UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!


AGM-158 JASSM Program Developments

The origins of the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) may be traced to the late 1970s when the Air Force turned to a cruise missile instead of participating in the JTACMS missile. The cruise missile program became the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM), which was subsequently canceled because of technical difficulties and cost increases on the order of threefold. JASSM was a FY-96 new start follow-on weapon system to the canceled TSSAM. Price was expected to be under $500,000 in quantity, whereas the TASSM was targeted at $750,000 and was estimated to have increased to over $2 million per unit. Initially, the program entertained proposals from seven contractors. The build-up to the Request for Proposal release was a period of intense interaction between all contractors and the government team.

From its outset in September 1995, JASSM has used virtually every acquisition reform initiative. Initially the program entertained proposals from seven contractors. Cost as an independent variable (CAIV) was used to achieve a balance between capability and affordability. The missile’s average unit procurement price was designated a technical requirement equal to JASSM’s operational requirements. The key to effective CAIV implementation is to provide the contractor with opportunities to offer tradeoffs and alternate approaches to achieve the affordability requirement while meeting operational requirements. To provide this “trade space” most military standards and “how-to” design and manufacture directives were eliminated, and the JASSM Operational Requirements Document specified only three non-negotiable key performance parameters: missile range, Missile Mission Effectiveness, and the ability to operate from an aircraft carrier. Seven other performance objectives were considered desirable, but these could be traded off against each other and against other factors to reduce costs. A fundamental JASSM program requirement that could not be traded was the price ceiling of $700,000 (FY 1995 dollars).

On June 17, 1996 Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Arthur Money announced that Lockheed-Martin Integrated Systems, Orlando, Fla.; and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, St. Louis, Mo., had been selected to compete in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the JASSM program. Lockheed-Martin Integrated Systems and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace were awarded cost plus fixed fee contracts totaling $237.4 million, and will compete in head to head competition over the next 24 months. At the end of this phase, the Department of Defense would select a single winning contractor to complete development and production of at least 2,400 JASSMs at a total program cost of approximately $3 billion.

The two contractors competed against each other for nearly 2 years as they refined their designs. They built hardware and conducted tradeoffs. Each contractor was assigned a dedicated help team of five to seven specialists from the JASSM Program Office. Each team’s goal was to win the competition. Carrying the principle of applying commercial practices a step further than usual, the contractors had full responsibility and accountability for their efforts. They had the flexibility to define their programs without the usual constraints of government imposed “how-to” requirements, and they had total accountability for the final design, including configuration control and control of the system performance specification.

As part of this accountability, the contractors proposed 15-year “bumper-to-bumper” lifetime warranties covering not only failures but also problems where the system failed to meet the performance specification. These warranties motivated the contractors to build a highly reliable system. The decision to use commercial parts and practices and contractor logistics support forced all parties—the program office, users, and contractors—to rethink how replaceable parts are chosen, specified, and procured and how to use trade space effectively. A related decision was to promote long-term collaborative relationships with subcontractors and suppliers.

This unorthodox acquisition approach produced two highly competitive designs at prices significantly below the price ceiling. Source selection was totally open to the contractors and they helped define the source selection plan. The program office determined price reasonableness using market research and price analysis similar to commercial methods.

The Air Force and Navy developed an aggressive acquisition approach that reflected the intent to develop, produce, and initially deploy JASSMs within five years, by 2001. To minimize overall program risk, JASSM leveraged off existing technologies, readily available components, and previous weapon system developments to the maximum extent possible. JASSM's acquisition approach was based on precepts of Acquisition Reform and the concept of Cost as an Independent Variable. Instead of mandating requirements supported by countless military specifications, the JASSM program has only three key performance parameters: range, missile mission effectiveness and carrier operability. All other requirements were tradable to obtain a missile below the threshold average unit price of $700,000 per missile. The JASSM requirements and cost goals evolved over the previous year in an unprecedented partnership with industry, the joint warfighters, and the Department of Defense Acquisition Community.

