Army Watercraft
Army Watercraft provide the foundation for theater opening and reception of Army and joint forces committed in advancing the national military strategy and are an integral part of Force XXI for projecting and sustaining combat power. Waterborne logistics delivers 90 percent of all unit equipment and supplies of US forces. Army watercraft - lighterage and floating utility craft (landing craft, amphibians, modular causeways and harbor craft) - provide the critical link between offshore arrival of combat power loaded aboard strategic sealift ships and placing that power ashore in a ready-to- fight configuration. Terminal operations and water transport, which includes strategic sealift and the logistic support provided by Army watercraft, are essential to projecting and sustaining forces engaged in a range of military operations worldwide. While strategic sealift delivers over 95 percent of the tonnage required by operating military forces, Army watercraft become the critical link when that tonnage is projected over the shore, through fixed ports not accessible to deep-draft vessels, or through fixed ports not adequate without the use of watercraft (all classified as LOTS operations). Army watercraft units execute all functions required for successful theater opening, reception, and sustainment of the deployed force.
A proper mix of Army watercraft must be pre-positioned for availability during the early phases of force closure. Army watercraft can be prepositioned on FLOFLO ships, SEABEEs, and/or on the decks of other large vessels. During a contingency, Army troops will need to be resupplied with ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food, etc., to sustain their operations. The Army has acquired watercraft to resupply its combat troops and to carry out terminal services at US and foreign seaports.
As of September 30, 1978, the Army had about 840 watercraft valued at about $340 million. Of the 840 watercraft, 518 are maintained in the Active and Reserve Army Forces. Army records do not identify operating and maintenance costs specifically associated with watercraft. Some watercraft are kept in storage. Because a large number of watercraft were acquired in the 1940s and 1950s and were approaching obsolescence in the 1970s, the Army experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining them. The Army estimated in 1979 that it would cost about $2 billion to replace its watercraft.
To bridge the gap until the introduction of new replacement watercraft, the Army initiated a program to extend the vessels' lives by 10 to 12 years. The program, expected to be completed by 1981, was estimated to cost about $80 million. In fiscal years 1977 and 1978, Fort Eustis' operation and maintenance costs for 108 watercraft averaged $3.9 million, or $37,000 per craft.
DOD's 1988 Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study noted that intratheater mobility requirement statements are extremely dependent on the theater concept of operations. The study recommended that all intratheater mobility requirements be expressed as ranges when possible and that those requirements not expressed as ranges be understood as approximations. The 1996 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility noted that the deployment phase most subject to disruption by the adversary is the intratheater movement of troops and equipment to their final destinations.
The Department of Defense's 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis [ILA] did not identify a requirement for Army watercraft and deferred a recommendation on these assets pending a planned study by the Logistics Management Institute. That study, issued in November 1996 (4 months after the ILA), found uncertainty among planners at the theater commands about the capability and availability of watercraft for intratheater operations. The Logistics Management Institute study evaluated the role of watercraft for logistics-over-the-shore and intracoastal main supply route operations in the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios. The study did not establish an intracoastal transportation requirement, however, because of a lack of data from theater commanders regarding the types and amounts of cargo and equipment that could be transported on watercraft. The study recommended that the Joint Staff provide theater command planners the analytical tools to match intratheater lift requirements with intracoastal transportation capability.
The Army has developed a long-range fleet management plan that includes an acquisition strategy to procure more watercraft, but the role and capability of watercraft to help meet intratheater requirements have not been addressed at the joint level. At the end of fiscal year 1997, the Army had 245 watercraft in its fleet. Some of these watercraft, such as the Logistics Support Vessel and the Landing Craft, Utility-2000 (LCU-2000), provide intratheater movement of equipment, cargo, and combat vehicles and transport cargo from ship to shore. The Logistics Support Vessel can self-deploy anywhere in the world to provide intratheater transport of large quantities of cargo, tracked and wheeled vehicles, and equipment. These vessels provided intratheater transport during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The LCU-2000 can perform tactical resupply missions to remote or underdeveloped coastlines and inland waterways. During Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, this vessel transported about 38,548 tons of equipment and supplies to fishing villages that had small piers or ramps.
Army watercraft employment is phased to meet the theater commanders' requirements to offload combat and support forces during major regional contingencies. During the first 3 weeks of a conflict, Army watercraft operations would focus on port operations and offloading combat and support equipment from prepositioned ships and large strategic sealift ships. After the first 3 weeks, watercraft would continue port operations and begin to transition to sustainment operations, which include establishing intracoastal main supply routes and transporting equipment and cargo to forward areas in the theater. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for example, watercraft delivered main battle tanks, ammunition, and other cargo to several locations on the Persian Gulf coast. Thus, although the port operations are the key mission for Army watercraft during the first part of a contingency, watercraft can contribute significantly to intratheater lift missions during later phases.
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