The Federalist Navy 1787-1801
"Without a Respectable Navy--Alas America!" wrote Captain John Paul Jones of the Continental Navy early in the American Revolutionary War.
After the United States won its independence, Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, was too weak to maintain more than a token armed force. The United States had financed the war through huge foreign loans and by issuing paper money. Without taxing power, the Confederation could not pay off the debt. Although the government possessed one tremendous asset, western lands, it would take time to translate that asset into cash. For the present, the Confederation government could not afford to maintain a single warship.
During the first years of the new republic, Americans did not see the need for a navy. As early as 1784 Thomas Jefferson had written "We ought to begin a naval power, if we mean to carry on our commerce. Can we begin it on a more honorable occasion, or with a weaker foe?" Alexander Hamilton argued extensively for the creation of a navy in his Federalist 11, citing the need for the protection of commerce as well as the foreign policy advantages it would give by allowing us to shape the outcome of naval conflicts. President Washington also weighed in on the side of the navy. Yet despite the influence of these three men on Congress, the facts remained that America was strapped for cash.
The last ship of the Continental Navy, the frigate Alliance, was sold in 1785, and its commander, Captain John Barry, returned to civilian life. The navy disappeared and the army dwindled to a mere 700 men.
The infant Republic's military weakness further convinced American nationalists of the necessity of adopting a new constitution that would increase the authority of the national government, particularly by giving it the power of taxation. The issue of naval power, itself, produced little debate during the Constitutional Convention in 1787. The frame of government proposed by the convention gave Congress power to raise money to "provide and maintain a navy," which implies a permanent naval establishment, as constrasted with the power to "raise and support armies," which suggests that armies would exist as temporary expedients. Whereas the Constitution restricted army appropriations to two years, it left the term of naval appropriations unlimited. Navies were not thought to pose the same threat to political liberty as did standing armies. After all, as Thomas Jefferson had once observed, "a naval force can never endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would do both"; or, as James Madison would argue in favor of ratification of the Constitution, a navy could "never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties."
"If the new Constitution is adopted, as there is reason to expect," John Paul Jones wrote in December 1787, "America will soon be a very respectable Nation; and the creation of a Marine Force will necessarily be among the first objects of her policy."4 Despite his wishful reasoning and the initiation of the ratified Constitution in 1789, when Jones died in 1792, the only naval force the United States possessed was the Revenue Cutter Service, a forerunner of the United States Coast Guard.
For eight years America remained without a navy. In this time, however, two major developments occurred. The first was the scrapping of the Articles of Confederation in favor of the Constitution of the United States of America in 1789. The Constitution, as any student of United States knows, provided for a much more robust central government, subsuming many of the powers previously retained by the states. Among these was the power to tax, and now the federal government had the means of providing for military forces.
The second development, less specific but more pertinent to the need for a navy, was the recovery of American maritime commerce. By the 1790's in was not uncommon for the flag of the United States to be seen waving in sea-ports as far away as China and Japan. Yet without a navy to back it up, this flag afforded its bearers absolutely no protection. In 1785, the same year as the last ship of the former navy was sold, the Dey of Algiers sent his corsairs into the Atlantic to prey upon the merchantmen of this new navyless nation. It was not long before two vessels were captured and their crews sold into disgraceful slavery.
It wasn't long before the need for a new Navy was realized. America's small merchant fleet was being molested on the high seas. Pirate attacks upon American commerce in the Mediterranean and Caribbean further accentuated the need for a navy.
In 1794, a Navy-conscious Congress authorized the construction of six frigates. They were to be of a new design -- longer and more heavily armed than traditional frigates. They possessed a combination of firepower and speed. One of these was the USS Constitution, completed in 1798. Rated a 44-gun, it was capable of sailing at 13.5 knots. The Constitution, nicknamed "Old Ironsides", is still in commission and can be seen at the Boston Navy Yard.
In the latter 1790s, France and Britain began a protracted war that threatened to involve the United States. In 1798, Congress established the Navy Department and the Marine Corps. Like the Navy that it served, the antebellum shore establishment appears relatively simple by today's standards. Yet the Navy Department could build, repair, and resupply its fleet with its collection of yards and stations. The limited naval technology of the nineteenth century did not require greater sophistication.
