Sudan - Fourth Civil War - 2023-20??
Sudan plunged into conflict in April 2023, when long-simmering tensions between army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo broke out in a conflict that has displaced about 12 million people. The war continues to rage, with the RSF and the Sudanese army accusing each other of war crimes, including targeting civilians and indiscriminately shelling residential areas, which have resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people.
Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) chief admitted 30 October 2025 that his fighters committed “some violations” against civilians during the recent capture of Al-Fashir, the capital of war-torn North Darfur. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, said in a 25-minute video posted on Telegram that a committee to investigate the abuses has been formed. He added that legal and military investigators have already arrived in the city and promised that any trials would be public. “The investigative commission will immediately begin to examine and hold accountable any officer or soldier who exceeded their limits or violated the rights of others. They will be arrested and sentenced immediately,” he said.
His comments followed widespread anger over atrocities after the RSF seized Al-Fashir from the Sudanese army on Sunday, following an 18-month siege marked by reports of starvation and heavy bombardment. World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the UN health agency was “appalled and deeply shocked” by reports that more than 460 people were killed at the city’s last functioning hospital. “Prior to this latest attack, WHO has verified 185 attacks on health care in Sudan with 1204 deaths and 416 injuries of health workers and patients since the start of the conflict in April 2023. Forty-nine of these attacks occurred this year alone, killing 966 people,” he wrote on X.
The Sudan Doctors’ Network said that six medical workers, including four doctors, a pharmacist and a nurse, were abducted in Al-Fashir by RSF units demanding a $1 million ransom for their release. The union accused the paramilitary group of trying to destroy what remains of Darfur’s health care system and urged the WHO and other international agencies to intervene urgently.
The Sudanese authorities have previously expressed concern over the presence of foreign mercenaries in the RSF. Sovereign Council member and Army Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yasir Al-Atta has repeatedly noted that the RSF recruits thousands of mercenaries from countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Initially, there were about 120,000 fighters and gradually 49,000 more servicemen joined the RSF. Al-Atta also accused the UAE and South Sudan of supplying the RSF with arms and fuel.
Sudanese experts have long suggested that Hemedti wants to create a state for Arabs dispersed across the Sahel countries. This sentiment has also been echoed by the authorities in Sudan. In September 2024, Yasir Al-Atta stated that the UAE had urged the RSF leader to consider establishing an Arab state in Sudan to better control agricultural lands, ports, and gold mines.
The war between the army and the RSF – once allies who governed the country during the transitional period – erupted in April 2023 over disputes regarding the timeline for integrating the RSF into the Sudanese Armed Forces. Previously, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as ‘Hemedti’, shared power with the army and civilian politicians under an agreement reached following the ousting of former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. In 2021, along with the commander of the armed forces and Chairman of the TSC Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, he helped remove civilian leaders, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, from their posts – an act that was viewed by the international community as a new coup.
According to a report published November 2024 by London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine researchers, more than 61,000 people were killed in the first 14 months of the violence in Khartoum State, where the fighting began. The non-profit organization Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) said it had recorded over 28,700 fatalities by the end of November 2024, including over 7,500 civilians killed in direct attacks.
On 22 February 2025, a charter was signed in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, establishing a parallel ‘Government of Peace and Unity’ in Sudan in opposition to the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The ceremony, organized by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was attended by various political parties and armed groups.
Despite the ceremonious signing of the charter in Nairobi, the chances are slim that the parallel government in Sudan will receive international recognition and support. The key figure, Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, was absent at the ceremony, during the negotiations that preceded it, and during the subsequent signing of the constitution. In early February 2025, the Wall Street Journal reported that Hemedti had not been seen in public for several months, raising questions about his whereabouts. At official events and on the battlefield, he has been replaced by his brother Abdul Rahim Dagalo, the deputy leader of the RSF.
Attempts to enlist other political figures like Fadlallah Burma Nasir and Ibrahim Al-Mirghani to obtain the support of Sudan’s two largest political parties – the National Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party – fell flat. Nasir attended the February 2025 ceremony without the approval of the Umma Party which he leads, but other party members later stated that his presence was a personal initiative that did not reflect the party’s position. Meanwhile, Ibrahim Al-Mirghani, a descendant of the founder of the Democratic Unionist Party, Ahmed al-Mirghani, attended the event as the party’s representative. However, later the Democratic Unionist Party stated that he had been expelled from it back in 2022. As a result, neither organization officially signed the Nairobi charter.
