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RCV-H Heavy

~20 Ton GVW
L x W x H	350 x 144 x 142 in
Transport	two RCV (H) by C-17

The RCV (H) vehicle fights as a decisive-lethality wingman that maneuvers in tandem with its manned-vehicle counterparts or as part of a robotic platoon to destroy all threat targets with its onboard weapon systems. The RCV-H is to weigh between 20 and 30 tons, with dimensions (length, width, height) of no more than 350 x 144 x 142 inches. In terms of transportability, two RCV-Hs would be transported by a C-17 transport aircraft. The RCV-H is to have on-board direct fire weapon systems capable of defeating all known enemy armored vehicles. The RCV-H is considered a nonexpendable weapon system, meaning that it should be as survivable as a crewed system.

The Pentagon reported that by 2030, units of combat robots resembling the "Ghost Army" of the Second World War, commanded by General George Patton, will be formed in the American army. The "ghost Army" consisted of fake equipment and soldiers disguised as foreign troops and was intended to mislead the enemy.

Robotic combat vehicles currently under development will eventually be entrusted with front-line reconnaissance, participation in battles with the same robots, live soldiers, and even with enemy armored units. Thus, a light robotic combat vehicle (RCV-L) will help infantry and engineering units by delivering ammunition and heavy weapons, and a larger one – RCV-H – will act together with tank units and infantry fighting vehicles.

The largest RCV-H robotic vehicle will be reliably protected from machine-gun fire and shrapnel. It will be equipped with an automatic cannon and heavier JAGM air-to-ground anti-tank missiles. It will act together with any units of the ground forces, including tank units. The introduction of combat robots will allow the US Army to minimize losses in manpower in the future in the event of conflicts.

Commanders have been frequently forced to sacrifice the amount of detail collected about the operational environment to maneuver quickly; RCVs can effectively mitigate this gap entirely. Commanders, once limited not only by the enemy and terrain but also by the human dimension, both physically and mentally, now find themselves able to consistently maintain their overall operational tempo.

Unlike their manned fighting vehicle (MFV) counterparts, RCVs are not limited by Soldiers’ lack of sleep or endurance to maintain speed. The RCV can move ahead of the MFVs and quickly secure key terrain, while scouts can move more deliberately behind the forward-line-of-robots (FLOR) and forward-line-of-unmanned-aerial-vehicles (FLUA) to collect on terrain, civilian and even infrastructure information requirements.

By allowing RCVs to make first contact with the enemy and secure key terrain in front of the BCT, commanders ultimately can mitigate both the risk to force and to mission that was previously identified. Yet, while the RCV does enable commanders to maintain tactical mobility, it comes with its own mobility limitations that will fundamentally change how reconnaissance doctrine, specifically intelligence preparation of the battlefield IPB), is conducted.

Surviving first contact and dominating in the dispersed battlespace will require the integration of a range of ground and air systems: semiautonomous, fully autonomous, optionally manned, tethered and untethered. Autonomous unmanned systems will have the maneuverability to travel over complex terrain and environments with greater capabilities than their manned counterparts. These systems will extend the reach of U.S. forces and will allow them to initiate contact with their adversaries under the most favorable conditions. These platforms will extend the maneuver force's understanding of the combat environment, increase survivability and extend lethality. Autonomous systems also will perform some of the dangerous, physically demanding and mundane tasks required of Soldiers.

The Army is making investments in active and passive protection systems that allow for reduced armor requirements (weight), enable pre-shot understanding of the threat and post-shot protection from incoming threats. Vehicle protection applications that optimize passive armor and active protection systems allow for a decrease in vehicle size, thus improving de-ployability, mobility and protection.

The next generation of Army combat vehicles will need to include manned, unmanned and optionally manned variants that include the most advanced protection, mobility, lethality and power generation capabilities to ensure that Soldiers can survive first contact and defeat any adversary.

The modern battlefield has combined the air, land, sea, space, cyber and information battlespace into blended domains as simultaneous operations must be conducted over a dispersed battlefield. This requires the Army to design, equip and train forces capable of defeating adversaries with advanced capabilities to prevail in complex and multi-domain environments. While the Army's current fleet of ground vehicles maintains a tactical overmatch or close parity with adversaries, additional upgrades are proving challenging to these platforms given their current size, weight and power limitations. The ability to add evolving technologies to existing ground vehicles is rapidly diminishing as the weight-bearing capability, power generation and available footprint to support these technologies has exceeded the original design.

During World War II, Germany and the Soviet Union fielded medium tanks [Panther and T-34, respectively] and heavy tanks [Tiger and KV series]. During theh Cold War, the United States fielded what were effectvely heavy tanks [the Abrams], while the Soviet Union fielded medium tanks [T-72, T-90, etc]. While both mounted guns of similar lethality, the American tanks featured greater survivability through heavier armor, while the Soviet tanks sought survivability through smaller size.

The ACT3205 robotic combat vehicle offers the prospect of the best of both worlds - a small, heavily armored highly lethal vehicle. The ACT3205 would be more lethal than an Abrams just by virtue of its main gun, the XM360, which can accept higher pressure ammunition (meaning, it can shoot more powerful/heavier rounds) than the Abrams' M256. USAR has been meaning for quite a while already to replace the M256 with the XM360E1, but several setbacks such as the FCS cancellation and other budgetary constraints got in the way of that (not to mention, when the FCS program was still alive, the plan was to mount the XM360E1 on the Abrams once they finalized the A3 version). The support of higher pressures is mentioned for the XM360E1 only; the basic lightweight XM360 seems to be designed to deliver the same performance as the existing M256, but in a vehicle at half the Abrams' weight.

As for protection, since it doesn't have a crew, it frees up space for electronics and/or stuff like spaced armor to protect the digital vitals. Of course, one can argue that a remote-controlled tank brings its own caveats (see the multitude of troubles the Russian Uran UGV went through in Syria, such as intempestive disconnects and reduced visibility/attack range). Uran 9 should not be used as a scale/show of proper military grade UGV capabilities as the company behind it was almost a scam, and there were even arrests of company managers.