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Afghan National Army - End Strength

The Afghan military today is an all volunteer force.

The current ANDSF authorized force level as part of the tashkil remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel21 plus 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). The United States is the sole supporter of the ALP. Although the ALP fall under the MoI for oversight, they are not part of the 352,000 authorized ANDSF tashkil. Although the total authorization of 352,000 did not change, ABF and ANCOF transfers did change the apportionment of forces between MoD and MoI. Prior to transfer, the MoD was authorized 195,000 forces while the MoI was authorized 157,000. After the transfer of the ABF and the ANCOF, the MoD is now authorized 227,374 while the MoI was authorized 124,626.

By 2018, efforts to double the ASSF’s capacity by 2020 progressed; however, the rate of growth slowed a bit. Shortfalls in the conventional ANA recruiting and retention resulted in undermanned basic training courses and delays in course start dates. ANA overall recruiting and retention goals were set at levels below requirements to keep pace with attrition and grow the force in accordance with ANDSF Roadmap goals. Therefore, despite meeting recruiting and retention goals, the ANA will have to recruit and retain soldiers at higher than current rates throughout the year in order to keep pace with attrition and Roadmap milestones.

Attrition remained problematic for both the ANA and the ANP. ANA attrition is tracked with greater fidelity than ANP attrition due to better personnel systems and higher enrollment rates in AHRIMS and APPS. The number of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFR) significantly impacts ANA and ANP attrition rates. DFR personnel are those soldiers and police who leave the organization prior to the end of their contract for reasons that include desertion or being absent without leave (AWOL) for over a month. DFRs occur for a variety of reasons, including low pay or delays in pay, austere living conditions, denial of leave, and intimidation by insurgents. The single greatest contributor to DFRs is poor leadership. Soldiers and police grow disillusioned with leaders who fail to take care of them with leave, promotion, and pay in accordance with standing policies.

The ANA and ANP have policies to prevent personnel from going absent without leave. Enforcement of the policies and accountability for offenders remain inconsistent. Coalition advisory efforts continue to focus on the ANDSF’s ability to regenerate forces through recruitment and operational readiness programs. During this reporting period, the ANA initially set recruiting and retention goals lower than what was necessary to keep pace with attrition and grow the force in accordance with the ANDSF Roadmap. Efforts are underway to realign future recruiting and retention goals to ensure strength levels do not impact readiness and remain relatively stable as they have over the two years 2016-2017.

The MoD and ANA took several steps to reduce the size of its officer corps, enforce merit-based promotion practices, and eliminate the presence of “ghost soldiers” on the ANDSF payroll. Under President Ghani’s new Inherent Law, officers are subject to mandatory retirement upon reaching a specified time in service or time in rank, or if the officer exceeds a specific age tied to his or her rank. For years, the MoD and ANA retained significantly more general officers and senior leaders than the tashkil authorized. Many excess colonels serve in positions designated for junior officers, resulting in many senior officers receiving significantly higher salaries for performing duties well below their rank. Implementation of the first wave of the Inherent Law occurred on January 1, 2018. As many as 162 General Officers and 494 Colonels retired, accounting for 656 retirees. No General Officers and only 12 Colonels were slotted in General Officer or Colonel positions, respectively, at the time of retirement.

As of 2012 the approved end-strength for the Afghan National Army [ANA] – the projected end-strength required to support transition to Afghan security lead – was 195,000 personnel by October 2012. The 195,000 end-strength goal would give Afghanistan the world's 22nd largest Army, nearly even with Taiwan's 200,000, but ahead of the 190,000 of Thailand and Brazil.

By March 2012 the force strength of the Afghan National Security Force [ANSF] was 337,516 (187,874 in the ANA; 149,642 in the Afghan National Police [ANP]). In June 2011, the Afghan government approved an increase to 352,000 by October 2012 — 195,000 in the ANA and 157,000 in the ANP. According to DoD, the ANA and ANP were on track to achieve those goals. The 352,000 end-strength goal would give Afghanistan the world's 11th largest Army, behind Turkey's 400,000, but just ahead of Iran and Singapore, both of which have 350,000 troops. Afghanistan is the 10th poorest county in the world.