Despite lacking significant leverage, opposition groups hope that the establishment of a parallel government in Sudan will allow them to easily procure weapons abroad. “The parallel government being set up by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) aims to grab diplomatic legitimacy from its army-led rival and ease access to advanced weaponry,” a source in the RSF told Reuters.
For the previous two years, Sudan had been engulfed in civil war, and the signing of the charter comes amid military progress achieved by the Sudanese army, which has recently succeeded in pushing the RSF out of the capital, Khartoum, and other regions. Given the situation on the battlefield and the fact that international legal organizations and countries, including the US, accuse the RSF of initiating ethnic cleansing, the success of the initiative is questionable. However, the agreement reached in Nairobi posed the threat of further division in Sudan, as the RSF still controls large territories in the west and south.
The charter states that Sudan should become a “secular, democratic, decentralized state” with a unified army, but armed groups should also be allowed to exist. It also emphasizes that the establishment of a new government is not aimed at fracturing the country but rather at ending the conflict. According to Al Hadi Idris, a former TSC member and leader of one of the armed factions who also signed the charter, an announcement about the formation of the new ‘Government of Peace and Unity’ will be made soon. The response from Sudan’s official authorities was predictably negative. “We will not allow any other country to recognize this so-called parallel government,” stated Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef al-Sharif.
By the time the charter was signed in Nairobi, the Sudanese army had pushed the RSF out of much of the capital and central Sudan, reclaiming major cities in Sennar State in the southeast. Nonetheless, the RSF still maintains control over significant territories in Darfur and continues to fight with the armed forces for control over North Darfur State and its capital, Al-Fashir. At the same time, large areas of South Kordofan and certain areas of Blue Nile State, which borders South Sudan, are under the control of the rebel group the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz Adam al-Hilu, who announced cooperation with the RSF during the charter signing in Nairobi.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said 07 January 2025 his government had determined that Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allied militias have committed genocide in the war against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAR) which started in April 2023. Blinken cited the “638,000 Sudanese experiencing the worst famine in Sudan’s recent history, over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, and tens of thousands dead” as reasons for the determination. Under the 1948 Genocide Convention, genocide is acts intended “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.
"The RSF and RSF-aligned militias have continued to direct attacks against civilians. The RSF and allied militias have systematically murdered men and boys—even infants—on an ethnic basis, and deliberately targeted women and girls from certain ethnic groups for rape and other forms of brutal sexual violence. Those same militias have targeted fleeing civilians, murdering innocent people escaping conflict, and prevented remaining civilians from accessing lifesaving supplies. Based on this information, I have now concluded that members of the RSF and allied militias have committed genocide in Sudan."
Since the war began, the RSF has demonstrated little ability to govern territories under its control, with fighters often looting, kidnapping for ransom and generating chaos. Many Sudanese, therefore, view the RSF as an existential threat to the state despite their acute concerns and traditional opposition towards the army.
The RSF typically recruited fighters from its core tribal base in western Sudan, and the army regularly treated civilians from these regions as RSF collaborators or sympathisers, say local monitors and rights groups. “Arab” and “non-Arab” are loose categories in rural Sudan as the former mainly refers to nomadic and pastoralist tribes while the latter refers to sedentary farmers. Both are black and Muslim and have intermarried for centuries.
The army has increasingly relied on a number of militias to spearhead its advances in recent months. Two of them, the Sudan Shield Forces and al-Baraa bin Malik Battalion, led the extrajudicial killings against unarmed men. Al-Baraa bin Malik - a militia tied to Sudan’s Islamic movement, which was the main part of former President Omar al-Bashir’s state apparatus for 30 years - has also committed some of the worst abuses so far.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) inflicted a significant setback on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 24 January 2025, breaking through the frontline in Khartoum Bahri to link up with besieged forces in Kober and northern Khartoum, where the SAF headquarters has been surrounded for nearly two years. SAF troops operating from northern Khartoum Bahri and Omdurman had been slowly gaining ground for several weeks, clearing a corridor along Ingaz Street, the main avenue that runs north-south through central Bahri. A final push yesterday closed the remaining 2-3 km gap, breaking through to Signal Corps and General Command.