The clear necessity of defending the nation's seaborne commerce finally moved Congress to create a naval force in the spring of 1794. With the beginning of the wars of the French Revolution in 1793, British warships began interfering with American trade with France, and French warships with American trade with Great Britain. Another source of genuine danger to American commerce came from corsairs of North Africa's Barbary Coast. Raiders sailing from the ports of Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis had long forced European powers either to maintain naval squadrons on station in the Mediterranean or to pay annual tribute to assure non-interference with merchant shipping. Previous to the American Revolution, American merchantmen in that region enjoyed the protection of the British government, but that protection evaporated with independence. In 1785 Algerine corsairs made their first seizures of American vessels, two merchantmen, taking twenty-two passengers and crew members prisoner. Congress declined to pay ransom, and by 1793 six of the prisoners had died in captivity. In 1793 Portugal, whose navy had been keeping the Algerine corsairs within the confines of the Mediterranean, signed a truce with Algiers. Soon after, Algerines sailed into the Atlantic to prey on American merchantmen. Before the end of the year they held over 100 Americans prisoner.
Congressional debate on the wisdom of reviving the navy began in earnest at the end of 1793. In his annual address to Congress on 3 December, President Washington spoke in general terms of the nation's need to prepare to defend itself: "If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace..., it must be known, that we are at all times ready for War." A few days later, news reached Philadelphia of the truce between Portugal and Algiers, opening the way for Barbary corsairs to cruise the Atlantic and imperil trade with much of Europe. On 16 December the President forwarded to Congress documents on the unsatisfactory negotiations with the Barbary Powers. In response to these events, the House of Representatives resolved on 2 January 1794 "that a naval force adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States, against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided," and appointed a committee to prepare a report on what kind of naval force would be necessary to deal with the menace. On 20 January 1794, committee chairman Thomas Fitzsimons, a Federalist from Pennsylvania, reported a resolution to authorize the procurement of six frigates, a force thought sufficient for the purpose.
Despite the real threat to American commerce, congressional approval of naval legislation was far from certain. By the 1790s some theorists of republican government were arguing that navies posed greater dangers to liberty that did armies. They maintained that the major expence of constructing, fitting out, and manning warships meant large expenditures and mounting taxes, and they considered this transfer of wealth from the people via politicians into the hands of a few to be a source of political corruption. Influenced by these beliefs, several congressmen spoke in opposition to the proposal to procure six frigates. Some surmised the Algerines were acting on behalf of the British and that going to war with the former would risk an Anglo-American war. They thought that paying tribute would be wiser and cheaper than building a navy. One congressman even suggested the alternative of hiring the Portuguese navy to protect American commerce. Opponents of the naval measure also questioned whether the six frigates proposed would be adequate to the object intended, and whether negotiation would not be a less costly and more effective means of attaining the desired end.
The pro-navy side was strengthened when the President sent documentation supporting his view that a navy was essential, and by the almost simultaneous arrival of distressing news that the British had prohibited all neutral trade with the French West Indies. The "Act to provide a naval armament," authorizing the President to acquire six frigates, four of forty-four guns each and two of thirty-six, by purchase or otherwise, passed the House of Representatives by a vote of fifty to thirty-nine. Those Congressmen who voted in favor came principally from cities that depended on maritime trade, and from the northern and eastern regions. Opponents came from rural areas, the south, and the frontier. The act passed the Senate and was signed by the President on 27 March 1794.
Secretary of War Henry Knox, responsible for the construction of these ships, reported to Congress in December 1794 that the passing of the act:
created an anxious solicitude that this second commencement of a navy for the United States should be worthy of their national character. That the vessels should combine such qualities of strength, durability, swiftness of sailing, and force, as to render them equal, if not superior, to any frigates belonging to any of the European Powers.
His succinct phrase, "this second commencement of a navy for the United States," summarized the resounding significance of this act. The "anxious solicitude" felt by the nation's leaders led to the design and building of superb ships of war.