On April 10, 2012, the Afghan Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior met with the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Among topics discussed at their meeting was the possibility that the ANSF will need to undergo a significant reduction—possibly to 230,000 personnel—after the NATO mission ends in 2014. According to media reports, the reductions projected beyond 2014 were based on plans to ensure that the ANSF can defend Afghanistan and remain sustainable as international contributions decrease.

In May 2012 there were reports that NATO's defense ministers had prepared a draft agenda for the May 2012 Chicago summit at a meeting on 02 February 2012. It was reported that budgetary constraints would cause the force that will soon reach its combined goal of 352,000 uniformed personnel (both Army and Police) to be rapidly cut back starting around 2015 to 228,500 [a suspiciously precise number, according to some]. This would appear to reflect a return to something like the force goals set in 2008 and achieved in 2010, implying an end-strength for the Afghan National Army of about 135,000 soldiers.

On May 21, 2012, the leaders of the 50 countries contributing to the NATO mission in Afghanistan met in Chicago and agreed to a new transition timetable that would put Afghan security forces in charge of security throughout the country by the summer of 2013. The United States and its coalition partners have been building the ANSF to a combined strength of 352,000 soldiers and police. NATO leaders agreed to scale back the total force to a more financially sustainable 228,500 by 2017, security conditions permitting.

Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak said "I have told them that this number is too little in comparison to forces in regional countries and they will not be able to maintain security on their own after foreign troops' withdrawal." Minister of Interior Bismillah Mohammadi told the Afghan parliament that the government would ask NATO states at the May 2012 summit to delay reduce the strength of Afghan security forces to 2017.

The initial goal was reaching a critical mass of 20,000 troops, which would imbue the ANA with considerable influence in the political landscape, was achievable, but was dependent on increased international support and improved recruitment. Also, an ANA of this size would be far from sufficient to guarantee security on a countrywide level.

The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person Afghan Naitonal Police (ANP). The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel.

As of February 2005, around 24,000 people had been recruited in the ANA since its creation in 2002 and 28,000 people in the ANP. The country planned to have a trained 70,000-strong army and 50,000-strong police force by 2006. At that time there were 20,000 people on standby in 34 ANA recruitment centers. The ANA could recruit 3,000 every month, but could only recruit 100 applicants from each province every month to maintain the ethnic balance of the Army. In addition to ex-poppy growers, many of the demobilised ex-combatants had also chosen to join the ANA.

As of 2007 the Afghan National Army was 36,000 strong and on its way to an end-strength of 70,000. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions had evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community's Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP.

In 2008 some 35,000 soldiers had been trained by U.S. forces and participated in counterterrorism operations, but the air force, still in the formative stage, had only 1,400 technical and logistical personnel. Afghanistan, a landlocked nation, has no navy. The long-term goal has been to prepare an army of 70,000 (in five corps), an air force of 8,000, a border guard force of 12,000, and a police force of 82,000. With the endorsement of the JCMB on 5 February 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.

In September 2008, the JCMB, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of February 2009, the ANA had an actual strength of 79,300 personnel. This represented 59 percent of the 134.000 approved strength, which was scheduled at that time to be reached by the end of 2011. Operationally, the ANA was fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90 percent of ISAF operations were conducted in conjunction with the ANA.

On 10 September 2008, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced that the expansion of the Afghan army would change from a goal of some 85,000 men to 162,100 troops. "We can train and help grow the Afghan security forces ... and we are. In fact, they are on track to reach total end strength of 162,000 troops by 2010.... But until those Afghan forces have the support of local leaders to improve security on their own, we will only be as much as a crutch, and a temporary one at that."

The U.S Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)'s fall 2009 plan was to grow the Afghan Army to 240,000 personnel and the Afghan Police to 160,000 by October 2013. In December, CSTC-A and its successor, the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) announced a more modest objective of 134,000 (Army) and 109,000 (police) by October 2010, and a "goal" of 171,600 (army) 134,000 (police) by October 2011, with further growth dependent on ISAF's future assessments of the security situation.

