Military

CSAR-X Contract Award

Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal represented the "best value" based on consideration of four evaluation factors: (1) mission capability, including (in descending order of importance) subfactors for Block 0 aircraft performance, system architecture and software, systems engineering, product support, management/schedule and Block 10 aircraft performance; (2) proposal risk; (3) past performance; and (4) cost/price. The solicitation further provided that, for evaluation purposes, cost/price would be calculated on the basis of the Most Probable Life Cycle Cost (MPLCC) for the aircraft, which was comprised not only of the cost/price of system development and demonstration and of production, but also of O&S costs and other life cycle costs.

After conducting several rounds of written and oral discussions--including several face-to-face "debriefings" during which offerors were advised of the agency's current evaluation of their technical proposals and past performance -- and after a flight evaluation to assess the current capability of the offerors' baseline aircraft, the Air Force requested final proposal revisions (FPR) by September 18, 2006.

Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal represented the "best value" based on consideration of four evaluation factors: (1) mission capability, including (in descending order of importance) subfactors for Block 0 aircraft performance, system architecture and software, systems engineering, product support, management/schedule and Block 10 aircraft performance; (2) proposal risk, assessed at the subfactor level, and focusing on weaknesses associated with an offeror's proposed approach and the resulting potential for disruption of schedule, increased cost, degradation of performance, the need for increased government oversight, and the likelihood of unsuccessful contract performance; (3) past performance; and (4) cost/price.

Of particular importance, the solicitation provided that, for evaluation purposes, cost/price would be calculated on the basis of the Most Probable Life Cycle Cost (MPLCC) for the aircraft, comprised of the cost/price of: (1) system development and demonstration (SDD); (2) the award fee; (3) production; (4) operations and support (O&S); (5) other government costs; and (6) proposal risk adjustments, based on a quantification in terms of schedule and cost of the impact of the technical, programmatic and schedule risk of the offeror's proposed approach. Mission capability, proposal risk and past performance were of equal importance and, when combined, were "significantly more important than" cost/price.

Boeing, Sikorsky and LMSI submitted initial proposals by the November 5, 2005 closing time. Boeing proposed the twin-rotor HH-47 helicopter, an updated version of the MH-47G helicopter, part of a family of helicopters that have been in production and flying for over 40 years. LMSI proposed the single-rotor US101 helicopter, a version of the EH-101, military versions of which are in military service with the United Kingdom. Sikorsky proposed the single-rotor S-92 helicopter, currently in commercial use to ferry personnel to and from off-shore oil platforms and used by the United Kingdom, Canada and several other governments for maritime search and rescue.

On 09 November 2006 the Boeing Company's HH-47 helicopter was selected by the US Air Force as the winner of the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) program competition. The CSAR program called for initial operational capability of the HH-47 aircraft in 2012. The program will take place in two parts. The first increment, Block 0, will deliver an improved capability. The Initial Operational Capability with 10 aircraft is scheduled for 2012. If the Department of Defense exercises the second increment, Block 10, the acquisition program could continue through 2019.

Based on the evaluation results, the source selection authority (SSA) determined that Boeing's proposal represented the "best value." In this regard, the SSA noted that LMSI's proposal had received a high risk rating under the Block 0 performance subfactor due to [DELETED]. According to the SSA, since "[DELETED]," he "saw no reason to take on that HIGH level of risk." In addition, the SSA noted that LMSI had received a little confidence rating for past performance due to unsatisfactory performance under its current contract for the VH-71 Presidential helicopter, which was evaluated as the most highly relevant to this procurement. According to the SSA, LMSI had "show[n under that contract] that it could not reliably meet important schedule requirements and had difficulty in systems engineering flow-downs to their subcontractors." The SSA, noting the "stronger proposals offered by Boeing and Sikorsky," concluded that the "modest" MPLCC savings associated with LMSI's proposal were outweighed by LMSI's high risk rating under the Block 0 performance subfactor and little confidence past performance rating.

The SSA also determined that Boeing's proposal was more advantageous than Sikorsky's lower cost proposal. In this regard, the SSA emphasized that Boeing's was the only proposal that received an excellent rating under the Block 0 performance subfactor, having received significantly more strengths (including strengths for mission load and occupant protection) than Sikorsky's proposal. The SSA also noted Boeing's advantage under the Block 10 performance subfactor (the least important subfactor), where Boeing's proposal was rated exceptional and Sikorsky's only acceptable. The SSA concluded that Boeing's greater mission capability strengths outweighed Sikorsky's "slightly lower"

LMSI received a past performance rating of little confidence (indicating that a substantial doubt existed that the offeror would successfully perform the required effort) due to unsatisfactory performance under its current contract to design, develop and field the VH-71 Presidential helicopter, a contract evaluated as highly relevant to this procurement. the Air Force considered the VH-71 contract to be the most "highly relevant" contract for LMSI, because the VH-71 helicopter was based on the same helicopter (EH101) as LMSI's proposed CSAR-X helicopter, and the VH-71 contract effort involved a similar teaming arrangement with AgustaWestland. The SSA noted that LMSI had shown under the VH-71 contract that it "could not reliably meet important schedule requirements and had difficulty in systems engineering flow-downs to their subcontractors,", and cited LMSI's poor performance as one of the principal bases for his determination that, notwithstanding its lower evaluated cost/price, LMSI's proposal nevertheless did not represent the best value.

The RFP provided for evaluation of an offeror's deployability strategy under the product support subfactor of the mission capability evaluation factor. The CSAR-X System Requirements Document (SRD) specifically required that the proposed aircraft be capable of being configured, prepared, and ready for loading aboard either a C-17 or C-5 cargo aircraft in no more than 3 hours, with an objective of no more than 2 hours, and that, following off-loading at the destination, the aircraft "be reconfigured and flight ready" within a maximum of 3 hours, with an objective of no more than 2 hours. Offerors were required to demonstrate their deployability strategy both in their proposals and as part of a required flight demonstration. In this regard, the RFP provided that "[i]n order to assist the government in assessing proposal risk, each offeror is required to participate in a CSAR-X flight evaluation of the aircraft they intend to use as the non-developmental baseline aircraft for the CSAR-X program."

Unlike the single rotor Sikorsky baseline S-92 and LMSI baseline EH101 helicopters, the Boeing baseline MH-47G helicopter has two rotors, and in order to load it into a cargo aircraft, it is necessary to remove the rotor blades, its transmission packages, and the aft and forward pylons on which the rotors are mounted. Boeing's baseline aircraft, [DELETED], demonstrated a teardown time of less than the specified 2-hour objective time. However, during Boeing's December 6, 2005 flight demonstration, Boeing's baseline MH-47G helicopter was determined flight-ready 2 hours 58 minutes after build-up began, just short of the maximum of 3 hours allowed in the SRD.