The Navy proposed to replace the joint program for JASSM with the Navy's SLAM-ER, prior to completion of the program definition and risk reduction phase for JASSM. The proposal was one of the program alternatives that was considered at the Milestone II review for entry of the JASSM program into engineering and manufacturing development in July 1998, evaluated the technical progress in the program and risk reduction phase, cost and operational effectiveness analysis, and other factors.

A downselect to one contractor for the engineering and manufacturing development and full-rate production phases occurred in April 1998 with the selection of Lockheed-Martin. EMD Objectives were to demonstrate through test and/or analysis that all requirements as stated in the contractor generated System Performance Specification, derived from Operational Requirements, are met, including military utility (operational effectiveness and suitability); demonstrate ability to deliver an affordable and producible system at or under the AUPP requirement; demonstrate all production processes; and produce production representative systems for operational test and evaluation, including combined development/operational test and evaluation.

JASSM was an OSD flagship program under Cost as An Independent Variable (CAIV). This allows the contractor to have maximum trade space to develop an affordable missile that met four Key Performance Parameters. Under CAIV, the program maintains a threshold Average Unit Procurement Price (AUPP) of $700,000 (BY95$) and an objective AUPP of $400,000 (BY95$). The Government is buying the JASSM system based on a contractor developed, government-approved System Performance Specification (SPS) which became contractually binding at downselect. The contractor assumes Total System Performance Reliability (TSPR) as defined in the SPS and warrants system performance for 15 years. Accordingly, the contractor is responsible not only for the design of the missile system, but also for planning and executing the Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) program to verify the missile system performance. In its role as facilitator and advisor to the contractor, the Government formally arranges and funds the use of Government flight test support for DT&E. Although funded by the Government, flight test support funds are part of the negotiated commitment between the contractor and the Government ensuring the contractor is able to execute the DT&E program according to the scope of the EMD contract.

The decision to allow contractors to seek the best practice solutions in the design and manufacture of JASSM was an important decision in the success of the effort. Requiring military specifications would have severely constrained the adoption of commercial practices. For example, Lockheed Martin wanted to make the fuselage, wings, and vertical stabilizer primarily out of nonmetallic composite materials; however, standard aerospace composite materials and processes cost from $600 to $1,000 per pound as finished items. Such costs would put JASSM beyond its price ceiling.

Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors used market research to look for commercial solutions and found a process, Vacuum Assisted Resin Transfer Molding (VARTM), used in making fiberglass hulls for pleasure boats. This process produced finished fiber composite parts that cost about $5 per pound. Engineers developed a variation that was more expensive than the VARTM process for boat hulls, but only a fraction of the cost of the traditional aerospace approach. The modified VARTM process was used for the JASSM fuselage. To lay down the fiber matrix for the missile body, engineers adopted and modified another commercial technology based on commercial machines used to braid socks, shoe laces, and freeway pillar reinforcement rings.

To achieve its performance requirements for autonomous terminal target acquisition and guidance, JASSM needed to use advanced sensors with target recognition capability. No appropriate commercial technologies existed to meet these needs. Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors developed a derivative of the imaging infrared seeker on the Hellfire and Javelin antitank missiles, appropriate for JASSM needs.

The contractor used a combination of approaches to save development costs on the JASSM engine. Market research again helped designers to select an existing engine that for 2 decades powered the Harpoon antiship missile. Then the prime contractor helped the engine supplier lower the cost of the engine by a third by replacing outdated military specification parts and technology with modern but much less expensive commercial parts and technology. The contractor also was able to choose a modern commercial digital controller to replace the old analog engine controller. This technology adaptation came from an off-the-shelf automobile industry anti-skid processor. By being able to choose from available technology, the contractor also saved development costs on other subsystems using similar creative solutions.