Construction of the First Six Frigates
Without a Department of the Navy, implementation of the 1794 naval legislation fell to the Department of War, headed by Secretary of War Henry Knox until 1795, Timothy Pickering from 1795 to 1796, and James McHenry from 1796 to 1798. After consulting several persons knowledgeable about warship construction, including John Foster Williams, a captain in the Massachusetts Navy during the Revolution; John Barry, Continental Navy captain; Joshua Humphreys, a Philadelphia shipbuilder; and James Hackett, shipbuilder for the Continental Navy at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Knox made recommendations to Washington on 15 April 1794, which the President accepted immediately.
Rather than purchasing merchant ships and converting them into men-of-war, an option under the act, Knox recommended the construction of new frigates designed to be superior to any vessel of that class in European navies. To keep labor costs down, government employees rather than by private contractors would build the ships, and construction sites would be distributed geographically in order to spread the economic benefit and win popular support. "It is just and wise to proportion . . . benefits as nearly as may be to those places or states which pay the greatest amount to its support," Knox advised. Although it might be cheaper to build the frigates successively in a single place, "a few thousand dollars in expences will be no object compared with the satisfaction a just distribution would afford."
No express provision was made by Congress for establishing navy yards for building the first six frigates directed by law. But as vessels so large cannot be built without first erecting wharves, or extending wharves before erected, both these things were done, and in every instance on private property; so that the public have now little or no advantage from the expenditure of sums to a considerable amount. The evil, however, did not stop here. The yards connected with the wharves were, in almost every instance, too confined to admit of the convenience of piling away the timber in a manner to prevent the necessity of frequent removals of one piece to get at another, which happened to be first wanted. The expense of this unnecessary kind of labor, arising solely from the want of sufficient room in the yard, amounted to several thousand dollars in building the frigate United States at Philadelphia.
The President approved six construction sites: Portsmouth, N.H.; Boston, Mass.; New York, N.Y.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Baltimore, Md.; and Gosport (Norfolk), Va. At each site, a civilian naval constructor was hired to direct the work. Navy captains were appointed as superintendents, one for each of the six frigates. John Barry, last officer of the Continental Navy in active service, received commission number one as first officer in the new United States Navy.
Because of the difficulty of gathering supplies and the decision to build major structural components out of live oak, which had to be harvested in southern forests, construction proceeded slowly. In March 1795 Secretary of War Timothy Pickering prepared a list of ten suggested names for the ships. It is likely that President Washington was responsible for selecting five of them: Constitution, United States, President, Constellation, and Congress. Chesapeake's name was designated some time later.
Site Frigate Guns Superintendent Naval Constructor Portsmouth Congress 36 James Sever James Hackett Boston Constitution 44 Samuel Nicholson George Claghorn New York President 44 Silas Talbot Forman Cheeseman Philadelphia United States 44 John Barry Joshua Humphreys Baltimore Constellation 36 Thomas Truxtun David Stodder Gosport Chesapeake 36 Richard Dale Josiah Fox
Joshua Humphreys was the premier ship-builder and the most innovative and revolutionary designer of the age of sail. Humphreys designed several warships for the young republic, all of them larger, faster, and more heavily armed than similar vessels in England or France. Collectively known today as the "super frigates," this group included such storied vessels as Constitution, United States, and President. Even Admiral Horatio Nelson, the preeminent naval leader of his day, is quoted by Lehman as foreseeing "trouble for Britain in those big frigates across the sea".
The warships were still being framed when, in early 1796, word came of a negotiated peace with Algiers, at the cost of nearly one million dollars, which included payment of ransom for the American prisoners and the cost of building the 32-gun frigate Crescent for the Bey's fleet. The act authorizing the six frigates had called for a halt in construction in the event of peace with Algiers, but President Washington urged Congress to extend authorization to complete the six frigates.
Congress approved the completion of only three of the frigates. The other three would remain in their partially constructed state. Accordingly, on 20 April 1796 the President signed the "Act supplementary to an act, entitled 'An act to provide a naval armament.'" Under the terms of the 1796 act the frigate United States was launched at Philadelphia on 10 May 1797; the Constellation, at Baltimore on 7 September 1797; and the Constitution, at Boston on 21 October 1797.
