report estimates it is as high as 800,000. In the Tahoua region, influential chiefs facilitate the transfer of girls from impoverished families to men as “fifth wives” for financial or political gain. This practice—known as wahaya—results in some community members exploiting girls as young as nine in forced labor and sexual servitude; wahayu children are then born into slave castes, perpetuating the cycle of slavery.

Semi-organized transnational criminal groups exploit children from Niger and neighboring countries in sex trafficking and forced labor in gold, salt, trona, and gypsum mines; agriculture; forced begging; stone quarries; markets; bus stations; and manufacturing within the country. Community members working in the artisanal gold mines in Komabangou, Tillaberi, use boys and some girls in potentially exploitative conditions. Traffickers exploit girls in sex trafficking near the border with Nigeria and along the main east-west highway, primarily between the cities of Birni n’Konni and Zinder. Traffickers transit Nigerian women through Niger and exploit them in sex trafficking in neighboring countries, and traffickers exploit Nigerian and Nigerien women in sex trafficking in northern mining cities and transportation centers in Niger.

The government increased prosecution efforts. Order No. 2010-86 on Combating Trafficking in Persons, enacted in 2010, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving an adult victim, and 10 to 30 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim.

Despite continued reporting that such practices remained prevalent, the government reported minimal law enforcement action to address hereditary slavery practices, including the enslavement of children, and child forced begging. The government did not report law enforcement statistics on investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of traffickers exploiting victims in hereditary slavery, traditional chiefs who perpetuated hereditary slavery practices, or corrupt marabouts (Quranic teachers) who forced children to beg.

Civil servants often demand bribes in exchange for public services. A poorly trained civil service and weak administrative controls compounded corruption. Other contributing factors included poverty, low salaries, politicization of the public service, traditional kinship and ethnic allegiances, a culture of impunity, and a lack of civic education.

Terrorist groups targeted and killed civilians, committed forced disappearances, inflicted cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and recruited child soldiers. Armed bandit groups, smugglers, drug and human traffickers, and community-based armed militias committed abuses. Wary of increasing attacks on its borders as well as spillover from insecurity in Libya, the government participated in campaigns against terrorist groups with the governments of Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, and Nigeria.

There were numerous reports of arbitrary or unlawful executions by authorities or their agents. For example, the armed forces were accused of summarily executing persons suspected of fighting with terrorist groups in the Diffa and Tillaberi Regions. Armed terrorist groups, including Boko Haram and groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida, ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), attacked and killed civilians and security forces. Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces, particularly among army and police members, due to a lack of effective oversight of military investigative and prosecutorial processes.

Threats to national security abound as violent extremists (VE) terrorize in the borderlands; the transit of fighters and weapons to and from Libya destabilizes the region; and traffickers using traditional trade routes across the Sahara bolster criminal and terrorist organizations. This scenario jeopardizes democratic principles, impedes international investment and development, undermines good governance, and jeopardizes safety.

Criminals and terrorist groups conducted terrorist attacks throughout the country, primarily in Diffa Region and portions of the Tillaberi Region and southern Tahoua Region. Many killings, especially in Diffa and Tillaberi Regions, specifically targeted government authorities, including killing or abducting canton chiefs, or private individuals seen as government informants. This practice also extended to village chiefs who were subjected to repeated threats, attacks, and killings in Torodi and other locations near the border with Burkina Faso, particularly Mali. Observers stated threats and attacks significantly disrupted government efforts to protect communities, introduced insecurity into previously safe areas, and led to a substantial increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Local media reported ISIS-GS and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin affiliates in northern and western Tillaberi Region continued to impose taxes on local villagers. Terrorists reportedly burned government-funded schools, telling villagers their children should not attend such schools. Terrorists reportedly began collecting taxes in eastern Dosso Region along the border with Nigeria.