Guinea - Internal Insecurity
Since 1960 a number of attempts had been made to overthrow the government of President Toure by assassination, coup d’etat, and invasion. It would be difficult to define the exact number of times such threats had occurred as the government had been almost ceaseless in its accusations that efforts either were being planned or were under way. Generally the accusations had been aimed at foreign powers — singly or in concert — who allegedly were supporting or formulating moves to institute a new political order in Guinea. The list of countries accused at various times stretched across the political spectrum from Portugal, Guinea’s more conservative African neighbors, France, and the United States to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Despite such accusations, most of the threats were clearly the work of Guinean dissidents. The one obvious major exception was the seaborne invasion of Conakry in November 1970, which was at least partially motivated by something more than a desire to overthrow the government. A number of incidents labeled by the government as coup attempts appeared to have been only peaceful efforts at public protest. The first overt manifestation of latent insecurity was disclosed in April 1960, less than fifteen months after independence, when PDG agents reportedly discovered a plot to overthrow the government by armed force. The Guinean High Court of Justice subsequently tried more than forty people for treason, sentencing nineteen to death (eight in absentia) and twenty-two to long prison terms at hard labor. Eight French nationals were expelled or fled to Senegal.
According to the PDG, the instigators of the plot were Guinean citizens who used funds from foreign sources, allegedly French, and possessed arms smuggled in from Senegal and Ivory Coast. Also included were explosives, radio equipment, subversive pamphlets urging the people to revolt, and correspondence outlining plans to hire some 5,000 saboteurs. A network of spies, President Toure explained to the N. tional Assembly, had been set up in Conakry and in some of the towns and villages. The PDG reacted vigorously and called on all its members for increased vigilance to detect and root out all traitors and “imperialist agents.”
In November 1961 an event occurred, still having repercussions in the 1970s, that demonstrated that opposition to the government could come from those who felt that PDG policies were not bringing about change fast enough as well as those for whom change was too fast. A strike over working conditions by the teacher’s union, supported by students, was termed a left-wing coup attempt and was put down with considerable severity. Five leaders of the teacher’s union were executed, and the Soviet embassy in Conakry was accused of supporting the teachers; the Soviet ambassador was expelled from Guinea. The readiness of the government to use force against opposition was demonstrated again in late 1965. Accusations of plotting to bring about the downfall of the government led to the arrest of the leaders of a group publicly attempting to form a legal opposition political party, as allowed by the Constitution. By 1969 tension had risen further as the flight of opponents into exile continued and as the government took cognizance of the military coups d’etat that were occurring in other African countries. President Toure adopted a policy aimed at increasing PDG control in order to avoid a situation in Guinea similar to the events in neighboring Mali, where the friendly government had been overthrown by its army in November 1968.
In February 1969, after military dissatisfaction overthe creation of party control elements within each army unit, the Guinean government moved against the army's deputy chief of staff and a former minister of defense and security. Attention was directed to the army garrison at Labe, the center of the Peul homeland in Middle Guinea, which had originally been an area noted for its opposition to the PDG. The government initially alleged that a Peul group planned to assassinate President Toure and seize national power or, failing that, to bring about the secession of Middle Guinea. These accusations were later broadened to include other groups, and the charge of a specific Peul connection was dropped. More than 1,000 Guineans were arrested throughout the country in this so-called Labe plot. Thirteen of those arrested were executed, and twenty-seven wore imprisoned; among them were three former cabinet ministers, including one of the key members of the party’s left wing, Fodeba Keita.
While the army’s capabilities to act independently were reduced by weakening it, efforts to strengthen PDG control over the country were increased. Nevertheless violent opposition persisted. In June 1969 a crowd of onlookers witnessed one of several reported attempted assassinations of President Toure, This occurred as be drove in an open car with former Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. The would-be assassin was captured and lynched by the crowd, and three other men were arrested and accused of complicity. According to the government radio, the man who tried to kill President Toure had been a member of the Guinean National Liberation Front (Front pour la Liberation Nationale de Guinee — FLNG), an element of the exile opposition. Allegedly the assassination team bad trained in Ivory Coast, although the government of that country denied any involvement. Additional vague charges were made by President Toure against “imperialist powers,” foreign embassies in Conakry, and certain foreign companies operating in Guinea. The attempt ou the president’s life appeared to have been connected with the earlier Labe plot.
The most serious attack on the government of President Toure was mounted in November of 1970 in the form of a seaborne invasion of Conakry conducted under cover of darkness. According to a wide variety of reports, considerable confusion existed regarding the size and composition of the force as well as the invaders’ intentions. A subsequent United Nations (UN) mission — dispatched to Conakry to investigate the situation — clarified to some degree what actually occurred, although the report of the mission of inquiry and the procedures followed in producing it were open to question by some observers.