In his last annual address to Congress in December 1796, President Washington urged "the gradual creation of a navy" for the protection of the country's commerce. Nevertheless, during the ensuing year Congress remained divided over whether to allow the three new frigates to fit out and man in preparation for duty at sea. In July 1797, however, the French government's disdain for American rights to trade with France's enemies prompted Congress to authorize the President to man and employ the three frigates.
France had been America's major ally in the War of Independence, and without its assistance the United States may not have won independence. But the new government of Revolutionary France viewed a 1794 commercial agreement between the United States and Great Britain, known as Jay's Treaty, as a violation of France's 1778 treaties with the United States. The French increased their seizures of American ships trading with their British enemies and refused to receive a new United States minister when he arrived in Paris in December 1796. In his annual message to Congress at the close of 1797, President John Adams reported on France's refusal to negotiate and spoke of the need "to place our country in a suitable posture of defense.".
In April of 1798 President Adams informed Congress of the infamous "X Y Z Affair," in which French agents demanded a large bribe for the restoration of relations with the United States. Outraged by this affront to national honor, on 27 April 1798 Congress authorized the President to acquire, arm, and man no more than twelve vessels, of up to twenty-two guns each. Under the terms of this act several vessels were purchased and converted into ships of war. One of these, the Ganges, a Philadelphia-built merchant ship, became "the first man-of- war to fit out and get to sea [24 May 1798] under the second organization of the Navy."
Creation of the Department of the Navy
In March 1798, overworked Secretary of War James McHenry brought before Congress the problem of his responsibility for naval affairs. Naval administration had become a significant portion of his department's work, as it had for the Department of the Treasury, which oversaw all the Navy's contracting and disbursing. The Department of War also had received congressional criticism for what was seen as the mismanagement and the exces- sive cost of the naval construction program. In addition, the growing trouble with the French induced Congress to authorize an increase in the size of the navy and raised the possibility that the navy would be called on to confront French privateers.
In response to the obvious need for an executive department responsible solely for, and staffed with persons competent in, naval affairs, Congress passed a bill establishing the Department of the Navy. President John Adams signed the historic act on 30 April 1798. Benjamin Stoddert, a Maryland merchant who had served as secretary to the Continental Board of War during the American Revolution, became the first secretary of the navy. One historian writes that Stoddert "was a classic Navalist" who "desired an American navy which could, not only protect commerce, but which would increase American prestige."
Benjamin Stoddert's mercantile experience and staunch Federalism had led to his appointment as the first Secretary of the Navy. This was a most fortunate appointment at the critical time when the United States Navy was very weak, and the nation was on the verge of a war with France over depredations committed against American merchant shipping by armed French privateers. Through great effort, he acquired 50 ships in the next two years, forming a fleet under celebrated officers that gave protection to expanding American commerce, so vital to the growth and well being of the nation.
Quasi-War with France
On 28 May 1798 Congress authorized the public vessels of the United States to capture armed French vessels hovering off the coast of the United States, initiating an undeclared Quasi-War with France. That conflict led to the rapid passage of several pieces of naval legislation. An act of 30 June gave the President authority to accept ships on loan from private citizens, who would be paid in interest-bearing government bonds. On 9 July Congress authorized U.S. naval vessels to capture armed French vessels anywhere on the high seas, not just off the coast of the United States. This act also sanctioned the issuance of priva- teering commissions. Two days later, the president signed the act that established the United States Marine Corps. On 16 July Congress appropriated funds to build and equip the three remain- ing frigates begun under the Act of 1794: Congress, launched at Portsmouth, N.H., on 15 August 1799; Chesapeake, at Gosport, Va., on 2 December 1799; and President, at New York, N.Y., on 10 April 1800.
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert realized that the navy possessed too few warships to protect a far-flung merchant marine by using convoys or by patrolling the North American coast. Rather, he concluded that the best way to defeat the French campaign against American shipping was by offensive operations in the Carribean, where most of the French cruisers were based. Thus at the very outset of the conflict, the Department of the Navy adopted a policy of going to the source of the enemy's strength. Nevertheless, by 1799, in response to teh merchant's insistent demands for protection, naval vessels were convoying merchant ships in the Caribbean in addition to cruising against the enemy.
