Portuguese Guinea - Counter-Insurgency
Portuguese Guinea had been the scene of an active and moderately successful armed insurgency since 1963. Anti-Portuguese rebels operating primarily from bases in neighboring Guinea and Senegal tied down sizable Portuguese military forces in a guerrilla war that in 1972 seemed stalemated. Although Portuguese Guinea was of little economic value, Lisbon believed that a defeat there would encourage the active rebellions in its more valuable territories of Angola and Mozambique, and undermine the Portuguese position.
Governor Spinola ran the province in his own fashion, with considerable support, but apparently without too much interference, from Lisbon. He was allowed to develop in Portuguese Guinea counterinsurgency policies different from those pursued in the other African provinces. These included strengthening traditional institutions, maintaining close coordination between the administration and the local people, and developing cooperative efforts in various fields. Governor Spinola was also a staunch proponent of social and economic development. Under his aegis roads, dispensaries, and schools were built and more social services made available.
Spinola permitted the establishment of annual peoples' congresses - an expanded version of the traditional African village council - to sound out the Africans' views. The congresses were long (about six weeks) and unstructured, and the format was largely left to the Africans. All tribal groups are represented as well as all levels of authority.
Most members of the provincial administration were appointed by the minister for overseas or by the governor acting in his place. One major administrative shortcoming was the lack of trained black Africans to staff the provincial administration, a problem which had been particularly noticeable since the 1964 decision to Africanize many local administrative positions. By 1972 the Portuguese had been able to place only a few Africans in these posts because of the paucity of qualified applicants. The qualifications generally required literacy in the Portuguese language and a certain amount of education beyond the primary grades. In lieu of qualified Africans the Portuguese frequently employed Cape Verdeans as well as metropolitan Portuguese.
The durable insurgency spurred the Portuguese to greater efforts to woo the province's 17 tribal groups through economic and social action projects. Some progress had been made among the province's Muslim tribes, notably the large Fulani group, although these groups traditionally had cooperated with the government.
The rebels' recruiting efforts had been most successful among the animist tribes, particularly the Balantas, the province's largest and most backward tribe. The pagan Balantas had long resented the favoritism shown by Portugal toward the Muslim tribes. The rebels and Portuguese, who were increasingly aware of the necessity of winning the allegiance of the indigenous people, were stressing their respective abilities to provide health services, schools, and security to the population. The government embarked on a strategic hamlet strategy, which occasioned the resettlement of large groups of people.
Political activity was rigidly controlled according to strict guidelines issued from the metropole, where political activity other than that by officially authorized organizations was banned. General Spinola permitted limited political activity among the indigenous population, but the activity was closely scrutinized.
The governor developed a Guinean branch of Portugal's political organization, National Popular Action (ANP), which unlike its counterparts elsewhere in Portuguese territory, brought together political activists of virtually all persuasions. Another striking feature of the Guinean branch of ANP was that it was virtually all black. Although some Cape Verdeans were involved, black formerly unaffiliated political activists dominated its leadership. Governor Spinola seemed committed to preparing more Guineans for an increased role in running their own affairs, a novel concept among Portuguese authorities in Africa.
By 1972, the military situation was stalemated, with the Portuguese in control of key towns and most of the population, while the rebels, ensconced in tracts along the southern border and operating from sanctuaries in Senegal and Guinea, appeared capable of attacking practically anywhere in the province.
Portuguese forces have been hard pressed to contain the full-scale guerrilla warfare that began in Portuguese Guinea in 1963. As of early 1972, nearly 30,000 Portuguese military personnel were being used against the guerrillas, partly because of Lisbon's belief that any setback in Bissau would have a domino effect on its African empire.
As an integral part of Portugal, the African province of Guinea had no independent foreign policy. Portugal's major foreign policy objective - as it applied to Africa - was to defend its sovereignty over the African provinces in the face of increasingly hostile international public opinion. While showing no less a commitment than the Salazar regime to retain its African provinces, the new government of Prime Minister Caetano promised to make long overdue reforms in the status of the overseas territories. These reforms aimed at giving the two more advanced African provinces of Mozambique and Angola greater local autonomy. As for Guinea, the most economically and politically depressed of the three African territories, the protracted conflict there seemed to militate against any sweeping change that might dilute Portuguese control.
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