In the aftermath of the 1970 invasion an extensive purge of the Guinean political and administrative elite was carried out in three stages. When it was concluded, sixteen of the twenty-four members of the cabinet, five former government ministers, thirteen of the country’s twenty-nine governors of administrative regions, several Guinean ambassadors, and the Roman Catholic archbishop of Conakry had fallen. Many of those arrested, including the archbishop, were among President Toure’s oldest friends and closest supporters.
Only a few military and police officers were among those seized in the initial purge. In this move ninety-two persons were sentenced to death (thirty-four in absentia) including four former cabinet members and the chief of state security. A further seventy-two persons were sentenced to imprisonment for life at hard labor. Even in the first wave of the purge, at least as many Guinean officials as captured invaders were involved.
In the second wave of arrests, in July 1971, the army's officer corps bore the brunt of the accusations. Those convicted included General Noumandian Keita, chief of the Combined Arms General Staff, and a majority of the field-grade army officers. A number of junior officers and noncommissioned personnel were also charged. Eight officers were sentenced to death.
All of the resulting trials took a highly irregular form. No use was made of the regular courts, the military court, or the existing revolutionary tribunal of the party. Instead the National Assembly was constituted by presidential appointment as the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal. The accused were not given the right to counsel, to defend themselves, or even to appear at their own trials. Instead, after long periods in jail, tape recordings of detailed confessions were released. These confessions generally implicated others as members of a vague fifth column, which was defined as including anyone accused of not acting effectively in instituting the policies of the government.
The failure of the Seven Year Plan (1964-71), therefore, could be blamed on sabotage by “enemies of the people” through such “counter revolutionary acts” as the ordering of wrong spare parts or the unwise assignment of equipment. Such acts were presumed to be treasonable because collectively they influenced the people and alienated them from the government. Accusations of fifth column activity were accordingly lumped together and defined as part of a plot to discredit and weaken the government.
According to the government prosecutors, this fifth column had supported either a Portuguese invasion or even vaguer programs to overthrow the government, allegedly sponsored by a number of countries in Africa and Europe. Most notable among the countries accused was the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Generally the people accused testified that they had succumbed to bribes, often from varying and conflicting sources. General Keita, for example, claimed he had been paid a large sum of money to join the West German ambassador’s spy networks with duties as varied as organizing plans for Guinea’s invasion and creating discord among army units. The recorded confessions were broadcast over the government radio and published, page after page, in the country’s only daily newspaper for months. Local party units were instructed to study the testimony and then to decide the fate of the accused. Their verdicts were tabulated by the regional upper echelons of the party and eventually passed for ratification to the National Assembly, acting as the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal. The number of people convicted, even from among the army, was never released, but those publicly convicted numbered some 250. A number of reports by outside observers estimated that, in all, about 10,000 arrests were made. After a period of relative calm in 1972, new accusations of plots against the government were voiced loudly in 1973. In April of that year a number of cabinet ministers were accused of being implicated in an effort allegedly aimed at the overthrow of the governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone. According to President Toure this plot was supported by Portugal, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
Some outside observers speculated that President Toure’s apparent preoccupation with plots against his government may have been conditioned in part by a firm desire to instill a sense of vigilance within the Guinean people. In each instance he has broadcast his warnings of impending threats over the government radio in addition to exhortations that are dispensed to the lowest levels of the party organization. For example, in his address welcoming Nigerian head-of-state General Yakubu Gowon to Guinea in February 1974, President Toure advised Guineans who had gathered for the occasion in the Conakry stadium and those who were listening to the radio broadcast:
At this very moment, there are 1,500 mercenaries stationed on the two borders of our national territory ready to attack us again. . . . They say they have already acquired three warships for the purpose. They also say that they will carry out maneuvers to divert the attention of our troops so that their ships can land the mercenaries in Guinea to accomplish their cowardly assignment. They say they will attack Conakry’ airport and seize the Alpha Yaya military barracks in Conakry because, according to them, our arms and ammunition are stored there and once they seize it our people will be without arms and ammunition. According to them, when this happens they will then prevent troops from friendly countries from coming to our assistance. . . .
"Let these mercenaries come. The Guinean armed forces are always ready. Their tomb is in each Guinean home, workshop, and road junction. They will be given a first class burial. The Guinean revolution will triumph over their machinations. We say this in the presence of the current president of the Organization of African Unity; he can himself speak to the mercenaries who have returned from the Ivoiy Coast and Senegal. Among the mercenaries are Ivorians, Guineans, Senegalese, and foreigners. The OAU president can question them himself, and he will see the truth of what we have been saying about the anti-Guinean plot. . . .
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria! Long live General Gowon! Down with imperialist lackeys! Down with colonialism and imperialism! Honor to struggling peoples! Ready for revolution!
Treason and other major offenses against the state were regarded by the government as the most serious crimes. Theft, ar»on, and embezzlement involving state property or funds were generally dealt with more severely than the same offenses against private property. Those charged with treasonable acts usually were tried promptly and, if convicted, could expect to be executed or to be given maximum prison sentences. The death sentence also could be expected in convictions for offenses viewed as sabotage of the national economy.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