When Stoddert became secretary in June 1798, only one American naval vessel was deployed. By the end of the year a force of twenty ships was planned for the Caribbean. Before the war ended, the force available to the navy approached thirty vessels, with some 700 officers and 5,000 seamen.
During the Naval War with France, Stoddert received Congressional authorization for a new Navy of 13 frigates and 12 74-gun warships. Acting on the advice of Joshua Humphreys and using the need for space to build the larger 74-gun ships, he acquired property for the development of navy yards in Portsmouth and Kittery, Maine; Washington, Boston, Gosport, Va., New York, and Philadelphia. He also drafted the important bill for the government of the United States Marine Corps and commenced the construction of the United States Navy Hospital at Newport, R.I.
The highlight of the first year of the undeclared war was the capture by Thomas Truxtun's Constellation of the French frigate l'Insurgente in February 1799. In addition, American naval vessels seized nineteen French privateers during the winter of 1798-99. The French challenge to American naval forces increased late in 1799 as six French warships arrived in the Antilles with instructions to intensify the commercial war. The American squadrons responded aggressively. Constellation fought to a draw the more powerful la Vengeance on 1 February 1800. Silas Talbot engineered an expedition in the Puerto Plata harbor in St. Domingo, a possession of France's ally Spain, on 11 May 1800 in which a naval force under Lieutenant Isaac Hull cut out the French privateer Sandwich from the harbor and spiked the guns in the Spanish fort. By the end of the war American ships had made prizes of approximately eighty-five French vessels. American successes resulted from a combination of Stoddert's administrative skill in deploying effectively his limited forces and the initiative of his seagoing officers.
Congress, one of six frigates authorized by congressional enactment of 27 March 1794, was built by naval constructor, J. Hackett, at Portsmouth, N.H. Her construction, interrupted upon conclusion of peace terms with Algiers, was resumed with the imminence of naval war with France, and she was launched 15 August 1799 under the command of Captain J. Sever. After outfitting at Portsmouth and Boston, Congress proceeded to Newport, R.I., in December 1799 then to sea to protect commerce from French despoilment.
Although they were fighting the same enemy, the Royal Navy and the United States Navy did not cooperate operationally, nor did they share operational plans or come to mutual understandings about deployment of their forces. The British did sell the American government naval stores and munitions. And the two navies shared a system of signals by which to recognize each other's warships at sea and allowed merchantmen of their respective nations to join their convoys.
By October 1800, aggressiveness of the cruisers of the United States Navy, as well as those of the Royal Navy, combined with a more conciliatory diplomatic stance by the French toward America, produced a reduction in the activity of the French privateers and warships. In mid-December 1800 news reached Washington that a peace treaty with France (Convention of Mortefontaine, 30 September 1800) ended the Quasi-War.
The war highlighted several weaknesses in the fledgling navy, both in the shore establishment and in the operational forces. Problems arose in procurement, provisioning, manning of ships, delegation of authority, and planning for an extensive campaign. Squadron commanders learned that they required smaller ships to pursue enemy privateerws in shallow waters. Many of the merchantmen converted into men-of-war proved to be poor sailers. During the first year of the war, Stoddert did not fully coordi- nate the rotation of vessels refitting in port with those on stations requiring relief. By restricting the enlistments in the navy to one year, Congress effectively limited the time that ships could remain deployed. The leadership qualities among Stoddert's senior officers varied widely and politics and personal jealousies often stymied his attempts to assign them the the navy's best advantage. One of the navy's senior officers, Captain Isaac Phillips, was dismissed for permitting a British officer to board his ship, USS Baltimore, and press several seamen.
Despite these problems, the newly reestablished United States Navy acquitted itself well during the Quasi-War and succeeded in achieving its limited goal of stopping the depredations of the French corsairs against American commerce. In the war, the navy proved itself an effective instrument of national policy.