The program team and contractors made additional strategic standardization decisions by seeking out common and available solutions already being used in other weapon system applications. For example, two military standards were adopted to ensure JASSM interoperability with various aircraft. MIL-STD-1760, Aircraft/Store Electrical Interconnection System, ensured interoperability of the stores and software interface with host aircraft and MIL-STD-1553, Interface Standard for Digital Time Division Command/Responses, specified the high-speed bus interface.

In December 1998 the development of JASSM was slowed, following concerns that the program's development schedule was "too aggressive." The engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase was extended from 34 to 40 months. Another reason given for the extended schedule was that the Theater Battle Management Core System, on which the JASSM was expected to rely, was not yet year 2000-compliant. The JASSMs, costing approximately $300,000 per unit, were tested beginning in February 1999 at Eglin Air Force Base and White Sands Missile Range.

In 1998, the Joint Chiefs of Staff selected the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) as the Global Positioning System (GPS) security architecture, with the mandate that as of 01 October 2006, all newly fielded military GPS systems will use SAASM-compliant Precise Positioning System (PPS) devices.

On April 01, 1999 Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems, Inc., Orlando, Fla., was awarded a $12,600,000 face value increase to a cost-plus-award-fee contract to provide for engineering and manufacturing development to incorporate the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module to the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). This module will enhance the security of the missile's guidance system. The work will be performed at Lockheed Martin's plant in Orlando, Fla. (41%), and Raytheon Company's plant in Fullerton, Calif. (59%). The work is expected to be completed by April 2002. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, Fla., is the contracting activity (F08626-96/C-0002, P00047).

Following the FTV-1 failure/analysis and concerns with some subcontractor hardware deliveries, the EMD program went through a modification. An additional 10 months was added to EMD, which began in November 1998, and by 2000 was scheduled to run for 50 months, resulting in a one-year slip of IOT&E; Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) award was also moved 10 months from 3Q/01 to 1Q/02.

Low-rate initial production decision for JASSM was in the year 2000, with full-scale production scheduled to run from 2002 to 2009. Total missile production for the US Air Force was expected to be 2400 missiles. The total for the US Navy had not been determined at that time. The total program was valued at the time at approximately $3 billion.

The Air Force implemented a streamlined acquisition strategy that incorporates reforms intended to reduce time spent designing a weapon system by eliminating unneeded military standards and specifications, relying on mature technologies, and limiting changes in performance requirements. As a result, the Engineering Manufacturing Development 55-month timeframe for the JASSM program represented a substantial reduction from the historical average of 128 months for other programs. The JASSM's first missile was delivered from Lockheed Martin's production facility in Troy, Ala. in early April 2000.

Undersecretary of Defense Pete Aldridge gave the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program the go-ahead for Low Rate Initial Production on 21 December 2001. This decision would give the Air Force combat capability on the F-16 and B-52 by 2003. This low-cost, high performance program came in below the objective unit cost of $400K in FY95 dollars. As a result, the Air Force increased its buy from 2400 to 3700 missiles over 13 years. The Air Force planned to make the decision for full-rate production in late 2003. The Navy planned to purchase 450 JASSMs at that time.

In July 2002 JASSM successfully demonstrated a state-of-the-art anti-jam GPS feature in a test from an F-16 aircraft at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. This test, DT-9A, was the first launch of a JASSM Block 1A missile that included Selective Availability Anti-spoofing Module (SAASM) technology. This component will be included in JASSM production vehicles made in Lot 2 in 2004. The upgraded anti-jam capability improves JASSM's performance in acquiring and tracking GPS signals in a jamming environment. Nulling enhances the missile's ability to ignore signal noise from multiple directions that might interfere with target navigation. Beam steering provides the additional benefit of focusing the reception pattern only in the direction of the GPS satellites. Lockheed Martin Systems Integration - Owego produces the digital, high anti-jam adaptive nulling and beam-steering GPS receiver.