This action ended the threat to the SAF headquarters and positioned SAF for a new push to recapture the capital. Khartoum and Bahri braced for more fighting as SAF reinforcements pour into southern Bahri and central Khartoum for the first time since 2023. The RSF remain in control of most of the capital Khartoum, but it would be harder for them to defend as the SAF could revive fighting on a frontline around General Command that had largely been quiet.
Sudan is the scene of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, and millions have fled the civil war. The former PM said 04 November 2024 that the displacement and famine are "much, much greater than Gaza and Ukraine combined." In November 2024 a new study from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine looked at multiple sources and suggests the death rate is much higher than previously thought - about 61,000 deaths due to disease, starvation and directly from the violence itself. Among that 61,000, there were about 26,000 who had been killed directly by violence.
In the end there can be only one. Violence erupted over the planned integration of Daglo's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the regular army. The integration was a key element of talks to finalise a deal that would return the country to civilian rule and end the political and economic crisis sparked by their 2021 coup in one of the world's poorest countries. Official sources stated that the early July 2024 clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had escalated on multiple fronts across Sudan, notably in Sinnar, West Kordofan, and North Darfur states.
The terms “Arab” and “non-Arab” are slippery labels in many regions in Sudan. Both communities are Black and Muslim and have inter-married for centuries. The labels mostly denote communal ways of life. “Arabs” are traditionally pastoralists and camel herders, while “non-Arabs” are sedentary farmers.
Commanded by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, the Rapid Support Forces was formed in 2013 as a paramilitary force composed mostly of former Janjaweed fighters. The Janjaweed were notorious for their involvement in the Darfur genocide, which began in 2003 and was considered one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Since its formation, the RSF had been accused of human rights abuses, including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In 2019, the RSF was involved in a violent crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Khartoum, which resulted in the deaths of more than 100 people. The RSF had also been involved in the ongoing conflict in the Darfur region, where it had been accused of committing war crimes and ethnic cleansing against non-Arab groups. After the Darfur Genocide, Hemedti faced a one-way ticket to The Hague.
The military in Sudan sought to disempower civilians after its October 2021 coup, a cause that united different factions within the security sector, including Hemedti. The Sudanese people who had been protesting for four years, demanding a democratic civilian government, had been right all along, and everyone forcing them to compromise with the army and the militia had been wrong. Democracy would bring stability to Sudan, yet civilians are disunited on everything.
The International Crisis Group noted "In courting the civilian elites, Hemedti exploited the fact that many of them – much as they distrust the RSF – view the army as their historical enemy, a redoubt of Bashir sympathisers including Islamists who had staffed the former president’s bureaucracy. In December 2022, a framework agreement promising to restore civilian rule accentuated their rivalry. While Burhan signed the deal only under heavy external pressure, Hemedti championed it, due to clauses he saw as giving him autonomy from Burhan and the army. The agreement recognised the RSF as a regular entity affiliated with the armed forces but placed it under the direct command of a civilian head of state, rather than the army chief, during a transition period. The deal also required the RSF to integrate into the army but left the timetable open to negotiation. This arrangement only deepened the distrust between Sudan’s two military overlords."
By April 2023, with civilians removed from the political process, the inevitable clash between Hemedti and al-Burhan erupted. Sudanese soldiers shouted Allahu Akbar, celebrating the capture of other Sudanese soldiers wearing a slightly different camouflage uniform, all boasting the Sudanese flag on their chests.
Violence broke out on 15 April 2023 between forces loyal to Sudanese Armed Forces chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy turned rival Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, who commands the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Previous allies worked together to overthrow the interim Sudanese government in 2021, now clashed for power with neither party gaining a visible advantage. Negotiations had been under way to get the country back on a path to democracy. Under international pressure, Burhan and Hemedti agreed in December 2022 to a framework agreement with political parties and pro-democracy groups. But the deal was vague on key points of dispute, including how the RSF would be integrated into the armed force and who would have final control. The framework agreement ratcheted up tensions when it elevated Hemedti's position into Burhan's equal, rather than his deputy. That shift in power was why conversations about security sector reform and integration of the RSF ended up in armed conflict rather than heated debate around the table.
