KC-X - Boeing Protest Factor 5 - Integrated Assessment
The model used by the Air Force to judge tanker "fleet effectiveness" was developed and is maintained by Northrop Grumman. The mission scenarios and operational constraints to be used with the model issued in the draft RFP to judge tanker "fleet effectiveness" were based upon the 2005 Air Mobility Command "Mobility Capabilities Study" (MCS). Before and after the RFP release, changes to the model's parameters occurred so as to allow a "greater variety of aircraft to be considered" -- in essence to allow larger aircraft to compete. However the Air Force promised that it would tie the numerical output of the model back to real-world constraints by weighing "insights and observations." According to Boeing, the inherent complexities of the model made its results inconsistent and un-repeatable and its overall operational relevance questionable.
The KC-X Request for Proposal (RFP) sought to replace aging KC-135s, a medium-sized tanker. A future program, KC-Z, would aim to replace larger KC-10 tankers. Boeing noted that, using ground rules in the KC-X Request for Proposal, nearly twice as many KC-767s can be based on a parking ramp compared to the competitor's oversized aircraft. Those additional KC-767s will provide more critical fuel to receiver aircraft closer to the fight while requiring fewer bases to support tanker operations.
During the KC-X acquisition process, Boeing stated that it was led to believe that its 767 was the appropriate platform to offer, since it appeared to answer precisely the Air Force's requirements. Yet the KC-30 is much larger than the KC-767 and even 27% larger than the KC-10. Boeing contends that this excess capacity sacrificed fundamental Air Force requirements of deployability and survivability. Boeing stated that flaws in this procurement resulted in a significant gap between the aircraft the Air Force originally set out to procure -- a medium-sized tanker to replace the KC-135, as stated in the RFP -- and the much larger Airbus A330-based tanker it ultimately selected. To Boeing it was clear that frequent and often unstated changes during the course of the competition -- including manipulation of evaluation criteria and application of unstated and unsupported priorities among the key system requirements -- resulted in selection of an aircraft that was radically different from that sought by the Air Force and inferior to the Boeing 767 tanker offering.
Northrop Grumman contends that the size of the proposed tanker aircraft was not dictated by the Air Force nor was size an established criteria -- each contractor was free to propose the best solution and platform to meet Air Force warfighter requirements. Both contractors had ample opportunity in the protracted acquisition and source selection process to propose the best aerial refueling capability to meet the warfighter's requirements.
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