The JASSM successfully cleared its test program and moved into production. The Air Force suspended testing of the JASSM for about three months after two consecutive failures during test shots on 10 October and 24 October 2002. The first consecutive missile failure in August 2002, was blamed on the Air Force launch crew. Prior to these three failures, JASSM had 12 development and two operational combat test flights successes.

On 14 November 2002 the quarterly Selected Acquisition Report said JASSM had slipped nine months and that its cost had gone from about $3.12 billion to $3.16 billion, and increase of $43.6 million, or 1.4 percent. The December 2002 SAR, released in April 2003, reported that program costs increased $887.6 million (+28.1%) from $3,163.2 million to $4,050.8 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 6 developmental test/operational test missiles for JASSM-Extended Range (ER) (+$6.8 million) and 640 procurement missiles (from 3700 to 4340 missiles) (+$433.0 million). There were also increases for JASSM-ER development and additional capability engine/fuel costs (+$438.6 million).

JASSM began low rate initial production (LRIP) in FY02 with a buy of 76 missiles. Deliveries began in April 2003. In late March 2003 a JASSM was successfully launched from a B-52H aircraft and precisely navigated through its final development test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. This flight test completed developmental testing and positioned the team for the recertification of JASSM for Independent Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). This was the fourth JASSM Block 1A missile with the Selective Availability Anti-spoofing Module (SAASM) technology in an enhanced digital anti-jam Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. The B-52 was the first aircraft to reach RAA (Required Assets Available) in September 2003, while B-2, B-1, and F-16 followed in FY04.

In December 2003 Pentagon Comptroller Dov Zakheim overturned a proposal from his staff, deciding to delay the Navy's production of the Lockheed Martin Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. Navy JASSM production was to slip from FY '07 to FY '08 as a result of Zakheim's decision, which is recorded in program budget decision No. 702R2, which contains revisions, including additional decisions, made to the original PBD No. 702, which covers Navy programs. Zakheim's staff originally rejected the Navy's plan, saying the service had not justified the delay.

In July 2004 JASSM reached Full Rate Production. However, even as JASSM continued to hit milestones some challenges remained. Achieving demonstrated in-flight reliability turned out to be the biggest challenge in the transition from development to full rate production. To address these challenges, the program pulled together the experts from across industry and the Department of Defense to review plans and givefeedback to ensure the type of reliability growth needed to field large numbers of assets in the field. In late Summer/Fall 2004, OSD/Air Force convened an independent Reliability Enhancement Team (RET) to review JASSM processes and system engineering procedures, and to investigate reliability/quality initiatives. The Air Force implemented RET recommendations through a combination of detailed design analysis, production quality reviews, and comprehensive ground and flight testing.

The F-16 testing was moved to follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E) due to lack of an operationally representative software and aircraft. FOT&E would evaluate F-16 operational JASSM capability and address outstanding issues from IOT&E. JASSM Key Performance Parameters were missile mission effectiveness (the ability to survive and kill a defined target set), interoperability, missile range, and aircraft carrier operability. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved moving the Carrier Operability Key Performance Parameter until after Milestone III due to funding limitations and F/A-18 E/F test aircraft availability.

The Air Force extensively tested the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile during 2005 after a break in testing. The JASSM team went back to prove the weapon could deliver on its promise. During flight tests in 2005 the weapon scored nine successes in 11 tests, followed by two more successful flights already in 2006. On the heels of those successes, the weapon finished the year strong reaching Initial Operational Capability on the B-52 and B-1. Approximately 360 missiles per year were planned for full-rate production.

The Navy funding only provided for unique testing for the Carrier Operability KPP and integration aboard the Navy F/A-18E/F including mission planning. Due to higher Navy prioriities and redundancy in mission, Navy participation in JASSM was terminated in FY05.

By 2006 more than 350 JASSMs had been delivered and were in the hands of the warfighter and ready for combat use around the world if called upon. By that time, the Air Force planned to buy 2,400 JASSMs and 2,500 JASSM-ERs with production extending through 2018.