Because the SAF and RSF were designed to be complementary rather than competing forces within one state, the conflict setting in Khartoum put both in a deadlock, observers say. At the same time, the rift between al-Burhan and Hemedti had weakened state power. The unclear situation on the ground deterred political actors from intervening, in another blow to the already faltering democratic process. The coup in 2021 made it very clear that powerful figures in the security services were not willing to allow democratisation without serious preservation of their powers and the spoils they are getting from the system. As long as neither RSF nor SAF had the upper hand, a chance for negotiations would not be in sight. Neither of these sides wants to end the fighting. They had agreed to every ceasefire, though they did not implement them. What might create a real opening for dialogue was if one side was about to win. If one side gains a tactical advantage – like if the RSF was driven out of Khartoum – that might create a real opportunity for them to talk.
The military can use long-range artillery and fighter jets to defend their positions. Up close they had tanks and heavy armor. The RSF was not positioned to hold territory and defend positions because it was configured like a guerilla force that strikes and retreats quickly. Many RSF recruits are also unfamiliar with the operational environment in the capital. These are people from the peripheral regions of the country with very little knowledge of the streets and neighbourhoods in Khartoum. The SAF had an advantage there because the SAF knows Khartoum. At the same time, the SAF was not mobile; it cannot defend positions reasonably well and it was not going to be able to chase the RSF around the city.
Still, neither force appeared to be adjusting its combat tactics to its surroundings. RSF used the same tactics from the Janjaweed: they are pillaging, marauding, and looting in neighborhoods. With no established supply lines in Khartoum and their headquarters destroyed, RSF fighters go into people’s homes to steal food, water, supplies, and occupy them].
The United States expected the fighting between two military chiefs in Sudan to continue as neither had an incentive to seek peace, US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said. “The fighting in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is, we assess, likely to be protracted as both sides believe that they can win militarily and had few incentives to come to the negotiating table,” Haines told a US Senate hearing on 04 May 2023. “Both sides are seeking external sources of support, which, if successful, was likely to intensify the conflict and create a greater potential for spillover challenges in the region,” she said.
Following the failure of the peace initiative and the offensive of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in December 2023, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, carried out additional recruitment into the SAF under the slogan of “popular resistance”. In the second half of January 2024, the SAF launched an offensive from Shendi (River Nile State) to the northern areas of the Khartoum metropolitan area. One of the main directions for the SAF was an operation in the central part of Omdurman with the goal of “breaking the blockade of the engineering corps.” After prolonged fighting, the SAF finally broke through the ten-month blockade of the Corps of Engineers at Omdurman on 20 February and achieved its first major military victory in a long time.
Among the significant factors that provide new capabilities to the SAF are the Iranian Mohajer-6 UAVs. Their regular supplies are carried out by flights from Iran to Port Sudan. And although the RSF forces have already reported the downing of 3 such UAVs, they continue to be widely and effectively used by the SAF.
Sudan’s war has entered a new phase following an army breakthrough in central Omdurman, the nation’s largest city, in mid-February 2024. The breakthrough relieves the 10-month siege of a military district known as Corps of Engineers, and it represents the army’s first major offensive success of the war. The breakthrough also severs the connection between RSF troops in Ombada and the eastern neighborhoods known as Old Omdurman. Attempts by the army to eradicate RSF resistance in this eastern part of the city could represent the next phase of the Battle of Omdurman, Sudan War Monitor reported. The Sudanese military has suffered major defeats at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a rogue paramilitary, which outmatched it in tactics and maneuver warfare early in the war.
The central government has retreated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan. What little budget it has left it spends on military equipment and operations. It has few international allies. Eritrea and Iran have emerged as its main military backers, while Egypt, in spite of its historical ties with the Sudanese army, has not intervened. Egypt is currently going through a deep economic crisis of its own. China is also a long-time supplier of military equipment to Sudan, though it isn’t play a political role in the war.
Sudan War Monitor reported 12 March 2024 that "The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are being steamrolled in Sudan’s largest city, Omdurman, losing a large amount territory, men, and equipment under a relentless combined-arms assault involving infantry, drones, and artillery. The latest fighting coincides with the first two days of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, ignoring appeals by the United Nations for a temporary ceasefire. After relieving the siege of Corps of Engineers in central Omdurman mid-February, the Sudanese army trapped hundreds or possibly thousands of RSF fighters in eastern neighborhoods of the city, an area known as Old Omdurman. In the following weeks, the army consolidated control over northern neighborhoods of this district—including Wad Nubawi, Abu Rof, and Beit al-Mal—confining the RSF troops in an increasingly small pocket of territory centered around the state television and radio complex in Al-Mawrada. The battle culminated in an attempt by the RSF to break out of this pocket, which failed spectacularly... "
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