During the first dozen years under the Constitution, the new nation grappled with the difficulties of developing a naval force. In giving the navy its "second commencement," the nation's executive and legislative leaders dealt with problems relating to finance, warship technology and design, an infra-structure of shipyards and shipwrights, sources of raw materials and naval stores, necessary force size, officering, and manning. They struggled with these challenges within the contexts of a complex international situation and of concerns about constitutional authority, high taxes, cost overruns, and political corruption. Ultimately, the United States Navy was reestablished with the purposes of defending the country's commerce and asserting its rights on the high seas as a sovereign nation.
Secretary of the Navy Stoddert was concerned not only with daily administrative and operational activities but also with increasing the navy's strength for the future. Using some of the money Congress appropriated for shipbuilding, Stoddert established six navy yards. In a December 1798 proposal to Congress, Stoddert reported to Congress on naval objectives to insure "protection of our coasts . . . safety of our important commerce, and our future peace ...." He recommended a Navy of at least "12 ships of 74 guns, as many frigates, and 20 or 30 smaller vessels ...."
Congress responded with the act of 25 February 1799 which authorized six 74-gun ships and six sloops-of-war. The money appropriated could not finance both classes of warships and only the sloops were built. Though the 74s were never completed, construction materials were gathered at six seaports and much design work was done by Joshua Humphreys. His son, Samuel, redrew the design which called for a length between perpendiculars of 183 feet, beam of 48 feet, 6 inches; and depth in hold of 19 feet 6 inches. It was planned to make all guns 32-pounders.
William Doughty, destined to become a leading 74 designer, assisted in making copies of the revised plan which represented the most advanced American ideas on what a ship-of-the-line ought to be at the turn of the 19th century. They would have ranked with the most powerful ships of their class in the world. If these 74s had been in commission or fitting out, their mere existence might have caused second thoughts in England, preventing some of the major incidents at sea that contributed to the causes of the War of 1812. Their planning helped Benjamin Stoddert to lay the foundation of a strong Navy. Acting on the advice of Joshua Humphreys, he acquired property for their building that led to the development of navy yards and docks along the Atlantic seaboard.
As the war with France wound down in 1800 the prospects for a stronger naval force dimmed. President John Adams shared Stoddert's commitment to a strong navy. Whereas Adams supported a cruiser navy, his secretary wanted to build ships of the line, keep thirteen frigates, and sell off the smaller vessels. Stoddert reasoned that in the event of another war the government could purchase smaller vessels more readily than larger ones. The navy needed to have the larger vessels built before any conflict erupted because of their lengthy construction process. Congress, in a cost-cutting mood, adopted the Peace Establishment Act, which kept the frigates but eliminated construction of the ships of the line and drastically reduced the officer corps. Adams could have left this naval legislation to the new Jeffersonian Republican administration, which won the fall 1800 elections, but reasoned that the Jeffersonians might make even deeper cuts. In one of his last duties as president, he signed the act on 3 March 1801.
Thomas Jefferson, in his "Notes on Virginia," in 1785 had expressed his views on our maritime policy in the following terms:-- "You ask me what I think of the expediency of encouraging our States to become commercial. Were I to indulge my own theory, I wish them to practise neither commerce or navigation, but to stand with respect to Europe precisely on the footing of China."
President Thomas Jefferson commenced his administration intent on reducing the navy's budget. Jefferson came into power as the advocate of retrenchment and reform. Under his administration the military academy was thrown into the shade, the coast-defences were forgotten, most of the new frigates and sloops built by patriotic citizens were sold, the navy reduced to ten frigates, half of which were suffered to decay, the frames of the ships of the line were used for repairs, and the appropriations for the increase of the navy were reduced to the pitiful sum of a quarter of a million, which was applied principally to gunboats.
Renewed problems with the Barbary States in 1801, however, forced Jefferson to send a small squadron to the Mediterranean as a show of force. Before the American squadron could leave its native shores, Tripoli declared war on the United States, compelling the President to wage a prolonged overseas war that did not conclude until 1805. In effect, therefore, this conflict resulted in the Republicans confirming their political opponents' fateful decision in the 1790s to reestablish a United States Navy.
The navy was suffered to decay. In 1807 but one frigate and five sloops-of-war were in commission. The Federal party, however, although in a weak minority, did not tamely submit to the unhappy policy of Southern statesmen; and individuals even of the dominant party opposed it.
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