On March 15, 2006 Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, Orlando, Fla., was awarded a $79,950,626 firm fixed price contract modification. This action provides for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) (AGM-158) Production Lot 5 for 70 production units, Lot 5 contractor engineering support and JASSM reliability enhancement efforts (includes 5 dedicated JASSM reliability test vehicles). At this time, total funds have been obligated. This work will be complete February 2008. The Headquarters Air Armament Center Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., is the contracting activity (FA8682-04-C-0060/P00012).

JASSM Program Restructure

In April 2007 DOD reported to Congress that JASSM's cost had increased from $4.3 billion to $5.8 billion. JASSM was one of five programs that exceeded its original per-unit cost estimate by more than 50 percent in 2007, triggering Nunn-McCurdy review. By then, DoD already had about 600 of the missiles on hand, with plans to buy another 4,000. The primary drivers for the cost breach were the addition of 2,500 of the more expensive Extended Range variant (increasing total missile quantity from 2,400 to 4,900) and a reliability improvement program. As a result, even if JASSM performed successfully in its ground and flight tests, the program could not continue unless the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics certifies that it was essential to national security, no feasible alternatives exist, cost estimates were reasonable, and the program's management structure was adequate. The Under Secretary delayed certification pending the test results.

In test flights during April and May 2007, the program experienced four of four test failures, producing an overall missile reliability rate of less than 60 percent. During tests on 30 April and 01 May 2007, three of the missiles missed by up to 200 feet, and a fourth failed to detonate on impact, a repeat of a previously-experienced fuze failure. Developers blamed the misses on "GPS dropout" that compromised the missile's navigation system. The GPS receiver works with a very weak signal from fast-moving distant satellites, and some such dropouts are unavoidable. GPS dropout conditions may occur because of moving into an area with terrain blockage. At times there may be interference from other radio sources or even sunspot activity. When a GPS dropout does occur, navigation systems can give bad track. Following a GPS dropout, a receiver can require several seconds for reacquisition lock.

The program office developed a plan to solve the reliability problems by: (1) implementing a software change to the GPS receiver, (2) correcting a design flaw by moving a cable associated with the weapon's anti-spoofing capability farther away from the engine, and (3) reworking the software code for a key data processor. The program office planned a minimum of nine ground tests in late 2007 and early 2008 as well as a 16-shot test-flight program in the February through mid-March 2008 time frame. These tests were expected to verify the planned improvements to JASSM's reliability. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would evaluate the test results.

Following the test failures, the Air Force officially halted procurement of JASSM missiles in July 2007. No additional procurement would occur until the reliability improvements had been demonstrated. Of the 942 missiles on contract as of March 2008 (Lots 1-6) from the total planned buy of 4,900 baseline and ER variants, 611 have been delivered. According to program officials, if the planned tests validated JASSM's reliability, the Air Force expected to restart procurement by renegotiating the Lot 7 buy.

The Government Accountability Office reported in a March 2008 assessment that the JASSM design was still not stable. The program office was not acquiring drawings, a measure of design stability, because the contractor had Total System Performance Responsibility wherein, according to program officials, the contractor guarantees the missile performance. Component problems supplied by sub-contractors include the missile's electrical systems, warhead, and power system, as well as its guidance kit and engine components.

The USAF responded to the GAO's assessment by reiterating that JASSM remained in the Nunn-McCurdy certification process. The Air Force added that previous independent reviews found reliability issues primarily driven by supplier quality control problems. It was further stated that significant progress had been made towards the resolution of the GPS issue and once corrective actions were validated and verified through continued testing they would be incorporated into additional JASSM test missiles.

