Portuguese Guinea - Counter-Insurgency Forces
The more than 25,000 Portuguese troops in the province bolstered the cash economy. Police strength in the province totalled about 1,000 men, of which 600 (organized into four companies) were African administrative police. The remaining 424 [as of November 1972] were Portuguese members of the Public Security Police (PSP). In Portuguese Guinea the PSP did not have control over other paramilitary units as it did elsewhere in Portuguese Africa. The PSP was responsible for normal police functions such as deterring crime, maintaining order, and protecting lives and property. It was answerable to the minister of the interior in Lisbon who coordinated with the minister of overseas. Although the Portuguese did not maintain police forces in the villages, they did provide training and arms, upon request, to local village self-defense units. More than 100 of these units were operational by 1972.
Portuguese Guinea's armed forces were an integral part of the armed forces of Portugal. All military units in the territory were commanded by the commander in chief of the armed forces (CINC) Portuguese Guinea, who also doubles as the provincial governor. The CINC was directly subordinate to the minister of national defense in Lisbon.
The Portuguese Army - the predominant service in the province - falls under the Independent Territorial Command of Guinea based in Bissau. Subordinate to army headquarters were four sectors (west, east, south, and Bissau), one operational group command, (CAOP) and one operational command (COP). The CAOP was a brigade-level force created to suppress insurgent activities in the west sector. Its operational area was flexible and varied to meet the insurgent threat wherever it seemed greatest. The COP was a temporary battalion-sized task force, formed specifically to counter the insurgents along the Senegalese border. There was no fixed number of units assigned to the sectors or operational commands.
The Portuguese armed forces in the province were estimated at 28,000 men as of early 1972, (army: 25,500 organized mainly in battalion-sized units; air force: 1,400; navy: 1,100). In addition, the Portuguese had been training indigenous forces to carry a greater share of the struggle and have integrated some of them into the armed forces. These forces were estimated to number some 15,000: 5,000 militia, 5,000 village self-defense, and 5,000 regular army.
The armed forces had been steadily increased since 1961 to counter the spreading insurgency. General Spinola used his military forces effectively, relying heavily on helicopters for increased mobility. The army also engaged in a major civic action and pacification program, providing food, medication, education, and other assistance to the indigenous population to woo them away from the rebels. The army was also heavily involved in a population resettlement program.
Portuguese Air Force strength in Portuguese Guinea included 450 paratroopers and 150 personnel stationed at the Portuguese air base on Sal Island in the Cape Verde Islands, which formed part of the Cape Verde - Guinea Air Zone headquartered at Bissau. The exact number of indigenous personnel in the air force in Guinea was unknown s of 1972, but probably was low. There were a small number of African paratroopers. The total aircraft inventory in Guinea was 70, including 12 jet fighter-bombers (G-91). The majority of the aircraft as well as the paratroop unit were based in Bissau, although several airfields in the east and northwest sectors can handle jets.
The principal mission of the air force was to provide close air support, trooplift, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation. Although handicapped by obsolete fixed-wing aircraft, insufficient numbers of helicopters, and shortages of pilots and technicians, the air force was effective in the performance of its mission.
Portuguese naval strength in Guinea included four special marine detachments - one of which is locally recruited - two marine companies, and an underwater demolition team. Another African marine detachment was being formed in 1972. All naval forces in Portuguese Guinea came under the Maritime Defense Command based at Bissau. Ship strength consisted mainly of small patrol craft and a few larger supply vessels. The general mission of the navy (excluding the marines) was two-fold; resupply by river of land forces in the interior and river patrol. The navy's mission was crucial because 90 percent of the total resupply operations are waterborne.
The Portuguese armed forces in Guinea received all their military equipment and considerably more than half their financial support from Lisbon. Most of the food used by the military forces had to be imported from the metropole. The military budget for the province is prepared by the governor in conformity with Lisbon's guidelines. The budget was then submitted to the minister of overseas for approval. Lisbon's actual contribution to finance the conflict in Guinea - in the form of a loan - was not known but the provincial share in 1969 was just over $1 million out of a total provincial budget of about $7 million; the lion's share of the budget went for development projects.
Portugal depended almost entirely on conscription to maintain its army in both Portugal and its African provinces. Army units arriving from the metropole processed through the army replacement center in Bissau, where they received weapons and equipment. After a short orientation, units were assigned to the field, where they served 12 to 22 month tours. Portuguese conscripts received only four to seven weeks of basic training after which they were formed into units. These new units were then rotated with ones returning from Guinea. Any advanced or further training was conducted in combat areas under actual insurgency conditions. Indigenous personnel were recruited for military service after a careful screening. Black units were being formed and many had already been integrated into the armed services.
The logistical system for Portuguese Guinea - unique because most of the province's supplies must be moved by water - provided adequate support for the current level of counterinsurgency. Airfield and helipad construction brought most military units and probably 95 percent of the population within an hour of Bissau. Military units were considered well-equipped but lacked sophisticated electronic and communications equipment.
Portuguese ground and air forces in Portuguese Guinea were accused by Senegal and Guinea of territorial violations. The seriousness of these apparent border violations increased over time, culminating in a Portuguese-led attack on Conakry in November 1970, which had among its objectives the toppling of the Toure regime and the destruction of anti-Portuguese rebel headquarters there. The Senegalese, who had shown some restraint in denouncing the Portuguese, became more vocal in 1971 after a series of mining incidents and shellings along their border. Senegal demanded and received UN Security Council condemnation of Portuguese activities. Dakar also showed a greater willingness to support the anti-Portuguese rebels whose movements on its territory had occasionally been subjected to tight curbs. Military supplies and other aid flowed through Conakry en route to rebel units inside Portuguese Guinea. Guinea, perhaps the shrillest of Portugal's detractors, continued to provide the Conakry-based rebels carte blanche.
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