By 2010 the Afghan National Army had grown from 97,000 to 138,164, while the police force rose from about 95,000 to 120,500. In 2011 the end-strength was 171,600. The 135,000 end-strength goal discussed in early 2012 would give Afghanistan the world's 26th largest Army, just behind Japan which has 152,000 soldiers, even with Ethiopia's 135,000 soldiers, and ahead of the 130,000 soldiers of France.

No trustworthy statistics regarding the strength of the Afghan army are available, but there does not appear to be any moment in history in which Afghanistan had so large an army. When the Afghan armies of Ahmad Shah Abdali were overrunning the Punjab, and threatening Hindustan, neither the Moghuls nor the Mahrattas ever troubled themselves about the Afghans until the invaders reached Delhi. Ahmad ShahAbdali died in 1773, and his sons were too much occupied in fighting one another for the throne to attempt a renewal of their aggressions on Hindustan. In the mid-18th century the strength of the Afghan army was 60,000, half of which were the Afghans-Abdali tribe's troops. In the mid-19th century the cavalry was the traditional strength of the Afghan army. The main strength of the Afghan army was in the Douranee [Durrani] horse. The Douranee tribes had been settled in Western Afghanistan by Nadir Shah. He had first conquered, then taken them into his service.

As of 1876 the strength of the Afghan army was calculated at 57 regiments of infantry of a nominal strength of 650 bayonets [that is, 37,000 troops]. Fifty of these regiments were thought to be properly equipped. There were 16 regular cavalry regiments, each composed of four troops of 100 men each, for 6,400 total. Of irregular cavalry there were 8,000 horsemen. Besides these, there were about 3,500 irregular infantry or jezailohees, aud a local militia, of whom not more than from 1,000 to 1,500 could be got together at one place. At that time, the population is estimated at 2,500,000 souls.

Beginning in the late 19th century, Afghan rulers introduced conscription to address challenges of manpower within the army and to unify the country's fractious social groups and regions. Because the Afghan state was weak and the tribes strong, Afghan rulers had to negotiate with the tribes to secure manpower for the army. Tribal leaders often selected sub-standard recruits, usually the least wanted among the tribe. In the year 1900, including tribal levies, the effective war strength of the Afghan army was supposed to exceed 50,000 men. In 1906 it was said to number between 60,000 and 90,000 men, including 9,000 cavalry. In 1919 the strength of the Afghan army was placed at about 98,000 men, including 18,000 cavalry, at which time the control of foreign policy rested entirely in the British government of India.

From 1939 to 1953, Muhammad Daud Khan, commander of the Kabul Army Corps under King Zahir Shah, resumed efforts to build a modern conscript army. Armed revolts were common - especially among Pashtun tribes in the south and east. Bribery and corruption were common. By the 1950s, approximately half the military budget was lost to corruption and waste; meanwhile, the army was disintegrating. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Afghan army relied increasingly on the Soviet Union for training and organization. These efforts were to no avail, leading up to the collapse of Afghanistan's communist government in 1979 and the Soviet invasion.

The combat readiness of the Army of the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan plunged as government purges swept the officer corps. Soldiers, units and entire regiments deserted to the resistance and by the end of 1979, the actual strength of the Afghan Army was less than half of its authorized strength of 90,000. One estimate held that the numerical strength of the Afghan Army eroded from about 80,000 in 1978 to as low as 25,000 by the end of 1980. By another estimate, in the 1980s the strength of the Afghan Army had dwindled from 110,000 to less than 40,000. Rand Corporation estimated in 1980 that, as a result of defections and purges, the troop strength of the Afghan army had fallen from 120,000 to about 40-50,000. Some US intelligence experts believed the functioning strength of the Afghan army had dropped to 30,000 men in early 1984. Yet another source reports that before the 1978 coup, the strength of the Afghan army was placed at 100,000 men - by the end of 1980, this figure had fallen to 30,000, and only 10,000-15,000 of these were valued as an effective fighting force.

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Page last modified: 06-09-2018 17:36:48 ZULU