During the first of three Product Upgrade Verification [PUV] tests on 31 October 2007 the JASSM flew successfully and detonated at the target. The second of three Product Upgrade Verification flight tests at White Sands Missile Range, NM, appears to have been an unqualified success. The 20 December 2007 test validated hardware and software changes to overcome the loss of the GPS navigation signal in flight, an anomaly that plagued the missile in the three flight tests in April 2007. Missile separation, control surface deployment, transition to stable flight, and engine start occurred nominally. GPS acquisition occurred on the expected timelines, overall navigation performance appeared nominal, and no GPS dropouts were noted. Accuracy against the target appears to have been spot on, and the impact resulted in a high order detonation. The third Product Upgrade Verification flight test was slated for January 2008 to evaluate corrective actions to the navigation anomaly encountered during the first half of the October 2007 flight test, and to test the missile in a GPS jamming environment. According to one report, these three PUV tests incorporated a new "Trimble-based GPS receiver" that will be used in production missiles starting with Lot 6, but this is not well attested.

As of late 2007 the Air Force planned to embark on a series of 16 flights, beginning in February 2008, to characterize the reliability of the missile, which remaine under scrutiny for faulty performance in earlier tests.

The Air Force implemented corrections in Lot 5 missiles; however, the results from flight testing did not meet requirements, with only six of 10 successful missile firings, and a 0.60 reliability point estimate. Due to the less than satisfactory results in Lot 5 testing, OSD mandated a 16-shot Lot 7 reliability acceptance test late in FY09, a necessary condition for the Lot 8 production contract award. Fifteen of 17 missile test launches were successful. One missile failed to detonate and another was not released due to a malfunction within the launch B-1 aircraft.

JASSM Program Developments

The Air Force FY 2009 Unfunded Requirements List [February 2008] included the JASSM Weapons Data Link (WDL). Funding of $23.9M would develops ASuW (attack capital ships at sea) capability for JASSM, with JASSM program recertification pending April 2008. Guidance and Control Engineering provide GNC and simulation support for FOC development activities including the development of a guidance concept that permits JASSM to meet ASUW and moving ground target requirements. This includes defining ISR and WDL requirements, designing a target track filter, updating mid-course guidance requirements, updating seeker search algorithm requirements, updating terminal guidance algorithms, developing detailed models for targets and updating 6DOF simulation routines. The 6DOF simulation changes will be incorporated into the End-to-End simulation and used to evaluate terminal guidance performance against three ship targets and one moving ground target. The HIL simulation will be updated to incorporate ASUW and moving ground target requirements and capabilities. The HIL will be used to verify OPF releases for MAS testing and production.

As of March 2008, the USAF planned to buy a total of 2,500 JASSM-ER missiles. It should arrive in fiscal 2009.

An Earned Value Management [EVM] waiver was granted by the MDA in January 2015. While the contemplated production contract meets the dollar threshold for full EVM implementation, the impetus for continuing with a FPIF contract is not driven by, nor related to EVM purposes. This is not the typical, historical application of FPIF contract type. Instead, under the Better Buying Power (BBP) goals of "Employ appropriate contract types" and "Achieve affordable programs," the JASSM program office is appropriately using a FPIF contract in order to reduce the actual production costs to the Air Force. FPIF will allow the Air Force to share in actual cost savings with the contractor, prevent the contractor from receiving huge profit windfalls, lower the amount the Air Force ultimately pays for missile production, and motivate the contractor to provide satisfactory performance at lower costs. This application of FPIF is not intended to more closely manage the contractor's efforts or costs (as is traditionally done in EVM), but is being used solely for the Government to benefit from any cost savings that can occur. Thus, EVM is not only unnecessary, but is ineffective for this production contract. Nonetheless, the tenets of sound planning and sharing of contract execution data between the contractor and the Government already exist in the JASSM program office. For example, JASSM Production/Sustainment Branch conducts several weekly meetings with the contractor where contract status and schedules are reviewed, as well as actual problems are identified, discussed, and addressed. This disciplined approach that is built into the existing structure of the JASSM program office provides ample insight into the contractor's production contracts.

