Congo - Fusiliers Marins
The Congolse Navy is primarily a riverine constabulary force - the personnel strength in 2016 was 800 people, including 600 Fusiliers Marins. The Fusiliers Marins [naval infantry] are qualified for boarding teams. They are naval infantry, so they operate in desert and water-based environments. Congolese sealift capacity for its Naval Infantry is nil. Amphibious operations are used to gain a bridgehead on land using naval and ground elements. Riverine operations are conducted to control inland rivers, lakes, and waterways. Created in 2002, the 32ème Groupement Naval [32th Naval Group] of the FAC (Forces armées congolaises) is a Naval training unit stationed in the defense zone No. 9. This military chain of command was officially created by a presidential decree dated 03 January 2002. Included in the military zone of defense number 9, Brazzaville, the 32nd naval group, led by Admiral Bouagnabeya, extends for nearly 230 km, going from the blue hand after the Djoué bridge to the mouth of the Léfini, 200 km, on the national road number 2. It has four units of troops namely: le 324ème bataillon des fusiliers marins, le 326ème bataillon des fusiliers marins (Mpouya), la 321ème Flottille et la Base navale 02 [the 324th battalion of marines, the 326th battalion of marines (Mpouya), the 321th Fleet and Naval Base 02].
The 336e bataillon des fusiliers marins was authoritataively attested in the "journal officiel - Secrétariat général du Gouvernement:" of 11 July 2013, but further information is lacking.
Like other branches of the Congolese Armed Forces, this sector of nautical intervention has its precise missions. Apart from the general mission entrusted to the entire public force to ensure territorial integrity, the 32nd naval group is responsible for preventing possible threats likely to disrupt free traffic along the river fringe; To participate in public service missions, in particular the monitoring of clandestine entries on the Congo River. It also participates in peacekeeping operations and in humanitarian missions. The 32nd naval group includes nine specialties, including navigations and construction maneuvers, weapons maintenance and use, radio service and many others.
The Troupes de marine are an arm of the French Army with a tradition of service overseas. Through out most of the 19th Century French colonial affairs were conducted by the Ministre Marine et Colonies [Minister of Marine and Colonies]. They are sometimes referred to as French marines in English-speaking media. Despite their title they are not connected to either the French naval infantry (the Fusiliers Marins) or French naval special forces (the Commandos Marine).
Except for participation in the Great Patriotic War, when naval infantry units were formed to assist in the protection of the strategic flanks of the Red Army, naval infantry had not been part of the Soviet military force structure until 24 July 1964. In contrast to its US Marine Corps counterpart, the Soviet Naval Infantry had very little organic firepower or staying power. If a Naval Infantry regiment were committed in combat, it would have to be reinforced within 4 to 5 days due to its lack of organic maintenance and logistic support. Soviet exercises and doctrine indicate that the Naval Infantry are intended to be used as shock troops or as the spearhead of an assault when ground troops can follow.
The U.S. Navy deployed a single squadron (12 boats and 200 sailors) for riverine operations in Iraq to control the 2,890 miles of the rivers. Even then, the squadron did not always patrol the rivers; rather it spent considerable time in the Delta and maintaining security on the vital Haditha Dam.
The purpose of riverine operations may be to facilitate or prevent river traffic, or the river may be ancillary to the main purpose which is on the banks, not the river itself. Missions may include: naval combat; fire support; landing assault; mine and obstacle removal; reconnaissance; line of communication security; logistics support; ground force movement; line of communication interdiction; raids; patrolling; presence; piracy suppression; smuggling and contraband suppression; suppression of human trafficking (prostitution, slavery, illegal immigration); police support; fishing support; host nation training; vessel recovery; medical support/evacuation; humanitarian aid; and liaison with naval/ground units and local civilians. Trans-axial riverine operations may be categorized by these situations and include most of these missions. Historically, armied have devoted more thought to crossing rivers than controlling them until confronted with the opportunity to exploit terrain for maneuver, advantage, and supply.
Riverine operations present their own set of challenges. River navigability can be an issue. Rivers need to be deep, wide, and slow enough. Some mountain-fed rivers run too fast after the spring thaw and are too shallow in the summer and fall. Many rivers change their course or jump their banks and require dredging and channel marking. Rocks, rapids, ice, debris, low bridges, overhanging trees, logs and stumps, fishing traps/nets, and other obstacles can present a problem. River current is not constant but slows down and speeds up with the river’s configuration and water volume. Banks, levees, river junctions, whirlpools, quick sand, vegetation, animal life, docks, bridges, fords, water gates, and dams may complicate or ease riverine operations.
River movement is predictable. Watercraft move slower going upstream versus downstream. The deeper the vessel’s draft, the more restricted it is to the navigation channels. At river bends, the channel will run close to the bend while the opposite bank is more shallow. The river current accelerates at bends. Predictable speed and the navigation channel facilitate attacking vessels with underwater mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and obstacles. Ambushes often enjoy the advantage of height and overlook.
Riverine operations cover more than the actual river, canal, or lake. They might include the surrounding land, (especially the civilian communities), communications and transport infrastructure, industry, and trade. In major combat situations, riverine units will frequently work in close support of air and ground forces and will need training in target identification and marking, adjusting artillery and aviation strikes, calling in aerial medical evacuations, loading and unloading weapons and personnel, plus direct fire support of other vessels and units on shore.
Unless the riverine force is well-established and mature, the “tooth-to-tail” ratio is usually skewed to put a lot of firepower forward that is backed by inadequate logistics and maintenance support. The ground force usually ends up supplementing the logistics effort and the “maintenance-lite” posture means that vessels are often down for long periods of time awaiting maintenance.
Training for riverine combat is essential. Boarding and disembarking are very routine actions, yet for untrained personnel they are always confused, cumbersome, and slow. Troops need training on on-board actions: how to stay out of the way of the vessel crew; how to provide on-board security watch and fires; how to read waterways and shorelines; how to navigate while underway; how to tie up and cast off; how to eat, sleep, and observe sanitary measures on board; how to operate on-board ordnance and communications gear in an emergency; and how to observe proper naval protocol and customs. Soldiers also need training in ground tactics that emphasize conducting on-shore combat while protecting the riverine vessels.
From 6 to 11 November 2013, the French sloop Premier Maître L'Her conducted an operational break in Pointe Noire, Republic of Congo, as part of the highbush mission. The crew of the PM L'Her led a PIO to lead the Congolese visiting teams. Training was first provided on board the Aviso for the benefit of Congolese seamen, in order to remind them of the techniques of search and control of an individual. A rehearsal at sea, aboard Congolese patrol boats, was then scheduled. Two French sailors were present as observers to check the respect of the control and visiting techniques. Finally, a full-scale exercise was prepared and taken on board the PM L'Her . The visiting team of a Congolese patrol boat intervened aboard the Aviso. The latter played the role of a merchant vessel suspected of transporting illegals and weapons in Congolese territorial waters. All these actions have made it possible to set up and train the Congolese navy and more particularly the marine fusiliers.
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