Cameroon - Interethnic Relations
A variety of social systems existed among the country's numerous ethnic groups, the scope of traditional sociopolitical units ranging from small clans to highly structured chiefdoms. Despite the government's efforts at national integration, most Cameroonians were still caught up in micropolitics. Amidst this diversity of local systems, three major societal patterns could be discerned within as many geographic regions. In the northern savanna existed a number of conquest states in which there was a clear distinction between the governing Fulani and the various ethnic groups they had subdued during the past century. Typical of the highly organized structures in the western highlands were the Bamileke chiefdoms with their absolute rulers, systems of ranks and titles, important men's associations, and ancestor worship focused on dead and living chiefs. Egalitarian Pahouin society was representative of the southern pattern and of certain remote portions of the north that were outside Fulani influence. In both these areas political control traditionally did not transcend the limits of tiny dispersed communities in which descendants of the same ancestor lived grouped around the family head, who assigned land and agricultural tasks and who negotiated the marriages of his children.
Of the three basic societal patterns, only the Fulani had experience in building multiethnic states, and their organizing ability and political acumen had earned them the most important place among the national leaders. At the same time the practice of Islam and an attachment to feudal values set the Fulani apart from other Cameroonians. Western highlanders conceived of larger political units as embracing only people related by kinship — a system that could not serve as the model for a modern state. Moreover, dwindling land resources and certain features of traditional social organization drove many Bamileke to rebellion and migration to other parts of the country. The Bamileke had become the country's foremost economic force, but they were widely resented because of their quasi-monopoly of African activ- ity in commerce, transport, and moneylending. The lack of political cohesiveness and social hierarchy made it easier for individual Pahouin to free themselves from traditional controls and to adapt to change. Among them were found the greatest number of Christians and the highest percentage of people in modern professions.
Interethnic relations were often colored by memories of former warfare between groups; jealousy over access to modern education, health care, and economic opportunities; or simply by incmpatibility because of differences of language, religious belief, and social structure. These differences existed among the major regions and also within each of them.
In the north, historic tensions survive between the ruling Fulani and the people they conquered, especially those who live near them on the plains. They include the machudo (vassal groups), who pay tribute but follow their own life-style within their villages, and the descendants of enslaved prisoners of war who live with Fulani families. The latter particularly seem to have become somewhat rebellious in modern times. The mountain people, whose ancestors fled rather than submit to Fulani domination, have kept alive an awareness of what happened a century and a half ago, although they have little contact with the Fulani.
In the western highlands, ancient rivalries and military skirmishes are by no means forgotten. A fifty-year conflict between the Bali and the Widekum came to a head in 1952 when groups of Widekum burned down a large number of Bali huts. As punishment the British administrators fined the guilty parties, and the money was used to supply Bali towns with a piped water system. The Bamoun and the Bamileke in turn have long been hostile to each other, and for a long time both have guarded the Noun River, which is the boundary between them. Since the beginning of modern politics the two groups have been in different camps.
In January 1960 Bamileke terrorists attacked a Bamoun village in which one Bamoun was killed and three injured. In retaliation, 1,000 Bamoun warriors crossed the Noun River and razed a Bamileke village. Colonial rule quite often had the effect of developing ethnic consciousness among members of small groups, who began to resent the supremacy of larger and more favored peoples. In the forest region a case in point was the refusal of the Ewondo to accept Douala as a lingua franca during German rule. In modern times the Douala recall with pride their former supremacy and therefore are resented by their neighbors. Beti leaders, for example, took an opposing position on the reunification issue from that of the Douala for this very reason.
The Beti and the Boulou, in turn, have maintained a longstanding conflict with the Bassa. The reason for this may be that the Bassa appear to have arrived earlier at their present location and that they resent impingement by those who came later. The Boulou retaliate by calling the Bassa mvele, a term of disapproval. When different southern peoples were pressed into building the railroad in the mid- 19208, the Bassa were forced to grow more food in order to feed them. They disliked the newcomers and sabotaged their efforts. These conflicts are still remembered.
Missionaries found it impossible to carry on their work if Bassa, Boulou, and Ewondo were housed together. Small groups have resented the use of Boulou by Presbyterian missionaries as the language of church and education. They insisted that their own languages are equally as good and have demanded that the Bible be translated intothem. The Nguma (Mvumbo), a small coastal group, left the Presbyterian church over this question and formed their own religious association. Tensions between groups are aggravated by differences in religious denominations. The Ewondo and Eton are predominantly Roman Catholic, and the Boulou are largely Presbyterians. Neverthe- less, although there are cleavages within the Pahouin group, they face outsiders as one.
In addition to these interregional tensions, relationships remain somewhat strained between northerners and many southern Cameroonians, who resent the pride of the Fulani and their political domination. Southerners are often contemptuous of what they consider the backwardness and the feudal values of the north. Northerners, in turn, often blame southerners for the lack of schools and jobs in their area. During the 1960s tensions actually increased with growing economic development in the north because it necessitated sending southern civil servants, experts, and teachers to the area. The southerners lived in almost segregated quarters, where they seldom mingled socially with the northerners.
Most explosive has been the interaction of the Bamileke and other Cameroonians. Bamileke enterprise, mobility, aggressiveness, and large-scale emigration from their overpopulated homeland indirectly fueled the civil war that smoldered from 1956 until the mid-1960s. The rebellious forces of the Union of Cameroonian Peoples (Union des Populations du Cameroun—UPC) received most of their support from the younger Bamileke and Bassa. Despite the UPC's radical doctrine and communist ties, the young Bamileke saw the revolt as an effort to end the inequitable control of traditional chiefs over the limited agricultural land in their region.
In the southern town of Sangmelima in 1956, Bamileke market stalls were smashed and pillaged, and seven Bamileke were injured. In 1960 people in coastal Douala attacked and destroyed houses and shops owned by Bamileke. At least nineteen persons were killed, and over 5,000 were left homeless. Other isolated outbreaks occurred in 1970 and 1971. The Bamileke continue to incite resentment and envy because of their economic success. In the south, ethnic groups are largely segregated in different parts of the towns. Health facilities schedule their services to accommodate members of different ethnic affiliations on separate days.
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