On Nov. 28, 2016 the State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Poland for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and related support, equipment, and training. The estimated cost is $200 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of Poland has requested a possible sale of seventy (70) AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles Extended Range (JASSM-ER), two (2) AGM-158B Flight Test Vehicles, two (2) AGM-158B Mass Simulant Vehicles, one (1) AGM-158B Flight Test Vehicle – Captive Carry, three (3) AGM-158B Separation Test Vehicles. Also included are two (2) AGM-158B Weapon System Simulators, F-16 operational flight plan upgrade for the Polish F- 16C/D, JASSM-ER integration, missile containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated program value is $200 million.

David Ochmanek of the RAND Corporation, in testimony presented before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate on November 30, 2017, recommended " investing in near-term, here-and-now systems and adapting key aspects of established operational concepts.... . Accelerate and expand procurement of standoff weapons, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER), the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and powered dispensers with guided anti-armor munitions so that long-range bombers can effectively and survivably attack key enemy targets from the outset of a conflict."

Japanese Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera announced 08 December 2017 that Tokyo plans to equip Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) fighter aircraft with long-range cruise missiles amid heightened tensions in the region over North Korea’s development and testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Onodera said in a press conference that Japan would acquire the missiles under the budget for fiscal year 2018 (FY 2018) to enhance the country’s defense capabilities in view of an “increasingly severe security environment”, adding that Tokyo will still rely on the United States to strike enemy bases.

Lockheed Martin's Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) – Extended Range (ER) achieved full operational capability on the F-15E Strike Eagle, flown by the U.S. and allied nations' air forces, the US-based company announced Feb 10, 2018 during Singapore Airshow 2018.

General Robin Rand, Commander Air Force Global Strike Command, testifying on FY19 Posture for Department of Defense Nuclear Forces on 22 March 2018, "The Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade increases B-52 smart weapons capacity by 67%. This capability reached its initial operational capability milestone in May 2016 and added Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) capability in October 2017." Increment 1.2 develops the capability for internal carriage of eight Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) and its variants, to include JASSM Extended Range (JASSM-ER), and eight Miniature Air Launched Decoys (MALD) and its variants, to include MALD Jammer (MALD-J). This increment also develops the capability for external carriage for 12 JASSM-ER.

In 2018 Military (M) Code schedule slipped 11 months, due to software delays from the Military GPS Users Equipment (MGUE) program. In response, the JASSM Program Office was forced to implement an obsolescence fix and began a risk reduction effort to develop a Selective Availability-Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) based receiver that shares 80% commonality with the JASSM M-Code receiver. This approach allows continuation of the JASSM M-Code receiver development, while the MGUE software schedule progresses and also allows JASSM to continue fielding missiles.

The first operational expenditure of JASSM-BL occurred on April 14, 2018. All of the 19 missiles launched successfully and engaged their intended target. two known cases when this stealth missile was used in business: during the attack on the terrorist leader Al-Baghdadi in Syria in 2019, and also during the American bombing of Syrian facilities in 2018. Then the B-1B bomber was used for delivery.

Am Acquisition Program Baseline procurement breach was caused by a quantity increase of 2300 missiles from 4900 to 7200.

On 01 April 2020 Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Florida, was awarded an $818,210,722 firm-fixed-price contract for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) Lot 17 and 18 production. This contract provides for 360 Lot 17 JASSM-Extended Range (ER) missiles; 40 Lot 17 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) JASSM-ER missiles; and 390 Lot 18 JASSM-ER missiles. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be completed by Oct. 31, 2024. This award is the result of sole-source acquisition, and fiscal 2018 missile procurement funds in the amount of $767,485,823; and Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $50,724,899 will be obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity (FA8682-20-C-0001).

The FY21 budget requests $506.4 million to procure 400 missiles, which includes the introduction of our first AGM-158D JASSM missiles, incorporating weapon enhancements and obsolescence mitigation in a single update. With Congressional support, the JASSM production facility expansion which began in 2019 will enable up to a forty-seven percent increased production rate by 2025.

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list

Page last modified: 01-07-2021 17:59:57 ZULU